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Summary 
This dissertation investigates the way distortionary agricultural policies, responding to 
political tensions during South Africa’s structural transformation, also distorted the location of 
production. Taking the example of maize, it explores the interplay between changes in policy, 
production and productivity, and changes in the spatial footprint of production. The study covers 
more than a century (1904–2015), so as to include all the agricultural policy phases typical of an 
economy undergoing structural transformation. It finds that changes in agricultural policy after 
the mid-1930s, enacted in response to the political tensions that emanated from the converging 
and diverging interests of groups within the mining and agricultural sectors, are reflected in 
changes in maize production and prices. With the implementation of supportive policies, 
production expanded into areas previously supporting little maize, thereby undermining 
environment-based comparative advantages of production. Using spatial indexes, the study 
estimates that at its peak this policy-induced shift in the location of production reduced 
productivity by between 7.9 and 15.3 per cent. The dismantling of supportive policy during the 
1980s and 90s coincided with the removal of land from maize production by farmers. By 2015 
the area planted to maize had reverted back to the level it had reached almost 80 years earlier 
in 1935, before supportive measures were implemented. But spatial inefficiency partly persisted 
because some production continued in drier, lower-yielding regions.  
After the distortionary policies were removed, some of the spatial distortion remained, 
despite the lower productivity, because of region-specific investments in improving plant 
material, farming practices and infrastructure. So, while some of South Africa’s maize production 
ended up in the wrong places, technological improvements eventually made the wrong places 
more right. Despite the misguided policies, drought-focused research-and-development 
investment in technologies such as hybrid maize generated a sequence of innovations which 
more than quadrupled the maize yield per unit of rainfall between 1950 and 1993. The South 
African case serves to show that distortionary policies carry both short- and long-term costs. This 
is particularly relevant to sub-Saharan Africa, several of whose countries have pursued or are still 
pursuing various forms of maize and other agricultural intervention. The case also offers an 
example of successful adaptation to adverse weather conditions and suggests that a change in 
the location of production can serve as a proxy for climate change.  
Three new historical datasets for the period were created specifically for this study: maize 
price, trade and production data; hybrid adoption, replacement and yield trial data; and district-
level maize output and area planted data compiled from 17 digitised agricultural censuses, 
standardised to current spatial boundaries. Although the datasets are limited to maize, the 
procedures devised to construct them can be used by future researchers to extend the analysis 
to other crops and regions. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die manier waarop verwronge landboubeleid, in reaksie op 
politieke spanning gedurende Suid Afrika se strukturele transformasie, ook die ligging van 
produksie verwring het. Vanuit die perspektief van mielies, verken dit die wisselwerking tussen 
beleidsverandering, produksie en produktiwiteit, en veranderinge in die ruimtelike voetspoor 
van produksie. Die studie strek oor meer as ‘n eeu (1904–2015), sodat dit al die onderskeie 
landboubeleidsfases insluit wat tipies is aan ‘n ekonomie wat ‘n strukturele transformasie 
ondergaan. Dit vind dat veranderinge in landboubeleid na die middel-1930s, in reaksie op die 
politieke spanning wat voortgespruit het uit die gedeelde- and botsende belange van groepe in 
die myn- en landbou sektore, gereflekteer word in veranderinge in mielie-produksie en pryse. 
Met die implementering van ondersteunende beleid, het produksie uitgebrei tot gebiede wat 
voorheen min mielies verbou het, sodoende is die omgewingsgebaseerde vergelykbare voordeel 
van produksie ondermyn. Ruimtelike indekse word gebruik om te beraam dat hierdie 
beleidsgeïnduseerde verskuiwing, produktiwiteit met tussen 7.9 en 15.3 persent verlaag het. Die 
aftakeling van die ondersteunende beleid gedurende die 1980s en 90s strook met die onttrekking 
van grond van mielieproduksie. Teen 2015 het die aangeplante area teruggekrimp tot ‘n vlak wat 
dit byna 80 jaar vantevore in 1935 gehandhaaf het, voor die ondersteunende maatreëls. Maar 
die ruimtelike ondoeltreffendheid het gedeeltelik voortgeduur omdat produksie steeds 
plaasgevind het in sommige droër gebiede met ‘n laer opbrengspotensiaal.  
Nadat hierdie beleide verwyder is, het die ruimtelike verwringing gedeeltelik voortbestaan, 
ten spyte van die laer produktiwiteit, as gevolg van streekspesifieke beleggings in die verbetering 
van plantmateriaal, verbouingspraktykte en infrastruktuur. So, alhoewel van Suid Afrika se 
mielieproduksie in die verkeerde plekke beland het, het tegnologiese vooruitgang hierdie 
verkeerde plekke uiteindelik meer reg gemaak. Ten spyte van onbedagte beleid, het droogte 
gefokusde navorsing-en-ontwikkeling beleggings in tegnologieë soos batermielies, 
opeenvolgende innovasies tot gevolg gehad wat mielie opbrengs per eenheid reënval meer as 
viervoudig verhoog het tussen 1950 en 1993. Die Suid Afrikaanse geval wys dat verwronge beleid 
beide kort- en langtermyn kostes dra. Dit is besonder relevant tot sub-Sahara Afrika waar 
verskeie lande histories of tans verskillende vorme van mielie en ander bemarkingsintervensies 
voortsit. Die Suid Afrikaanse geval bied ook ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n suksesvolle aanpassing tot 
ongunstige klimaatsomstandighede and stel voor dat ‘n verskuiwing in die ligging van produksie 
kan dien ‘n proksie vir klimaatsverandering.  
Drie historiese datastelle vir die periode is spesifiek vir hierdie studie ontwikkel: mielieprys, 
handel en produksie-data, bastermielie aanneming-, vervanging- en proef opbrengs-data, and 
distriksvlak mielieproduksie en geplante area data saamgestel uit 17 gedigitaliseerde 
landbousensusse, gestandaardiseer tot huidige distriksgrense. Alhoewel die datastelle beperk is 
tot mielies, sal die prosedures wat ontwikkel is om hulle daar te stel ook deur ander navorsers 
toegepas kan word om die analise uit te brei na ander gewasse en streke.  
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Preface 
This dissertation is presented as a compilation of 6 chapters. Each chapter is introduced 
separately and is written according to the style of the journal to which it was submitted for 
publication: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Greyling, J.C. & Pardey, P.G. 2018. Measuring Maize in South Africa: The 
Shifting Structure of Production During the Twentieth Century, 1904–2015. 
Agrekon. https://doi.org/10.1080/03031853.2018.1523017 
The chapter presents and discusses an entirely new historical compilation of 
South African maize production data for the period 1904–2015. The 
candidate was responsible for collecting, digitising and cleaning the data 
used to construct the respective datasets and for analysing it. 
Chapter 3 Greyling, J.C., Vink, N. & Van der Merwe, E. 2018. Maize and Gold: South 
African agriculture’s transition from suppression to support (1886–1948). 
In H. Willebald & V. Pinilla (eds.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 
Agricultural Development in the World Periphery: A Global Economic 
History Approach. 
This chapter illustrates the complexity of the political tensions which gave rise 
to the policy transition from implicitly suppressing South African 
commercial agriculture prior to the 1940s to supporting it thereafter. The 
candidate was responsible for the conceptualisation and execution of the 
analysis. Vink and Van der Merwe assisted with background research. 
Chapter 4 Greyling, J.C. & Pardey, P.G. 2018. Hybrid Maize Adoption in South Africa 
During the 20th Century: Policy Failures and Climate Adaptation Successes. 
InSTePP Working paper. St Paul: International Science and Technology 
Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center, University of Minnesota, forthcoming. 
This chapter reports the results of my study on the initial adoption of hybrid 
maize by commercial farmers in South Africa during the 1950s to late 
1970s. The candidate was responsible for collecting, digitising and cleaning 
the data used to construct the respective datasets and for analysing it. 
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Chapter 5  Greyling, J.C., Senay, S. & Pardey, P.G. 2018. Politics, Production and 
Productivity: 20th Century Farm Policies and the Consequences for Maize 
Production in South Africa. InSTePP Working paper. St Paul: International 
Science and Technology Practice and Policy (InSTePP) center, University of 
Minnesota, forthcoming. 
This chapter integrates the results of the preceding chapters and supplement 
them with spatial indicators to illustrate the complex interplay between 
changing farm policy regimes, agricultural production and productivity. 
The candidate was responsible for collecting, digitising and cleaning the 
data used to construct the respective datasets and for analysing it. Senait 
was responsible for the digitisation of the district boundaries and the 
spatial disaggregation and reaggregation of the output and area indicators 
according to contemporary boundaries. 
   
Chapter 6  Summary and conclusion 
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1.1 The structural transformation 
Long-term change in the sectoral composition of economies is both the cause and effect of 
economic growth. This structural transformation is characterised by four interrelated forces: a 
decline in the relative share of the agricultural sector, an acceleration in rural to urban migration, 
an increase in the importance of the manufacturing and service sectors, and a decline in birth 
and mortality rates. The eventual result for the agricultural sector is that agricultural capital and 
labour productivity becomes indistinguishable from the productivity of the non-farm economy.  
This productivity convergence is not always a smooth process and typically goes through 
several stages (Timmer, 2009). Before the transformation, subsistence farming constitutes the 
lion’s share of economic output and employs most of the labour force. During the initial stages 
of development, most workers are engaged in subsistence production and the objective is simply 
to ‘get agriculture moving’ by increasing the output per worker sufficiently for the workforce to 
generate transferable surpluses (Mosher, 1965). Thereafter, an agricultural sector on the move 
assumes a central role in contributing to economic growth: meeting the domestic demand for 
food, supplying inputs for processing, earning foreign exchange through exported surpluses, 
releasing labour for the non-farm economy where it can be used more productively, generating 
capital for investment, and providing a market for manufactured inputs and consumables 
(Johnston & Mellor, 1961). Eventually these contributions also get the non-farm sector moving, 
typically at a faster rate than the farm sector (McMillan & Rodrik, 2011). At this stage agricultural 
labour productivity start to trail that of the broader economy, primarily because of the decline in 
the real value of agricultural produce over time due to ‘the farm problem’ and the labour 
rigidities.  
The former is the outcome of the inelastic demand for food, known as ‘Engels’ law’, the 
continued increase in agricultural productivity (Gardner, 1992). While is the result of friction in 
the agricultural labour market that slow the transfer of labour out of the sector because of the 
fixity of human and physical capital within the sector (Johnson & Quance, 1972). As a result, farm 
incomes begin to fall behind those earned in the rest of the economy, thereby contributing to 
the political tensions typically experienced during structural transformation (Timmer, 2009).  
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When we analyse the historical patterns of agricultural policy, we find that policymakers 
have shown an almost uniform response to these political tensions: supplementing farm incomes 
by protecting them from international competition or providing direct and indirect support 
through subsidies and other initiatives (Lindert, 1991). While such initiatives relieve the tension 
over the short term, they eventually become politically unsustainable given the budgetary and 
distortionary costs, and the declining political importance of farmers because of the continued 
rural-urban demographic transition (Timmer, 1988). In the absence of such support measures 
and the movement of labour out of agriculture, to remain competitive output per worker in 
agriculture must increase, with the result that agricultural productivity and incomes tend to 
converge with those of the non-farm economy. From a sector-level perspective we see 
agricultural value added and labour share converging with that of the non-agricultural sector, 
with the completion of a successful transformation signalled when they reach parity (Timmer, 
2009). 
1.2 The South African transformation 
The South African structural transformation has featured in various cross-country 
comparative studies of specific aspects of this persistent process (see for example Timmer, 2007; 
Losch, Fréguin-Gresh & White, 2012; Vries, Timmer & Vries, 2013; De Brauw, Mueller & Lee, 
2014). In a recent study, Binswanger-Mkhize (2014) regarded South Africa’s structural 
transformation as an example of a failed transformation, since farm and non-farm incomes, 
together with the farm sector’s value added and labour shares, failed to converge after the 
removal of public support to the agricultural sector during the late 1980s and 1990s. He 
attributed this failure to the persistent disparity between small- and large-scale farmers and the 
inability of the mining and manufacturing sectors to absorb sufficient labour. Various authors 
have deliberated on specific components of South Africa’s economic transformation, particularly 
highlighting the agricultural sector’s role in the boarder process of the country’s economic 
development. This has been studied both at both a sector-level (e.g., Du Plessis & Swanepoel, 
1963; Brand, 1969; Vink, 2004; Greyling, 2012) and a sub-sector level (Van Zyl & Nel, 1988). 
However, more work can yet to be done on the structural transformation of the South African 
economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular, most notably highlighting the 
technological and spatially sensitive aspects of this process as is done in this thesis. 
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Subsistence farming dominated agricultural production in the interior of South Africa 
before the discoveries of diamonds in 1866 and gold in 1886. The greatly expanded market for 
agricultural goods that resulted from these mineral discoveries, in conjunction with the limited 
transport infrastructure which provided a level of protection against import competition, gave 
the impetus to get farming in the interior of the country moving. However, there soon arose a 
conflict of economic interest between the farmers and the mining companies. The companies 
were eager to depress the price of agricultural products, especially maize, since they had to bear 
the cost of feeding their migrant workers (Trapido, 1971). Initially the farmers sought to 
counteract this through collective action with the establishment of farmer cooperatives, but only 
managed to do so after gaining enough political influence to secure various forms of direct and 
indirect support. Chief among these was the Marketing Act of 1937, which established the state 
as the sole buyer and seller of most agricultural products, at a price determined with the input 
of farmers and other stakeholders. This and other policy measures, notably the concerted efforts 
to eliminate competition from black farmers, heralded a golden age of agricultural support to 
commercial, aka white, farmers that started after the Second World War and continued until the 
early 1980s. When the farmers’ political influence dwindled after they isolated themselves from 
the ruling National Party by siding with the Conservative Party in 1983 (Bernstein, 2004), and the 
state became unable to afford the various forms of direct and indirect farmer support measures 
(Kassier Committee, 1992), agricultural policy did an about-face. Beginning with the partial 
deregulation of maize marketing in 1988, the gradual removal the removal of virtually all direct 
and indirect support was completed ten years later (Vink, Kirsten & Van Zyl, 2000). 
Many aspects of this still unfolding process have been well documented by numerous 
studies. These studies can be categorized according to their broad themes: those that examined 
macro policy trends and stages (see for example Vink & Kassier, 1991; World Bank, 1994; Vink, 
2012; Vink et al., 2018), ex ante and ex post studies of the deregulation of agricultural marketing 
(Brits, 1969; Van Zyl & Groenewald, 1988; Kassier Committee, 1992; Vink, 1993; Kirsten, Van Zyl 
& Van Rooyen, 1994; Groeneweld, 2000; Vink, Kirsten & Van Zyl, 2000; Vink, 2004; Vink & Van 
Rooyen, 2009; Greyling, Vink & Mabaya, 2015), studies that measure the extent of government 
interventions as subsidy equivalents or rates of assistance (OECD, 2006; Kirsten, Edwards & Vink, 
2007, 2009), and an extensive historiographical literature on the political economy of the sector 
in general (Morris, 1976; Morrell, 1986; Bernstein, 2004, 2013) and the dispossession and 
suppression of black farmers specifically (De Kiewiet, 1942; Bundy, 1972; Wolpe, 1972; Onselen, 
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1988; Marcus, 1989; Hendricks, 1990; Feinberg, 1993; Van Onselen, 1996). Hence South Africa 
provides a well-documented example of how agricultural policy evolves in response to the 
shifting political tensions created by the transformation process.  
1.3 Towards an integrated spatial approach 
Surprisingly, since agricultural production is a location-specific endeavour, agricultural and 
development economists have hitherto paid little attention to the long-term changes in the 
location of agricultural production during the structural transformation. The typical unit of spatial 
analysis in the structural transformation literature is simply the country itself. The structural 
change literature acknowledges the importance of location for farm structure and production 
methods, but it pays no specific attention to spatial factors (see for example Johnson & Quance, 
1972; Chavas, 2001). The agricultural productivity literature that quantifies the effects of 
machinery, fertiliser, improved crop genetics and other factors on crop yields also fails to take 
location into account, hence ignoring the important productivity and output implications of crop 
movement as addressed. Even much of the recent climate change literature assumes the 
footprint of crop production is invariant (see for example Mendelsohn, Nordhaus & Shaw, 1994; 
Ashenfelter & Storchmann, 2010; Deschênes & Greenstone, 2012). The recent study by Beddow 
and Pardey (2015) is a notable exception, which extends the work of Parker and Klein (1966) and 
Olmstead and Rhode (1994) to estimate the production and productivity implications of the 
spatial reallocation of U.S. maize production during the twentieth century.  
If the analysis is restricted further to explore the link between policy and the location of 
production, the U.S. literature is limited to those who assess the impact of the Conservation 
Reserve Programme (CRP). Through this programme the U.S. government pays farmers to 
remove cropland from production as a way to reduce land erosion, improve water quality and 
effect wildlife benefits. Studies on this topic focus on measuring either the overall economic 
impact of the program (Sullivan et al., 2004) or the unintended consequences thereof, and 
aspects that are implicitly spatial in nature such as the ‘slippage effect,’ whereby less productive 
land is removed from production while more productive land is retained or brought in to 
agriculture (Wu, 2005). 
Long-term changes in the location of South African agricultural production have not 
received specific attention in the literature, although some studies have linked spatial changes in 
production to the distortionary agricultural policies in effect during the late-1930s to 1990s. For 
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example, Brits (1969), Kassier CommIttee (1992), and Van Zyl, Fényes & Vink (1992) argued that 
supportive agricultural policies incentivised the expansion of maize, and other crops, into 
marginal areas that would not have been cultivated otherwise (Brits, 1969; Kassier Committee, 
1992; Van Zyl, Fényes & Vink, 1992). Some also argued that these spatial production distortions 
were reversed after the removal of the distortionary policies, bringing substantial productivity 
gains as a result (Groenewald, 2000; Vink, 2012). However, none of these studies has sought to 
quantify the precise nature, timing and extent of these spatial changes, the technological aspects 
associated with the changes, or their crop production and productivity implications, gaps this 
study attempts to fill. 
1.4 Main objective and contribution 
This dissertation reports the results of an investigation into the policy-induced distortions 
in the location of agricultural production in South Africa. It explores the complex interplay 
between changing agricultural policy regimes, agricultural production and productivity, and 
changes in the spatial footprint of production, taking the perspective of maize, the principal 
South African field crop. The study covers a period of more than a century (1904–2015), a period 
that encompasses many of the agricultural policy phases that characterise the structural 
transformation of an economy. Through the application of recent advances in spatial analytical 
methods, this study measures the physical movement of maize production and quantifies the 
productivity impact thereof. This makes it possible to estimate the spatial impact of the shifting 
orientation of agricultural policies experienced by the sector during this time. To this end, the 
late 1930s, as the period prior to the implementation of the various supportive policies, serves 
as a reference point to which the subsequent spatial changes in response to the implementation 
and removal of the various distortionary policies can be compared.  
In showing how the location of production is linked to changes in policy regimes, the study 
contributes to the structural transformation literature by demonstrating that political tensions 
also carry a spatial impact, the extent of which can be measured and the productivity impact 
quantified. The study also illustrates the complexity of the stakeholder interactions that give rise 
to the political tensions and eventual supportive agricultural policy measures that result. In 
addition the study shows how region-specific investments in improvements in plant material, 
farming practices and infrastructure enabled the changes in the location of production.  
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The study was made possible by the use of a newly constructed database of South African 
maize statistics spanning the period 1904–2018 that I compiled for this study. Not only does this 
new historical compilation encompass an extensive time period in a consistent manner, but in its 
construction I fully documented the sources of all data entries, and coded the data cleaning and 
spatialization of the series whenever possible. This makes it possible to replicate the results and 
apply the processes and procedures developed for this study to other commodities and census 
indicators.  
The database consists of three components. The first spans more than a century (1904–
2015) and distinguishes between the maize output and area planted by commercial (large-scale, 
historically white) and smallholder (small-scale, historically black) farmers, and also between 
white and yellow maize. The second component involved the digitisation, cleaning and 
spatialising of agricultural census reports spanning the period 1918 to 2007, the year of latest 
such report. This in itself was a large undertaking, given that the database includes 17 agricultural 
censuses that span nine decades and were unusable in their raw form because of various 
reporting and boundary inconsistencies. However, new analytical and mapping techniques 
enabled me to standardise the data spatially in accordance with a current set of spatial 
boundaries. The third component is a newly constructed spatially disaggregated dataset on the 
adoption of hybrid maize. It includes both the initial adoption of the state-developed hybrid 
varieties and their replacement by so-called ‘elite’ private-sector hybrids. This new data 
compilation also includes the results of early period yield trials. 
1.5 Chapter overview and objectives 
This dissertation consists of six chapters, of which Chapters 2 to 5 have been developed as 
standalone publishable pieces. While the structural transformation of the South African 
agricultural economy serves as a foundational and unifying theme of this study, the 
transformation process per se does not feature with equal prominence in each of chapters. 
Chapter 2 deals with the first objective of this study, which was to measure South African 
maize production and area planted during the twentieth century. The South African maize sector 
has for many years accounted for a significant share of the country’s overall agricultural 
economy, accounting for 82.5 per cent of the 3.67 million hectares sown to cereal crops in 2015 
and an average of 50.6 per cent of the country’s cropped area over the period 1948–2007 
(Liebenberg, 2012; DAS, 2017). However, in seeking to provide a broad contextual overview of 
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the industry, I found that there was little consensus in the literature on the true extent of South 
African output and area planted, especially if viewed over the longer term. The disagreement 
stems from the dualistic (arguably pluralistic) structure of South African agriculture, which is 
made up large commercial farmers and various groups of smallholders. During the past century, 
the output and area planted by the two types of farmers have been reported in varying degrees 
of detail, frequency and accuracy. In addition, historical datasets often do not differentiate 
between white and yellow maize production and area planted, the relative shares of which show 
significant temporal and spatial differences. 
The chapter presents and discusses an entirely new historical compilation of South African 
maize production data for the period 1904–2015. The dataset includes commercial and 
smallholder production indicators, with the latter disaggregated into homeland and non-
homeland smallholders wherever possible. Production is disaggregated into their respective 
output, area planted and yield components. The data sources are carefully described, and the 
apparent limitations and other issues with the data are discussed. In addition to the national 
aggregates, the data are also disaggregated into their white and yellow maize components in 
accordance with the current nine provinces for the period 1960–2015. 
Chapter 3 illustrates the complexity of the political tensions which gave rise to the policy 
transition from implicitly suppressing South African commercial agriculture prior to the 1940s to 
supporting it thereafter. This is analysed from the perspective of the maize industry during the 
period after the discovery of gold in 1886 up to the start of apartheid in 1948. To date numerous 
scholars have studied aspects of the political tensions that emerged during the transformation 
of the economy, but from the perspective of specific stakeholder interactions or specific 
agricultural policies (Trapido, 1971, 1978; Morrell, 1986, 1988; Bundy, 1988). However, 
stakeholder interactions are yet to be analysed from the perspective of the overall structural 
transformation of the country’s agricultural economy. To this end I integrate the existing 
literature and supplement it with new data, compiled by way of this study, such as the aggregate 
maize production and trade indicators, and also by other authors, notably the data on 
government research and support spending compiled by Liebenberg (2012). Collectively, the 
existing literature and the new data sources enable an analysis of the complex interactions 
between the three main stakeholder groups–white farmers, black farmers and the mining 
interests–to show how their shared or conflicting interests shaped agricultural policy during the 
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first half of the twentieth century, thereby determining the agricultural policy agenda for the 
next half century. 
Recent work on structural transformation processes has shown that while the process itself 
can be described according to several stylised facts, the same cannot be said for the policies that 
support or inhibit it, since these policies tend to be shaped by underlying, often country-specific, 
fundamentals (Losch, Fréguin-Gresh & White, 2011, 2012). The South African case illustrates 
both the complexity of the country-specific fundamentals that drove the policy formation 
process and their long-term effects on subsequent policy and economic outcomes. 
Chapter 4 reports the results of my study on the initial adoption of hybrid maize by 
commercial farmers in South Africa during the 1950s to late 1970s. Technological change is an 
intrinsic, and important, feature of any agricultural transformation process (Schultz, 1964; Alston 
& Pardey, 2018). Unlike the case of the U.S., where the topic has received substantial scholarly 
attention (Griliches, 1957a, 1960, 1980; Dixon, 1980; Sutch, 2011), the South African case is yet 
to be studied from an economic perspective. To this end I used my new historical compilation of 
national and subnational hybrid adoption rates, relative hybrid and non-hybrid yields and the 
relative share of private and publicly developed hybrid maize varieties in an effort to answer 
some important questions. 
The first question was why South African hybrid maize adoption lagged behind the US by 
almost two decades despite the early efforts to import US breeding material and an active hybrid 
breeding programme. To this end I compare the institutional structures and adoption rates of 
the two countries. The second question was whether South African hybrid adoption varied 
among regions in both the rate and timing of adoption, as Griliches (1957) found to be the case 
in the United States. I also applied and extended my dataset to test and refine Sutch’s (2011) 
hypothesis that the revealed drought advantage of hybrid maize acted as a major driver of the 
initial adoption of the technology. Building on this, I also explored the effectiveness of the South 
African breeding programme in improving the drought tolerance of hybrid maize. I quantified 
this using a simple yet informative rainfall productivity index, which is commonly used by soil 
scientists (see for example Bennie, Hoffman & Coetzee, 1995). And lastly, I studied the 
replacement of so-called public hybrids with elite private hybrids, to provide more detail on the 
institutional failures in the South African hybrid seed industry.  
In Chapter 5 I realise the fourth and final objective of this study, which was to integrate the 
results of the preceding chapters and supplement them with spatial indicators to illustrate the 
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complex interplay between changing farm policy regimes, agricultural production and 
productivity. I analysed the policy-production-productivity interactions in three steps. The first 
step was to test the temporal concordance between changes in policy and production, to 
establish whether policy had an impact on overall maize area planted and average prices. To do 
this I extended the policy context provided in Chapter 3 to the entire period (1910-2015) and 
summarised it as a timeline of the ever-changing policy prescriptions and practices affecting the 
South African economy. I then econometrically juxtaposed this with my 1904–2015 time series 
decomposition of the maize area planted (compiled in Chapter 2) and a newly compiled dataset 
of domestic and international farm gate prices, and net exports.  
The second step was to estimate the shift in the location of South African maize production, 
and to quantify its productivity impact during the twentieth century. I achieved this by applying 
the techniques developed by Beddow and Pardey (2015) to a new database, which I compiled 
from 17 agricultural censuses conducted between 1918 and 2007. This database reports maize 
output, area planted, and yields according to a spatially standardised set of municipal 
boundaries.  
The third step was to integrate the preceding results to determine whether there is 
evidence of policy-induced distortions in the location of agricultural production. Did the 
favourable production policies result in a substantial expansion of the physical footprint of 
production into areas that had previously supported little (if any) maize production? And if this 
was the case, did the total area revert to the geographical areas that were used before the 
implementation of the distortionary policies?  
The results of Chapters 2 to 5 are then summarised and synthesised in Chapter 6, leading 
into recommendations for policy and for further research. 
1.6 Delineations and terminology 
This is a study of the impact of agricultural policy on the location of South African maize 
production between 1904 and 2015. In this study the term ‘maize production’ refers to the 
combined production of commercial and smallholder farmers. Throughout this dissertation I 
distinguish between these two types of farmers, with the latter sub-divided into homeland and 
non-homeland smallholders whenever possible. These demarcations are consequential, and I 
highlight them to the extent that the data allow. I am aware of the value of doing more along 
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these lines than is presently possible, especially when assessing the developments affecting the 
maize sector over the historical long-run.  
Before the democratic transition in 1994, race played a central role in the collection and 
reporting of agricultural statistics. Historically, the Agricultural Censuses primarily reported the 
production of white farmers, but at times also reported the production of black (‘native’) farmers 
in ‘reserves’ and less frequently the production of black farmers on ‘white farms’. In this 
dissertation I have opted to distinguish between farmers on the basis of their location and to a 
lesser extent the scale of their operations, to accommodate the pre-transition categorisation of 
farmers while also making it possible to quantify longer-run trends, first in the structural changes 
after the 1950s, and then in the political and market changes that came with the democratic 
transition. Before the 1960s, for example, the statistical distinction between commercial and 
non-homeland smallholder farmers is not entirely clear, given their mutual dependence due to 
various sharecropping and tenant arrangements. At the same time, white farmers who lacked 
the necessary resources (most notably draft animals) to cultivate the land themselves often 
entered into sharecropping arrangements with smallholder producers (see for example Onselen, 
1988). Smallholders operating in the homelands also consisted of a diverse group of farmers–
distinguished, for example, by differences in the area size of their farming operations–who 
collectively increased their total production during the 1940s (see for example Simkins, 1981)  
In addition, the category designated ‘non-homeland smallholders’ becomes empirically 
irrelevant by the 1970s following the apartheid government’s efforts to stem tenant production 
and the forced removal of black farmers from so-called ‘black spots,’ as discussed in Chapter 2. 
After the transition to democracy, ‘commercial farm production’ refers to all production outside 
the former homeland areas, irrespective of the scale of the farm or the race of the farmer, and 
‘smallholder production’ refers exclusively to production in the former homeland areas. 
The production of both farmer groups was included in the analysis wherever possible, since 
reporting smallholder maize production is one of the main objectives of Chapter 2 and the 
interaction between commercial and smallholder farmers is analysed as one of the key 
stakeholder relationships in Chapter 3. However, smallholder farmers are excluded in the analysis 
of Chapters 4 and 5 because of a lack of available data or reporting inconsistencies.  
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Measuring maize:  
The shifting structure of production during the 
twentieth century (1904–2015) 
2.1 Introduction 
Maize has dominated the South African countryside for decades. Between 1970 and 2015 
an average of 57 per cent of the commercial area in field crops was dedicated to the production 
of maize. In addition to being a major South African feed and food staple, over this same period 
an average of 25 per cent of the country’s maize crop was exported, mostly to Southern African 
neighbours (DAS, 2017). Maize rose to prominence as a South African crop during the latter part 
of the ninetieth century. Given the dominance of pastoral livestock production during these early 
years, plus a lack of suitable export markets, the crop was mainly cultivated for local subsistence 
needs (Vorster, 1952). The market realities for maize began to change with the discovery of 
diamonds (1866) and gold (1886) at Kimberly and the Witwatersrand respectively. Largely 
protected from international competition due to unnavigable rivers and lack of rail infrastructure, 
black and white farmers alike seized the opportunity to supply maize to meet the rapidly 
expanding demand from the booming mining population located in the interior of the country 
(Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018).  
In subsequent decades, the maize industry had a pivotal place in shaping the South African 
political, policy and economic landscapes. The relationship between maize and mines during the 
first half of the 20th Century is extensively documented (see, for example, Trapido, 1971; Morrell, 
1988; Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). This involved the emergence of ‘two agricultures;’ 
one that suppressed the production potential of ‘smallholder’ black farmers (thus undermining 
self-subsistence and ensuring a supply of cheap labour for white farmers and the mines); the 
other that enhanced the production possibilities for ‘commercial’ (essentially white) farmers via 
substantial public investment, institutional and policy support (Lipton, 1977; Bundy, 1988; 
Marcus, 1989; Hendricks, 1990; Van Onselen, 1996).1 Beginning around 1983, in a process that 
                                                     
1 This black-white or commercial-smallholder dualism, which is often used to describe the great divide in South African 
agriculture, is, of course, an over simplification. The dual processes of legislative suppression and support affected both black and 
… 
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lasted until the late 1990s, the government gradually reduced public support to white farmers, 
most notably the dismantling of controlled commodity marketing schemes, once again reshaping 
the maize landscape (see, for example, Brits, 1969; Van Zyl, Fényes & Vink, 1992; Vink, Kirsten & 
Van Zyl, 2000; Bernstein, 2013) as part of the changing political economy for maize farmers 
(Bernstein, 2004). 
Notwithstanding this extensive literature, there are comparatively few studies that assess 
in any comprehensive detail the shifting historical structure of South African maize production. 
Moreover, almost all such studies focus exclusively on the changing production realities faced by 
commercial farming, to the exclusion of smallholder producers. Burtt-Davy (1913) and Saunders 
(1930) provide some initial insights into the early phases of commercial maize production in 
South Africa during the first half of the 20th century, which was revisited some years later by 
Vorster (1952). De Klerk (1983) examined the mechanisation of commercial maize harvesting in 
six districts of the Western Transvaal between 1968 and 1981, while Van Zyl, Vink & Fényes 
(1987) studied employment trends for three major maize producing districts between 1950 and 
1980. Using the conceptual framework laid out by Johnston & Mellor (1961), Van Zyl & Nel (1988) 
evaluated the macro-economic role that the maize industry played in the South African economy 
during the 1970s and 1980s, but did not delve into any details of the structural trends within the 
industry. Breitenbach & Fényes (2000) quantified production trends within the commercial maize 
and wheat industries during the 1985 to 1999 period, including a decomposition of maize 
production into its output and planted area components for nine provinces. Most recently, 
Greyling, Senait & Pardey (2018) evaluated the output consequences of the shifting location of 
commercial maize production in South Africa throughout the entire twentieth century.  
The literature on the extent of smallholder maize production is especially limited. Wilson 
(1971) and Wolpe (1972), commented on the decline of smallholder production in the former 
homeland areas after the 1930s, but gave limited empirical support for these claims. Simkins 
(1981) quantified the value of smallholder agricultural output in the former homeland areas 
between 1918 and 1969, but gave no maize-specific details. 
Here I address the omissions of prior studies, most notably taking a data-centric approach. 
I present and discuss an entirely new, historical compilation of South African maize production 
spanning the period 1904–2015 (see Appendices A to D). My compilation includes both 
                                                     
white farmers, but not all farmers and not all to the same extent. Nonetheless, the parallel land markets created by the 1913 
Natives Land Act made the distinction between black and white farmers considerably more stark than would otherwise been the 
case.  
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commercial and smallholder production, decomposed into their respective output, planted area 
and yield components. In presenting these estimates I carefully describe my data sources and the 
evident limitations and issues with the underlying data. In addition to the national aggregate 
evidence, for the period 1960–2015 I also decompose commercial maize production by type, into 
its white and yellow maize components, and by location, standardising the location in terms of 
the geographical boundaries delineated by the country’s current nine provinces.  
2.2 Data definitions, sources and estimation issues 
The data series I developed and summarize in this paper draws from various sources 
(Appendices C and D). Given the 112 years encompassed by my series, there were inevitably a 
host of data problems to address, including changes in the definition of what was being 
measured, how it was being measured, and in some cases a lack of measures altogether. Given 
these inconsistencies, I endeavoured to cross-reference my final estimates wherever possible, 
using a host of historical articles, book chapters, industry reports and official documents. All the 
primary data were digitized, and all the steps in converting the data to the estimates presented 
in this paper were coded or otherwise documented to ensure data replicability. While most of 
my aggregate maize production estimates could be cross-referenced by at least two sources, the 
same cannot be said for many of the planted area estimates, especially those relating to areas 
under smallholder production. Thus these smallholder estimates are on less firm footing, but I 
deemed them of sufficient reliability and interest to include in my compilation, not least given 
the substantial policy and livelihood implications of this disaggregated production evidence. 
While I drew on a number of different data sources, the preponderance of my estimates 
were derived from three primary sources, namely: 
• The Agricultural Censuses and Surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa and its 
predecessor agencies between 1918 and 2007. This constitutes the main data source for 
most variables prior to 1972, especially those relating to smallholder farmers. The 
digitisation of these Census documents was primarily done by the late Frikkie Liebenberg, 
and used in forming the various versions of the output, partial- and multi-factor 
productivity estimates reported in Liebenberg & Pardey (2012) and Liebenberg et al. 
(2015).2 The enumeration areas for each of the censuses were magisterial districts 
                                                     
2 Substantial further cleaning, (re-)processing and spatial disaggregation of these national aggregate data was conducted by Jan 
Greyling for the spatial maize dynamics analysis reported in Greyling, Senait & Pardey (2018) and the various series reported in 
this paper.  
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(whose numbers and boundaries change over time). Earlier censuses were carried out by 
the South African police (Union of South Africa, 1949), while more recent censuses were 
conducted via mailed or emailed surveys.  
• The Abstract of Agricultural Statistics published by the Directorate of Agricultural 
Statistics of the National Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries serves as the 
main source for aggregate (commercial and smallholder) output and area indicators after 
1972. As pointed out by Liebenberg (2012), the Abstract has always reported the (pre-
aggregated) area and production of both farmer groupings. I cross-referenced the 
Abstract data against SAGIS and FAO datasets, and discuss the discrepancies in 
subsequent sections.  
• The South African Grain Information Service (SAGIS)3 serves as the main source for 
disaggregated output and area data after 1986, both for smallholder and commercial 
farmers as well as for white and yellow maize.  
Appendices A and B summarize the compilation of maize production estimates I developed for 
this study. With respect to the production and area planted by all farmers (i.e., commercial and 
smallholder), my tabulations distinguish between the reported evidence and an aggregated 
version that I developed. Vorster (1952), for example, differentiates between total (commercial 
and smallholder) production and that of commercial farmers, while the respective Abstracts of 
Agricultural Statistics report only total production and planted area estimates (Liebenberg, 
2012). The largest production discrepancies between the reported and aggregated quantity 
totals were in the 1920s, with the maximum discrepancy being 8.8 per cent in 1924 (1,020,000 
tons reported versus 930,000 tons in the aggregated total) (see Appendices A and B). For planted 
area, the largest discrepancies were in 1978 (12.4 per cent, 4,412,000 hectares reported versus 
4,960,000 hectares from the aggregated total) and 1988 (10.5 per cent, 4,736,000 hectares 
reported versus 4,241,000 hectares aggregated). However, I deemed the use of the aggregated 
totals to have a negligible influence on the overall trends and production relativities reported in 
this paper, and so opted to use these aggregated totals in all the figures and discussion in the 
subsequent sections.4 For example, averaging over the entire 1904–2015 period, aggregated 
                                                     
3 SAGIS is a section 21 company that was established in November 1997, after the marketing deregulation of the South African 
maize sector. Its objective is the gathering, processing and timely distribution of reliable grain data. The organisation is funded 
by legacy contributions made to the now defunct Maize, Oil Seed, Sorghum and Winter Cereal Trusts. 
4 Not only were the discrepancies between the two totals generally negligible, use of the aggregated totals also meant that the 
national estimates were directly comparable with the sub-national decompositions presented in this paper.  
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national maize production was just 0.2 per cent smaller than the reported aggregate while the 
aggregated area planted was just 0.1 per cent greater than the reported total. 
2.3 Aggregate, smallholder and commercial production 
Figure 2.1 shows annual production (panel a), planted area (panel b) and national average yield 
(panel c) estimates for all South African maize producers during the period 1904 to 2015. The 
national aggregate estimate is indicated by the continuous solid black line shown in the 
production and area panels, while the stacked bar charts represent the respective production 
and area totals for commercial and smallholder producers. South African maize production 
totalled 328,000 tons5 in 1904 (Saunders, 1930) and grew to 1.68 million tons by 1935. It 
continued its upward trend at an average rate of 2.0 per cent per year thereafter to reach 2.9 
million tons in 1948. The area planted expanded at an average annual rate of 1.9 per cent per 
year from 1935 to 1948, meaning yields were effectively stagnant during this period (and 
averaged 0.6 tons per hectare for commercial farmers for whom I have area and production 
estimates back to 1918).  
Planted area continued to increase after 1948, peaking at 5.59 million hectares in 1964. 
With production expanding at a far brisker rate (3.9 per cent per year) than planted area (0.6 per 
cent per year), annual yield growth averaged 3.1 per cent for the period 1949–1964. The 
continued increase in planted area, particularly after the mid–1930s was enabled by the rapid 
adoption of tractors (and other agricultural machinery). In 1937, South African farmers were 
using just 6,019 tractors, which increased to 20,292 by 1945, and continued growing to a peak of 
173,570 units by 1976 (Liebenberg, 2012). The replacement of draught oxen by tractors enabled 
farmers to expand their area under crop production since it freed up land for marketable 
cropping purposes previously used to feed traction animals, while also increasing the amount of 
land an individual farm family could practically manage within a cropping season (Brand, 1969; 
Van Zyl, Vink & Fényes, 1987).  
Average yield growth accelerated to 3.8 per year between 1965 and 1981, which enabled 
production to reach its second highest historical total of 14.87 million tons in 1981. This was 
despite an average rate of decline in planted area of 0.6 per cent per year, which saw planted 
area falling from 5.59 million hectares in 1964 to 4.93 million hectares in 1981. The adoption of 
                                                     
5 Bosman and Osborne (1924) and the Union Statistics (1960) report a total of 361,169 tons. We chose to use the Saunders 
estimate given that Vorster (1952) and the subsequent Agricultural Censuses are in agreement with Saunders.  
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hybrid maize (in conjunction with other modern inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation) played a 
significant role in maize yield growth in U.S. agriculture during the 20th century (Beddow & 
Pardey, 2015). The uptake of hybrid maize also contributed to the increase in South African maize 
yields beginning in the late 1940s.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Production, area planted and yield by farmer type 
Source:  Authors estimates based on data from sources in Appendices C and D. 
Notes:  No data on smallholder area planted were reported before 1935. The dotted line in Panel c shows a fitted loess 
regression, with the grey area around the fitted function delineating the 95 per cent confidence interval. 
 
Although the first hybrids were distributed to commercial farmers in 1949, hybrids 
constituted only 6 per cent of commercial maize seed sales in 1954. However, their share 
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increased rapidly thereafter, rising to 29 per cent of maize seed sales by 1960, 64 per cent by 
1965, and around 98 per cent by 1979 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018a). Yield growth continued after 
1982 albeit at a slower rate (of 2.0 per cent per year through to 2015), noting the near complete 
adoption of hybrid maize by the beginning of this period. This continued growth in yields saw 
production reach an all-time high of 14.92 million tons in 2014, notwithstanding the continued 
contraction in planted area (by 1.4 per cent per year on average) to just 3.0 million hectares by 
2015. 
2.4 Delving into the maize details 
2.4.1 Smallholder output and area 
For much of the 20th century, black farmers were excluded from agricultural support 
measures, and there were additional, deliberate steps taken to limit their ability to compete with 
commercial farmers for the lucrative consumer market (Lipton, 1977; Bundy, 1988). As Lipton 
(1977) observed, this effectively created ‘two agricultures’; one characterised by a large group 
(by number) of mostly black ‘smallholder farmers’ primarily located in homeland areas; the other 
by a relatively small group (by number) of ‘commercial farmers.’ The reality was often subtler 
and more complex than this. For example, I was able to quantify production for three groups of 
farmers, wherein the smallholder group was split into two sub-groupings; one group operating 
within the homeland areas and the other who farmed on land outside the homeland areas, with 
the former restricted to just 14 per cent of the available farmland by the 1913 and the 1936 Land 
Acts. These Acts also included provisions to restrict labour and rent tenancy, but these 
restrictions were never strongly enforced.  
Smallholder farmers skirted these legislative restrictions in numerous ways. ‘Labour 
Tenants’ for example, gained access to land owned by white farmers and the mines, in exchange 
for providing a negotiated amount of contract farm labour per household per year to the white 
land owners (see, for example, Marcus, 1989). Another strategy for land access off the homeland 
areas involved a ‘sharecropping’ arrangement, whereby black farmers opted to share the 
proceeds of their efforts (typically 50 per cent of production) as payment for access to white-
owned land (see, for example, Van Onselen, 1996).  
Another strategy involved ‘squatting’, whereby black farmers accessed land from 
speculative landholding companies, absentee landholders, and commercial farmers, by paying 
cash rents for the use rights to agricultural land (see, for example, Bundy, 1972; Morris, 1976; 
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Trapido, 1978). Numerous speculative landholding companies were established after the mineral 
discoveries in 1866, and it is reported that they preferred to lease their land to smallholder 
‘squatters’ since they were deemed more dependable rent payers than white farmers (probably 
due to the lack of alternative opportunities afforded black farmers at that time). The amount of 
land accessed in this way was substantial. For example, at the turn of the 20th century, a single 
landholding company owned more than 1,300 farms in the Transvaal, of which a single ‘tribe’ 
rented more than 22 farms, while a Natal farmer is said to have housed more than 800 squatters 
on his 50,000 morgen (42,827 hectare) farm (Bundy, 1972). 
In addition, black farmers accessed land by purchasing it through a missionary who acted 
as an intermediary, given that they were legally prohibited from purchasing land directly 
(Trapido, 1978). This created the so-called ‘black spots’ or ‘Mission reserves’ since they were 
regarded as ‘practically’ homelands outside of the legally demarcated homelands. These areas 
were extensive; in 1916 they encompassed more than 58,000 hectares, with the average mission 
farm ranging from 2 to 5 000 hectares (Beaumont Commission, 1916). The Tomlinson 
Commission (1955) estimated that a total of just under 161,000 hectares was held in this way in 
1955. Ultimately the clearing of these ‘black spots’ by the apartheid government between 1960 
and 1983 resulted in the forced relocation of an estimated 3.5 million people (Platzky & Walker, 
1985). This is also reflected in the smallholder data. Figure 2.2 distinguishes between the amount 
of production (Panel a) and planted area (Panel b) accounted for by smallholders operating on 
homeland and non-homeland areas respectively. Figure 2.2 Panel c reports average yields for 
smallholders operating in homeland areas (1918–2015) and those operating in non-homeland 
areas (1935–1971). Smallholder production showed a steady increase from 265,600 tons in 1918 
to 600,000 tons in 1961. The area planted by smallholder producers peaked at 2.36 million 
hectares in 1944. This increase was partly enabled by provisions in the 1936 Land Act that laid 
down the legal framework for increasing the size of the former homeland areas by 6 per cent. 
Consequently, the state added an additional 3.9 million hectares to these homeland areas 
between 1936 and 1952 (Tomlinson Commission, 1955: 85). Thereafter, the total (homeland and 
non-homeland) area devoted to smallholder farming began to decline, falling to 1.45 million 
hectares by 1965 and down to 366,000 hectares in 1970. 
During the first half of the 20th century, the share of total smallholder production coming 
from smallholders operating in non-homeland areas was substantial; increasing from 38.6 per 
cent in 1935 to a peak of 53.1 per cent in 1956 (while at the same time increasing their share of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2: MEASURING MAIZE 19 
total smallholder maize area from 25.5 to 32.4 per cent). During this period, smallholders 
operating in non-homeland areas doubled their maize yields from 0.3 tons per hectare in 1935 
to 0.6 tons per hectare in 1956. By comparison, maize yields for commercial farmers averaged 
0.6 in 1935, increasing to 0.9 tons per hectare in 1956. Both commercial and non-homeland 
smallholder yields substantially exceeded the yields reported for smallholders operating in 
homeland areas, even though the latter group of producers also managed to double their yields 
in this period from an estimated 0.1 tons per hectare in 1935 to 0.2 tons per hectare in 1956.  
The post–1950s decline in non-homeland smallholder production and the complete 
disappearance of production from these farmers after 1971 (see Figure 2.2, Panels a and b) 
appears not to be a data anomaly. During the 1960s the state endeavoured to reduce the number 
of ‘surplus people’ within rural areas by restricting the operations of non-homeland smallholders. 
As a consequence, these former farmers were left with few options but to become hired 
labourers on commercial farms or work in the mines, thus reducing the competition they posed 
to commercial farmers for land and markets (Marcus, 1989). To this end, the 1964 revision of the 
1936 Native Trust and Land Act included a provision through which magisterial districts could 
declare labour tenancy and squatting to be illegal within their district. For some years this 
provision had been taken up by only a handful of Transvaal districts, but by 1967 labour tenancy 
and squatting practices were banned in 36 districts nationally, including 17 in Transvaal and 19 
in Natal. The number of districts enforcing such a ban continued to grow, such that by 1973 
labour tenancy had been completely outlawed within all provinces except Natal, where limited 
duration contracts were still issued, the last of which was deemed to have expired by 1980 
(Marcus, 1989: 81). 
Maize production sourced from smallholders operating in homeland areas also declined 
during the 1960s to a low of 138,500 tons in 1968, but grew steadily thereafter with a spike of 
production of 1.19 million tons in 1994 given exceptionally favourable weather that year for 
maize production throughout the country. As noted above, during the 1960s the area planted by 
smallholders sharply declined from the 1.16 million hectares in 1965 to a mere 365,700 hectares 
in 1970, whereafter the smallholder maize area more-or-less settled, fluctuating around an 
average of 508,100 hectares from 1971 to 2015 (the last year of available data). Taken at face 
value, the yield data plotted in Figure 2, Panel c indicate that smallholder maize yields for farmers 
operating in homeland areas underwent a structural shift in the late 1960s/early 1970s, growing 
markedly (albeit erratically) from 0.2 tons per hectare in 1965 to a peak of 2.2 tons per hectare 
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in 1994 after a long period of low and only gradually increasing yields during the preceding three 
decades.6 
 
Figure 2.2: Smallholder production, area planted and yield 
Source:  Authors estimates based on data summarized in Appendices A and B. 
Notes:  No data on smallholder area planted were reported before 1935.   
 
                                                     
6 The exceptionally low yield of just 0.8 tons per hectare in 1992 was due to one of the most devastating droughts in recent 
history. For example, Bothaville, one of the country’s main maize producing districts, received only 65 per cent of its long-term 
(1879-2000) growing season (Oct-Apr) average rainfall during that year (Authors calculations drawing on data obtained from 
Lynch, 2004). 
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2.4.2 Smallholder versus commercial maize production relativities 
Figure 2.3 provides details of total smallholder maize production (from both homeland and 
non-homeland areas) relative to production by commercial farm operators. Panels a and b 
express smallholder production and planted area, respectively, as a percentage share of total 
(i.e., smallholder plus commercial) maize activity. Panel c plots smallholder yields relative to 
commercial yields, differentiating between smallholder yields averaged across farms operating 
in homeland areas versus those operating outside the homelands. All the data reported in Figure 
2.3, Panels a and b are taken directly from primary sources (see Appendices C and D). These 
sources report production and planted area data from which I imputed the yield data plotted in 
Figure 2.3, Panel c. The plots in Panels b and c reveal some segments with thicker lines, which 
indicate persistent (and, to me at least, questionably invariant) planted area and yield relativities. 
Even though the data sources report smallholder planted area and yield estimates for all the 
years for which I plot data, it seems that for some years the smallholder area estimates are 
imputed relative to observed commercial production and assumed yield relativities. Bearing 
these aspects in mind, I proceed with an assessment of this new compilation of smallholder maize 
data, being careful not to over-interpret the evidence. 
My estimates suggest that smallholder producers accounted for a substantial share 
(roughly one-fifth) of total South African maize production in the early 1920s (Figure 2.3, Panel 
a). Smallholder production shares declined steadily thereafter, from an estimated high of 23.4 
per cent in 1924 to just 4.8 per cent in 1974, with the lion’s share of the decline taking place after 
1945. The data suggest there was a small, albeit transitory, resurgence in smallholder production 
shares during the 1980s and early 1990s. Panels b and c suggest this resurgence was a relative 
yield not a relative area effect, such that the yields of smallholders grew faster than the 
corresponding yields of commercial operators, while the smallholder share of planted area 
stayed proximally constant relative to the commercial (and overall) area under maize. However, 
the apparently interpolated nature of some of the area data during these decades means this 
measured resurgence should be taken with a pinch of salt. Nonetheless, the overarching trend 
revealed by these data may be indicative of the real trend, and indicate that the share of 
smallholder production in recent decades has plateaued at a relatively low level by historical 
standards, averaging just 4.0 per cent of total production since 2000 (through to 2015). 
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Figure 2.3: Relative smallholder production, area planted and yield 
Source:  Authors estimates based on data summarized in Appendices A and B. 
Notes:  See Figure 2.1. The dotted line in Panels a and b shows a fitted loess regression, with the grey area around the fitted 
function indicating the 95 per cent confidence interval. The thickened parts of the plotted data in Panels b and c 
indicate invariant shares reported in the source statistics.  
 
The relative decline in the smallholder share of total South African maize production, most 
notably during the 1945–1980 period, appears principally due to a contraction in the relative area 
planted to smallholder versus commercial maize.7  
Figure 2.2, Panel b shows smallholder maize area increasing from 1935 to 1944 by an 
average of 3.2 per cent per year, much faster than the corresponding area planted to commercial 
maize (which grew by an average of just 1.5 per cent per year).8 This was partially the result of 
the 1936 Land Act that enabled the homelands to expand their area by 25 per cent by 1952 
                                                     
7 Not only did the maize area planted by smallholders contract, but Wilson (1971), Wolpe, (1972) and Simkins (1981) observed 
that the quality of this land (in terms of nutrient and organic matter content, among other attributes) also deteriorated given a 
lack of nutrient inputs and limited adoption of improved soil management practices.  
8 Annualized growth rates calculated from five-year-centred moving averages. 
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(Tomlinson Commission, 1955: 84). Smallholder maize area declined thereafter by an average of 
4.8 per cent per year from 1945 to 1970. In contrast, commercial maize area continued expanding 
until 1968, and although it then trended downward, its overall 1945-1970 growth rate averaged 
1.7 per cent per year. This was higher than the corresponding smallholder rate, and so the 
balance of maize area shifted in favour of commercial farms during these decades, even though 
both commercial and smallholder maize area was contracting during this period. After 1970, the 
smallholder area share stabilized, and even showed some signs of a small trend increase 
beginning in 1970 when taking the area relativities in Figure 2.3, Panel c at face value.  
The smallholder-to-commercial yield relativities plotted in Figure 2.3, Panel c are revealing, 
even after setting aside the reported primary data that appear to be concocted by various (and 
changing) rules of thumb (see the questionably invariant thicker portions of the plotted yield 
relativities). Prior to 1960, the maize yields of smallholders operating in homeland areas averaged 
just 28 per cent of the corresponding yields of commercial farmers. Notably, during this same 
period the yields of smallholder producers operating on land outside the homelands were much 
higher, averaging 67 per cent of the corresponding commercial yields. If true, this begs the 
question, why this marked difference in yield relativities? Did smallholders operating in non-
homeland areas tend to be more educated, more skilful and more entrepreneurial than their 
homeland counterparts? Did they have access to better land, better roads and storage 
infrastructure, better credit and better technologies and knowhow? For instance, perhaps non-
homeland farmers, during the period they were able to retain access to land, benefited from 
being in close physical proximity to an economically dynamic commercial farmers.9 Or were there 
other factors in play, including measurement issues? For example, it may have been easier for 
statistical agencies to obtain a more complete assessment of the quantity of production (and 
planted area) of those operating in non-homeland areas versus those operating in homeland 
areas with less formal marketable surpluses and relatively more subsistence production which, 
by its consumed-where-grown nature, is intrinsically more difficult to measure. For example, the 
Tomlinson Commission (1955: 84) noted the possibility of measurement error in their production 
estimates since smallholders typically consumed some of their crop as green maize (corn on the 
cob), and it is uncertain if green maize production was included in the reported estimates. 
                                                     
9 Notably, not all commercial (white) farmers were “progressive” with respect to the adoption of the new technologies and 
farming practises (see, for example, Schirmer, 2005); however at least elsewhere in the world there is clear evidence of a 
proximity effect when it comes to the speed of adoption of improved production practices (e.g., Lindner, Pardey & Jarrett, 1982). 
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The trend in the reported yield relativities over the past several decades, if true, opens up 
another, important, and policy-relevant, line of inquiry for later work. The decline in relative 
smallholder yields during the period 1995–2005 reflect growing commercial yields versus 
declining smallholder yields over this period (an annual increase of 2.7 versus a decline of 6.7 per 
cent, respectively, derived from Appendix A and B). The growth in commercial yields during this 
period coincided with the dismantling of the agricultural marketing schemes and the 
liberalization of international trade. Vink et al. (2018) argue that at least some of the substantial 
rate of growth in (national) average commercial yields during this time may well have been the 
result of a reduction of maize planted in more marginal production areas, which was then planted 
to pastures or alternative crops such as sunflower and soybeans. Notably, my new data 
compilation (Figure 2.5, Panel b) shows a substantial contraction of maize area in the relatively 
drier, and relatively lower yielding, Northwest province.  
2.4.3 White and yellow maize 
Not only is South African maize production bifurcated between commercial and 
smallholder producers, it is also divided into white and yellow maize production, each with its 
own distinctive supply and demand dynamics. White maize is predominantly used for human 
consumption (74 per cent in 2015), while yellow maize is largely used for animal feed (88 per 
cent), particularly poultry and beef (Grain SA, 2018a). Notwithstanding the distinctive end use 
and other economic and food security implications of white versus yellow maize, production data 
that distinguishes between these two types of maize are only available for commercial farmers.  
The annual data used in this sub-national (provincial) compilation are compatible with the 
corresponding national data, all of which are sourced from Breitenbach & Fényes (2000) for the 
period 1986–1988, and SAGIS (2017) for the period 1989 to 2015. Data that distinguish between 
white and yellow maize production for the South African commercial sector prior to 1986 are 
especially limited. Nonetheless, I was able to compile such data for three census years—namely 
1960, 1971 and 1976 — from the Agricultural Census reports. I standardized the spatial 
representation of the entire 1960 to 2015 series using the present (nine) provincial boundaries 
that came into force in 1994.10  
In 1960 commercial maize farmers planted 56.9 per cent of their total maize area to white 
maize (Figure 2.4, Panel a). With white maize yields at this time around 20 per cent higher than 
                                                     
10 See Greyling, Senay & Pardey, (2018) and Senay et al. (2018) for details on the methods we developed and deployed to spatially 
standardize these production data. Note, prior to 1994 there were only four provinces in South Africa.  
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the corresponding national average yellow maize yields (Figure 2.4, Panel c), this meant that 60.7 
per cent of commercial maize production was white maize. Indeed, for all of the post–1960 
period plotted in Figure 2.4, Panel a, the commercial area planted to white maize exceeded the 
area planted to yellow maize, However, the data suggest that the (relative) area planted to white 
versus yellow maize areas went through two distinct phases. During the period 1960 to 2005 the 
commercial area planted to both yellow and white maize declined. However, the yellow maize 
area contracted at a faster rate than the white maize area, such that the relative area planted to 
yellow maize declined. During the decade after 2005 for which I have data, the area planted to 
white maize stabilized (albeit with significant year-on-year variation around the decade average 
area) while the area planted to yellow maize increased slowly, especially after 2011. Thus, in 
more recent decades, the balance of commercial maize area has shifted in favour of yellow maize. 
For example, in 2003 a contemporary peak of 70.1 per cent of the commercial maize was planted 
to white maize, which dropped steadily to just 54.6 per cent in 2015 (Figure 2.4, Panel a).  
The move towards yellow maize production (Figure 2.4, Panel b) has been even more 
pronounced than the move towards yellow maize area. This is because yellow maize yields have 
been rising faster than white maize, part of a long-run trend since at least the 1960s, such that 
by 2015 the three-year centred average yellow maize yield was 4.9 tons per hectare, 1.0 ton (20 
per cent) more than the corresponding white maize yield, which averaged 3.9 tons per hectare.  
Several structural economic and technological factors are likely at play here. On the 
demand side, the shift in favour of yellow versus white maize reflects part of a broader change 
in dietary preferences. Whereas direct human consumption of white maize is still a significant 
source of calories in South Africa (FAO, 2018), in more recent years calories from white maize 
have given way to a preference for bread, rice and potatoes as per capita incomes have grown 
and urbanization has increased. In addition, the increase in meat consumption, and especially 
poultry consumption (Ronquest-Ross, Vink & Sigge, 2015; BFAP, 2017), has in turn increased the 
demand for livestock feed, and especially yellow maize as a major ingredient in livestock feed 
rations.11  
                                                     
11 For example, (DAS, 2017) reports that the 76 per cent increase in South African per capita poultry consumption from 2003 to 
2015 has spurred a growth in the demand for yellow maize, which constitutes between 40 and 60 per cent of poultry rations. 
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Figure 2.4: Yellow and white maize production from commercial farms 
Source: 1960, 1971 and 1976 from Agricultural Census; 1986–1990 from Breitenbach & Fényes, (2000); and 1991–2015 from 
SAGIS (2017) 
Notes:  The dotted line in Panel c shows a fitted loess regression with the grey area around the fitted function indicating the 
95 per cent confidence interval. The plotted lines joining the census data points delineated by an ‘X’ in Panels a and b 
in the earlier part of the data series represent a linear interpolation by the authors.  
 
A shift of demand in favour of yellow versus white maize is concordant with two supply-
side responses. One is the recent rebound in the area planted to yellow maize (Figure 2.4 Panel 
b). The other is the faster rate of gain in the yields of yellow versus white maize, especially in the 
post–2000 period. In 1960 white maize yields averaged 116.7 per cent of the corresponding 
yellow maize yields, whereas by 2015 white maize yielded just 75.5 per cent of the corresponding 
yellow maize average.  
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Figure 2.4, Panel c shows that yields of both types of maize have been rising; however 
yellow maize yields have been increasing at a faster rate (4.0 per cent per year) than white maize 
yields (3.0 per cent per year) for much of the past half century (specifically 1960–2015).  
There are a complex set of factors that affect these yield relativities, including where in 
South Africa these two types of maize tend to be grown and the technological (including genetic) 
and management practices used to grow each crop. Differences between white and yellow maize 
in terms of the availability of new maize varieties is one stark point of technological distinction 
between the two crops. Hassan, Mekuria & Mwangi (2001) reported that in 1998, South African 
maize farmers had access to 44 improved yellow varieties compared with only 24 new varieties 
of white maize. In part this is because 96 per cent of the hybrid seed varieties used by South 
African farmers in 1992, for example, was developed by U.S. based companies where yellow 
maize dominates (South African Maize Board, 1993).12 Figure 2.5 provides a sub-national 
perspective on the location of white versus yellow maize production throughout the country. The 
figure includes three major maize producing provinces—specifically the Free State (FS), North 
West (NW) and Mpumalanga (MP)—that in 2015 collectively accounted for 83 per cent of all the 
maize produced in South Africa, and 87 per cent of the total area planted.  
Since 1960, white maize production has tended to be greater than yellow maize production 
in the Free State and the Northwest, but the reverse has been true for Mpumalanga (Figure 2.5, 
Panel a). The area planted to both yellow and white maize has declined in the Free State and the 
Northwest, especially since the mid–1980s, while the area planted to both types of maize in 
Mpumalanga is now similar (for white maize) and greater (for yellow maize) than it was 50 years 
ago. All three regions have shown solid, but erratic, growth in crop yields, but again Mpumalanga 
is the exception, with its yields for both types of maize growing faster than in the other two 
provinces. Combining these relative area and yield trends, Mpumalanga’s share of both white 
and yellow maize production in South Africa grew considerably over the past half century.  
 
                                                     
12 Although the U.S. is the world’s biggest maize (corn) producer, white maize production in that country is negligible. FAO (2017) 
reports that the U.S. produces around 400 million tons per year, only three per cent of which is typically used for direct human 
consumption. Hansen (2012) noted that white maize represents just one per cent (around 120,000 tons) of the 400 million ton 
U.S. total. 
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Figure 2.5: Provincial shares of commercial maize production, by type 
Source:  1960, 1971 and 1976 from Agricultural Census; 1986–1990 from Breitenbach & Fényes (2000); and 1991–2015 from 
SAGIS (2017). The plotted lines joining the census data points delineated by an ‘X’ in Panels a and b in the earlier part 
of the data series represent a linear interpolation by the authors. 
 
The province now accounts for about one-third of the country’s entire yellow maize 
production and around one-fifth of the white maize output. In contrast, the Northwest province 
lost ground, and now accounts for a significantly smaller share of South Africa’s production of 
both crops. Among these three provinces, the Free State is still the dominant maize producer, 
accounting for almost half the country’s white maize production and one-third of its yellow maize 
output in 2015. Maize production in the Northern Cape province also warrants attention. In 2015 
this province accounted for only 3.8 per cent of South Africa’s total yellow maize area but 
produced 12.3 per cent of the national yellow maize crop. The 2007 Agricultural Census reports 
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that 83 of the province’s maize production was grown under irrigation (Stats SA, 2010). 
Consequently, in 2015, farmers in the Northern Cape averaged yields of 13.6 tons per hectare, 
4.2 times larger than the average yield for farmers in the Free State. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Over the past century, South African maize production underwent some remarkable 
changes. As the 20th century dawned, in 1904, South Africa produced 328,000 tons of maize. By 
1935 that had grown to 1.68 million tons, increasing to a three-year average of 11.26 million tons 
centred on 2015.13 This 6.1-fold increase in maize production from 1935 to 2015 was achieved 
with an overall 35.7 per cent decline in maize area (from 4.14 million hectares in 1935, peaking 
at 5.59 million hectares in 1964, then falling to a three-year average of 2.9 million hectares 
centred on 2015). What made this possible was an 8.6-fold increase in average maize yields from 
1935 (0.5 tons per hectare) to the 2015 three-year centred average of 4.2 tons per hectare. 
The new historical compilation of maize data I developed and described here, enable me 
to dig behind these aggregate trends to reveal some equally dramatic developments in terms of 
what types of maize are being produced, by whom, and precisely where in the country the 
production took place. The data suggest that smallholder producers (both those operating within 
the former homeland areas and those operating elsewhere in the country) were once a 
substantial source of maize production. In 1942, smallholders accounted for 20.6 per cent of the 
total (i.e., smallholder plus commercial) maize production and 40.6 per cent of maize area. Now, 
in 2015, production from smallholders is a much smaller share of the respective totals (13.0 per 
cent of area and 6.3 per cent of output).  
With the preponderance of production coming from commercial operations, I was able to 
decompose that production into its white and yellow maize components. I show that over the 
past half century for which data were available, the production of white maize has been steadily 
losing ground to yellow maize. This was due to both an area effect and a yield effect, wherein the 
area planted to commercial white maize production fell as a share of total maize (from 60.7 per 
cent in 1960 to 47.6 per cent in 2015), and the relative yield of white to yellow maize also fell 
substantially (from 116.7 per cent in 1960 to 75.5 per cent in 2015). These compositional 
                                                     
13 2015 is an atypical year to use as a terminal production value for this long-run series. There were exceptionally adverse weather 
conditions that year, which particularly affected production in the western part of the country where drought conditions were 
severe and widespread. Hence, we opted to report a three-year average, deeming it to be more representative of the terminal 
production value in this series.  
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developments represent a complex combination of changing consumption preferences and 
technological and locational production practices. I broach some of those elements, but there is 
surely much more that can be done to understand the drivers of these trends, and hopefully 
these new data will spur such studies. 
Maize will no doubt continue to be a dominant food and feed crop in South Africa for some 
time to come. However, significant shares of the crop are now grown in areas that are subject to 
new, and spatially-sensitive, production pressures. In Mpumalanga the land used for maize 
production is competing against alternative uses of that same land—specifically, economic and 
policy pressures to use the land for open-cut coal mining (BFAP, 2012) . A major share of the 
national maize crop is grown in the drier Northwest province, a region which has the highest 
climate vulnerability in Southern Africa according to the IPCC (2014). 14 In addition a sizable share 
of the national maize crop is now grown in the Northern Cape, which is heavily reliant on 
irrigation (Stats SA, 2010). As pressures to use that water for other purposes mount, this 
significant source of production is also increasingly at risk. Continuing to expand, deepen and 
further nuance my measures of South African maize production in the decades ahead will be a 
necessary, but far from sufficient component of improving the myriad and consequential policy 
and production choices that lie ahead.
                                                     
14 One of the IPCC (2014) predictions has the average precipitation during the growing season (December – February) decreasing 
by up to 18 per cent (80mm) along with an increase of 3.1°C increase in the average temperature.  
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Maize and Gold: Transitioning from suppression 
to support (1886–1948) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the progression from ‘suppression to support’ of South African 
agriculture during the early twentieth century (1886 to 1948), revisiting the early part of the 
development of the South African agricultural sector from the perspective of the structural 
transformation framework. To this end the nature of the alliance between ‘gold’ and ‘maize’ (as 
coined by Trapido, 1971), and its subsequent disintegration (as documented by Morrell, 1988) is 
re-examined. The focus is on the evolution of political tensions stemming from the converging 
and diverging interests of groupings within the mining and agricultural sectors, specifically how 
this facilitated the transition from ‘squeezing’ a large but marginalised group of smaller white 
farmers as well as black farmers in general, to the reluctant ‘squeezing’ of the mining industry by 
the state and the eventual complete marginalisation of black farmers.  
The chapter contributes to the recent extension of the structural transformation literature 
that stresses the importance of taking underlying country fundamentals into account with 
development policy formation. The South African case illustrates the complexity of the political 
tensions created during the transformation process and their long-term impact, since these 
played a significant role in putting the country on the path to grand apartheid. In addition, a 
newly compiled long-term dataset on agricultural prices, output and public spending is provided, 
to add a quantitative perspective to the ability of either party to capture the state and a more 
precise estimate of the timing of the disintegration of the alliance. Two previously 
underemphasised aspects of stakeholder interactions at the time are also explored, namely the 
nature and policy impact of the interaction between white and black farmers and the mines 
within the context of shared and conflicting interests, and the changes in the nature and extent 
of support to white farmers during this period. 
In what follows, section two provides an overview of the structural transformation 
literature, while section three expands on the historical background and state capture. The fourth 
section describes the measures put in place by white farmers to stem the competition from black 
farmers. This is followed by a closely related discussion on the land and labour market 
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interventions by the state. In sections six and seven the transition to the controlled marketing of 
maize and other agricultural produce, and increased direct subsidies to the commercial farming 
sector are discussed, followed by a brief discussion of the post–1948 consolidation of support 
and its eventual decline towards the 1990s. The ninth and last section provides a summary and 
conclusion. 
3.2 The structural transformation 
The structural transformation of economies during development has shown itself to be a 
‘remarkably uniform’ process through the work of Clark (1940), Lewis (1954), Kuznets (1966) and 
Chenery & Syrquin (1975). This transformation is paramount since it is regarded as a defining 
characteristic of economic growth, both as cause and as effect (Syrquin, 2006).  
The trajectory of the transformation that industrialised economies transition through can 
be summarised as follow (Timmer 1988): Prior to the structural transformation the economy is 
dominated by farming, largely subsistence farming, since it constitutes the bulk of economic 
output and the labour force. During the initial stages of development, the productivity of the 
agricultural sector is required to increase sufficiently for the sector to be able generate surpluses. 
These surpluses enable the sector to meet the domestic demand for food, produce exportable 
surpluses, release labour to the rest of the economy, and serve as a source for capital and a 
market for manufactured inputs and consumables (Johnston & Mellor, 1961). At this point some 
countries could opt to ‘squeeze’ the agricultural sector through depressing commodity prices or 
increased taxation to raise greater surpluses from the sector, since these could earn a greater 
return if employed by non-farm industries with a greater productivity (Timmer 1988). Examples 
include the suppression of peasants in the USSR (see for example Allen 1996). 
Collectively these enable faster productivity growth in the non-farm economy relative to 
the farm economy, thereby resulting in farm incomes that increasingly fall behind incomes 
earned in the rest of the economy. “This lag in real earnings from agriculture is the fundamental 
cause of the deep political tensions generated by the structural transformation” (Timmer 2009, 
p6, emphasis in original). Given sufficient political influence the sector can lobby for policy 
interventions directed at narrowing the earnings gap – mostly through import protection, price 
support measures and direct transfers to farmers (Lindert, 1991). Finally, the agricultural sector 
transitions to the last phase in the transformation process following the removal of price 
interventions and other support measures, and continued agricultural productivity growth. At 
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this point the agricultural sector is fully integrated into the rest of the economy given 
indistinguishable productivity levels (Timmer, 1988). The income disparity between farm and 
non-farm labour also starts to converge and is eventually equalised (Barrett, Carter & Timmer, 
2010). 
While this constitutes the general trajectory of the transformation, the heterogeneity in 
the underlying fundamentals of individual countries results in different productivity expansion 
paths and development outcomes (Timmer 2007). This sentiment is also shared by the authors 
of a five-year World Bank study on the structural transformation of late developing African 
countries. They stress the importance of taking national characteristics such as ‘…country assets, 
market functionality, business climate, institutional arrangements, overall governance, and 
political stability…’ into account when formulating policy since these determine the constraints 
faced by households who are struggling to escape poverty (Losch, Fréguin-Gresh & White, 2011: 
xxii). Ultimately these determine the timing and extent of the eventual convergence of the urban-
rural productivity and income gaps, where successful countries such as China and South Korea 
achieve a classic transformation, while progress is stunted in others such as India or fails as with 
South Africa (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014).  
3.3 Historical background and capturing the state 
Subsistence farming dominated South Africa’s agricultural landscape for most of the 19th 
century, with the exception of the wool and wine exporting settler farmers of the Cape (Ross, 
1986). After starting their migration to the interior with the Great Trek (migration) of 1838, the 
newly established settlers of the northern interior could not readily join their exporting Cape 
compatriots given a coastline straddled by mountains and the lack of navigable rivers.  
The discovery of diamonds at Hopetown near Kimberley in 1866 and gold at the 
Witwatersrand in 1886 put this initial steady state in flux. While this development posed an 
economic and political threat to the predominantly farming community of the newly established 
Boer republics of the Free State and South African Republic (later Transvaal), the fortunes of 
some farmers were greatly improved through the substantial and growing market for agricultural 
produce in the interior.  
By the 1890s a ‘marriage of convenience’ had developed between wealthy mine owners of 
the Witwatersrand and some of the larger farmers of the interior, especially those of the eastern 
Transvaal. Likened to the union of ‘iron and rye’ of Imperial Germany (Trapido, 1971), the 
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marriage between maize and gold rested on two main pillars. One, because the gold mines took 
responsibility for housing and feeding mine workers, there was a mutual interest in a regular 
supply of, and dependable market for maize. Two, the two sectors had a shared interest in the 
creation and maintenance of a constant supply of cheap black labour (Trapido, 1971; Wolpe, 
1972; Morrell, 1988).  
The development and prosperity that came with the mines was followed closely by the 
struggle for the control of the Boer Republics. Conflict manifested itself in the Jameson Raid 
(1896) that the Republics managed to subdue, ultimately culminating in the Second Anglo Boer 
War (1899–1902) from which Great Britain emerged as victor (Davenport & Saunders, 2000).  
The ‘scorched earth’ strategy employed by Britain towards the end of the war wiped out 
the livestock that were the main source of traction and transport for farmers, and brought 
agriculture in the two Boer republics to its knees. After the war, Lord Alfred Milner as Governor 
of the Orange River and Transvaal colonies was tasked with the reconstruction efforts of the 
agricultural sector. This took the form of the provision of credit for buying land and equipment, 
as well as loans to import expensive cattle, but these efforts were directed at the larger farmers 
who were deemed to have a greater ability to repay loans and the potential to provide the gold 
mines with produce (Morrell, 1988).  
With smaller farmers left unsupported, this gave rise to a class of so-called ‘Boer notables’ 
who employed modern production techniques and made use of hired labour. At the time, a 
second group of prosperous Transvaal farmers established themselves as major actors in the 
industry. This emergent group of mostly English speaking ‘progressive’ farmers consisted of 
immigrants or former Rand businessmen whose social capital offered them greater access to 
financing, the mining market and land from landholding companies (Morrell, 1986). 
While the larger farmers played a dominant role in supplying the mines, the balance was 
supplied by rivalling smaller white and black farmers. At the time land and labour served as the 
major production inputs, with a sufficient supply of labour the greatest hurdle faced by white 
farmers. Conversely, black farmers faced major challenges in accessing land15.  
In dealing with the convergent and conflicting interests, both the mining and broader 
agricultural interest groups lobbied the State to turn its machinery in their favour. During the 
early part of the twentieth century, most of the larger farmers in Transvaal supported Botha and 
                                                     
15 The market competition between black and white farmers and the land challenges faced by black farmers have received 
relatively little attention within the context of the maize and gold debate, hence this will be expanded upon in Section 3.4. 
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Smuts’ Het Volk party, which favoured the mining interests. Het Volk amalgamated with the Cape 
Colony’s South African Party (SAP) after the formation of the Union in 1910 and became the party 
of the progressive Afrikaner farmers who supported the policy to restore relations between the 
historically estranged Boers and British. By 1911 the structural transformation of the economy 
had progressed beyond its agrarian roots to one where the agricultural sector represented 22 
per cent of GDP and mining 27 per cent (Nattrass & Seekings, 2010: 4). 
In reaction to the South African Party’s pro-British and pro-mines stance, Hertzog 
established the National Party (NP) in 1914 to promote Republicanism and Afrikaner Nationalism, 
and secession from Britain for the two former Boer republics. The party was particularly popular 
amongst smaller white farmers who felt left behind by Smuts. The National Party’s victory in 1924 
through a coalition with the (White) Labour Party served as a turning point in the popular 
imagination as the era of a “…white workers government antagonistic to the interest of mining 
capital…” (Davenport & Saunders 2000:300). Morell (1988) argues that this victory added 
momentum to the disintegration of the maize and gold alliance already in motion.  
Figure 3.1 provides a visual summary of the main stakeholders as well as the resource and 
influence flows. The main stakeholders, namely the white and black farmers, the mines and the 
state, are showed at the extremities. Maize is at the centre of this system, with both black and 
white farmers competing to supply the commodity. All three parties competed for both black 
labour and land, while only white farmers and the mines could lobby the state, as represented 
by the dotted lines. The nature of this lobbying warrants further exposition since at least four 
distinct groupings can be found in this process. These include the larger farmers and the mine 
owners, amongst whom the informal alliance emerged, the initially disenfranchised smaller 
farmers and the often-overlooked blue-collar white mine workers. 
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Figure 3.1: The stakeholders with their resource and influence flows 
3.4 Stemming the competition from black farmers 
The impact of the discovery of diamonds and gold was not limited to white farmers. In the 
rush to supply these new markets, African farmers proved themselves more than capable of 
producing substantial surpluses. For example, their output in Natal expanded two-and-a-half fold 
between 1867 and 1894, resulting in a nearly doubling of average per capita output (Lenta, 1983). 
Numerous examples of similar patterns can be found in other parts of South Africa (Wilson, 
1971a; Bundy, 1972; Morris, 1976; Trapido, 1978; Beinart, 1982; Lacey, 1982; Keegan, 1986). 
The success of these farmers created a problem for the white farmers. With simple 
technology and relatively abundant arable land, labour was the critical production factor. Capital-
constrained settler farmers found it difficult to offer wages that were high enough to attract 
indigenous labour, resulting in labour shortages in many regions of the country. They tried to 
resolve this by persuading the colonial government to limit African competition through the 
creation of reserves, to bring about an artificial land shortage using measures such as livestock, 
hut and poll taxes; road rents; location, vagrancy and pass laws; and confinement to the reserves. 
In the process they invoked a Nieboer-Domar system of serfdom, given the context of an 
abundance of land and a shortage of labour (Nieboer, 1900; Domar, 1970). 
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In response to the pressure to reduce such competition, the state intervened in the land 
rental market and sought to reduce the number of rent-paying African tenant farmers, with the 
Glen Grey Act of 1894 the precursor of things to come (e.g. Thompson and Nicholls 1993). It 
attempted to levy a labour tax on all men living in the reserves, and banned the sale, rental or 
subdivision of land by introducing a perverted form of communal tenure. While Africans could 
not access land through official channels during this period, many bought land as individuals and 
in groups as land syndicates. No exact information is available regarding the amount of land 
bought, but there was some speculation that Africans would succeed in buying back all that they 
had lost during the colonial wars (Plaatje, 1987). 
From the perspective of the maize and gold alliance, the parties faced the usual mix of 
shared and competing objectives. Both parties had an incentive to suppress black farmers since 
black self-subsistence posed a threat to the maintenance of the cheap labour system (Marcus, 
1989). Conversely, the mines had an incentive to act in favour of black farmers for two reasons. 
One, the mines and other land speculation companies owned vast tracts of land and favoured 
leasing to black tenants who were deemed more dependable with rent payments. The amount 
of land accessed in this way is substantial given that landholding companies alone owned more 
than 1 300 farms in the Transvaal at the turn of the century with a single tribe renting more than 
22 of these (Bundy, 1972). Secondly, the mines had a possible (probable?) incentive to support 
some black farmers since their competition weakened the bargaining position of white farmers, 
thereby lowering commodity prices.  
White farmers were opposed to black farmers in principle given the competition they 
posed for accessing land, cheap labour and the disposal of produce. Conversely, capital 
constrained farmers at the turn of the twentieth century opted for various tenure arrangements 
that enabled black families to access land and produce crops since access to labour was the most 
constraining production factor.  
3.5 Land and labour market interventions 
The existing racial discrimination in access to land was consolidated by the Land Act of 
1913, which made it explicit that ‘natives’ were only allowed to buy, rent or acquire by other 
means land from other ‘natives’, and white farmers from other whites, thereby creating parallel 
land markets and outlawing other forms of contract such as labour tenancy and sharecropping. 
This caused much disruption to the farm production of the black peasantry (Keegan, 1981; 
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Matsetela, 1981; Willan, 1984; Plaatje, 1987). The main intention of the law, which was ‘almost 
exclusively the basis of the country’s future policy of apartheid’ (Wilson 1971), was to transform 
tenants into wageworkers for the mines, thereby earning it the title of the “…law made for the 
mining houses…” (Davenport 1987). The law was also intended to “curb black farming practices at 
a time when white farming was beginning to pick up ... to check black sharecropping ... and to 
prevent the purchase of land by syndicates of blacks who ... were beginning to move ahead fast” 
(Davenport 1987).  
The immediate effect of the law was to force those African families, who were formerly 
independent farmers on sharecropped land, to accept wage labour and give up their equipment. 
The longer-term effect was to end African farming above the subsistence level and to degrade 
the reserves to ‘dormitories’ (Hendricks, 1990) for a cheap African labour force. The results were 
catastrophic: by 1918 agricultural production in the reserves covered at most 45 per cent of 
subsistence requirements, declining to 20 per cent in the 1950s (Simkins, 1984), while increasing 
population pressure caused African households in the reserves to spend 60 per cent of their 
income on food by the 1920s.  
Appointed under provisions of the Land Act, the Beaumont Commission reported that land 
scheduled for African occupation in terms of the Act was only sufficient for about half of the 
native population, and recommended that further land be released, specifying the areas which 
should be added. As indicated in Table 3.1, the reserves were limited to 7.8 per cent of the total 
land area before 1936. Outside the reserves, Africans owned only 0.7 per cent of the land and 
lived on state and European-owned lands (another 3.6 per cent); thus the total land technically 
available for their use was 12.1 per cent, excluding the mission reserves. This remained 
unchanged until the establishment of the Native Land Trust by the Native Trust and Land Act No. 
18 of 1936. The Trust was meant to release a further 6.2 million hectares (later to be known as 
‘released land’) and add it to the original Scheduled land to increase the size of the reserves to 
13.7 per cent of the country. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3: MAIZE AND GOLD 39 
Table 3.1: Land areas by land tenure systems, 1916 
Tenure system Area (hectares) Percentage 
Native reserves   9,538,300 7.8 
Mission reserves    460,000 0.4 
Native-owned lands 856,100 0.7 
Crown lands occupied 805,100 0.6 
EOL1: Occupied by Europeans 90,314,000 73.7 
EOL1: Occupied by Africans 3,550,900 2.9 
Vacant Crown land2, reserve3 and other 17,002,400 13.9 
Total: 122,526,800 100.0 
Note: 1: EOL: European-Owned Land; 2: Now called State Land: mountains, beaches, etc. where ownership is not allowed; 3: 
Nature reserves. 
Source: Beaumont Commission, 1916, pp. 3 and 4; DBSA, 1990, pp. 34. Excludes Walvis Bay. 
3.6 Towards controlled marketing 
Having traced the initial ‘squeeze’ and eventual marginalisation of black farmers, I now turn 
to the remaining stakeholders, namely the State, white farmers and mine owners, and show the 
multiple complexities of structural transformation in South African agriculture’s progression 
‘from suppression to support’.  
South African maize farmers, both black and white, made rapid strides towards achieving 
domestic maize self-sufficiency after the Second Anglo Boer War. Production more than doubled 
from 360 to 860 000 tons between 1904 and 1911, and continued to trend upwards to reach a 
high of 2.9 million tons by 1948 (Panel a, Figure 3.2).  
With neither the mines nor the greater Southern African market able to absorb the 
expanding harvest, farmers were forced to seek alternatives for their crop. For this they turned 
to the State, under whose supervision just over 42 000 tons were exported to the United 
Kingdom in 1907 and 1908 (Panel b, Figure 3.2). These exports were in part facilitated by the 
proclamation of ‘Government grades’ for maize that ensured the exportability of the 463 000 
bags of 200 pounds each (Bosman & Osborn, 1924: 42). Maize exports took off in earnest during 
the First World War, given the substantial premium that South African farmers could earn on the 
world market, panel b Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.2: South African maize production, area planted and exports 
Source:  See Greyling & Pardey, (2018b) (Chapter 2) 
Notes:  The dotted line shows a fitted loess regression with the grey area around the fitted function showing a 95 per cent 
confidence interval for each plot. 
 
The first cooperatives were established in 1908 and jointly formed the Central Agency (CA) 
for the marketing of their maize. The mines supported the establishment of the Central Agency 
since they hoped that it would facilitate effective marketing and promote efficiency in general, 
and the evidence suggests that they were indeed well served by the Central Agency (Morrell 
1988). It was also hoped that such an agency would strengthen the bargaining position of cash-
strapped small farmers who had to accept the price offered by their local merchant or traveling 
buyers (Brits, 1969). Cooperatives did not buy or sell the maize on their own account but merely 
acted as agents on behalf of their members. Farmers were paid an advance by the cooperatives 
upon delivery, and received the balance at the end of the marketing season once the relevant 
costs were deducted. This practice proved problematic since cooperatives often found 
themselves in a difficult financial position because of either paying out over-generous advances 
and/or inefficient management and administration. As a result, the cooperative movement 
struggled to gain traction among bigger farmers: by 1922 membership totalled some 6 300 
farmers who sold but 10 per cent of the total crop (Brits, 1969).  
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The export expansion failed to support the South African maize price during the War, 
however, since it trailed the U.S. price by more than 42 per cent ($250 per ton) at its 1916 peak. 
South African farmers struggled to gain traction on the world market given their low yields and 
limited infrastructure: South African farmers averaged a yield of 0.7 ton per ha nationally in 1925, 
with their counterparts in Argentina and U.S. achieving more than double that at 1.6 and 1.5 
respectively (Saunders, 1930). While the main rail lines from the ports to the interior had been 
completed by 1902, most of the branch lines critical for exports on a substantial scale were only 
added between 1905 and 1930. The expansion was substantial with 12 460 km of track added 
during this period, representing 64 per cent of all the lines built in South Africa up to that point 
(De Swardt, 1983). The construction of grain silos (elevators) along the railway lines in the main 
maize producing regions followed during the 1920s. Four elevators had been completed by 1925 
in the eastern Transvaal towns of Bethal, Balfour, Kinross, and Middelburg (De Swardt, 1983; 
Morrell, 1988). Attempts were also made to stimulate exports through preferential rail rates to 
the ports and subsidised ocean freight rates. The state went so far as to task a Union Government 
representative in London with marketing all unsold maize handled through the Railway 
authorities (Brits, 1969). 
South African maize prices trended continually downwards during the 1920s to reach a low 
of $160 per ton by 1932 following the onset of the Great Depression (see first panel of Figure 
3.3). In fact, the South African price declined by 28 per cent and 50 per cent relative to 1931 and 
1929 respectively, 68 per cent below the high of 1921. This hardship was amplified by the 1933 
drought that reduced total production by 56 per cent or a million tons (1.73 vs 0.76) relative to 
the previous year. 
Given their limited market power, South African farmers got the short end of the stick 
during the First World War by losing out on the resulting commodity price boom (Figure 3.3). 
However, South African farmers were somewhat sheltered against the decline pursuant on the 
Great Depression, but they also missed out on the post-depression boom. 
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Figure 3.3: Real maize prices: South Africa vs United States 
Source:  South African Data: Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (1970, 2018) and SAGIS (2018); deflated by the South African 
Reserve Bank 2009 GDP deflator and exchange adjusted with average 2009 South African exchange rate as published 
by The World Bank Databank, 2016 
U.S. Data: USDA, 2016 and deflated with the U.S. deflator as published by Barro, 2010  
 
Having failed to benefit from the First World War price increases and a growing impatience 
with the inability of the Central Agency to counter the continued price decline, farmers lobbied 
the State through the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) for support and domestic price 
controls, while mine owners opposed the move in the interest of profitability (Morrel 1988). The 
National Party government, as the torch bearer of the small farmer, was in favour of protecting 
domestic production and promoting self-sufficiency, as evidenced by a 1926 report which 
described agricultural protection as a ‘necessary evil’ required to stimulate production in a 
stagnating economy (Department of Agriculture, 1926: 12) 
The Central Agency was rendered obsolete by the Marketing act of 1931 that expanded 
state involvement in the maize market, and the Agency was dissolved in 1934. This was followed 
by the promulgation of the Marketing Act of 1937 that established the (pro-farmer) state as the 
sole buyer and seller of numerous agricultural commodities, including maize. So influential and 
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far-reaching were the effects of the 1937 Act that it was at one point described as the “Magna 
Carta of agriculture in South Africa” (Stanwix 2012: 8). Morell (1988) regards the promulgation 
of the 1937 Act as marking the final stage of the breakdown of the maize and gold alliance since 
(progressive) farmers no longer required the mines to ensure their success. This Act followed on 
the back of a growing divide between the mines and the progressive farmer group who 
increasingly cast their lot with that of the smaller farmers (Morrell, 1988). This manifested itself 
in the growing prominence of the farmer cooperative movement (cooperative societies that 
facilitated the collective marketing of maize, of which membership grew to 86,700 by the mid–
1930s (Department of Agriculture, 1934: 478)). 
According to Morris (1976) the 1924 National Party victory tipped the scales in the farmers’ 
favour and the 1937 Marketing Act decoupled their success from that of the mines. Morrell 
(1988) does not provide a specific date for the solemnisation of the divorce of the maize and gold 
alliance. Such a definite separation was not possible given the state’s unwillingness to “…sacrifice 
mining profitability for agricultural viability” (Morrell, 1998:634). Davenport & Saunders (2000) 
also stress the importance of maintaining mining profits, specifically for the sake of both white 
and blue-collar workers who made a crucial contribution to the National Party at the polls. 
Trapido (1978) adds to this by emphasising the importance of mining tax revenue to the State. 
The above therefore strengthens Davenport and Saunders' (2000) position that the NPs 1924 
victory was not as important to the farming community as has often been argued, especially if 
viewed from a marketing perspective. 
3.7 Towards direct subsidies 
Stanwix (2012:1) describes South Africa’s agricultural history as a “marathon of 
government intervention”. Built around the cornerstone provided by the 1937 Marketing Act, 
South African agricultural policy transitioned into its second phase after the Second World War. 
Various policy instruments set the scene for the almost total segregation of agriculture and for a 
comprehensive system of support measures to white farmers. Between 1910 and 1935, 87 Acts 
were passed in the Union Parliament rendering permanent assistance to farmers (Minnaar, 1990). 
State support to white farmers also came in the form of disaster relief, the construction of 
irrigation infrastructure, water subsidies, soil conservation, research, consumer price subsidies 
and soft interest rates.  
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Table 3.2 provides an overview of the various leases and purchases granted to white 
farmers in 1916. Between 1910 and 1936, an average of about 700 farmers were settled per year 
and supported by substantial state subsidies. Loans were also made to help white farmers obtain 
working capital and farming requisites. One result of this period of strong government support 
was the growth of the number of white farms from 81 432 in 1921 to a peak of 119 556 in 1952 
(Union of South Africa, 1916-54). 
 
Table 3.2: Allotment of agricultural holdings during 1916 










Land Settlement Act, 1912 141 210 168 636 110 053 - 
Crown Land Disposal Ordinance (TVL) 123 134 90 557 58 215 - 
Crown Land Disposal Ordinance 1903 (TVL) 26 26 21 414 10 654 - 
Act 15 of 1887 (Cape): Sales 12 13 4 356 993 - 
Act 26 of 1891 (Cape): Leases 24 25 19 291 - 523 
Act 26 of 1891 (Cape): Sales 2 1 7 621 395 - 
Natal Proclamation 36 35 28 711 13 026 53 
Irrigation Settlement Act 31 of 1909 22 22 120 3 353 - 
Act 13 of 1908 (OFS): Leases 3 7 2 085 - 145 
Total Land Alienated 389 473 322 791 196 689 721 
Source: Union of South Africa, 1916 as the South Africa Year Book of that year TVL: Transvaal province, OFS: Orange Free State 
Province, Cape: Cape Province 
 
Figure 3.4 shows changes in the different forms of state support to farmers over the period 
1910 to 199416. It is clear from both the first and second panel that the agricultural sector enjoyed 
limited support prior to 1924, with expenditure on the sector averaging close to 2.5 per cent of 
total public outlay.  
The early growth in non-subsidy and research spending (the dotted line of the first panel 
of Figure 3.4) can be explained by the establishment of the Land and Agricultural Development 
Bank (or ‘Land Bank’) in 1912.17 The bank was not created with a commercial aim, but rather to 
use public funds to promote agriculture, inter alia by making capital available to white farmers 
                                                     
16 Prior to 1910, agricultural policy was managed by each of the four provinces separately.  
17 Still in existence today, the institution is now governed by the Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002, with 
land redistribution, food security and agricultural growth as its primary objectives.  
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at below-market rates (Bertelsmann et al., 2008: 645). As the NP came to power in 1924, subsidy 
and assistance spending increased in 10 years from zero to R24 million (2005 values). 
Public support of the agricultural sector only took off in earnest with the drought of the 
mid-1930s that accompanied, as a result the sector’s public expenditure share reached an all-
time high of close to 20 per cent. Droughts played a significant role in the level of state support 
at different times. Unsurprisingly, in response to the Great Depression and a severe drought that 
lasted three years, Hertzog’s government increased state support to agriculture substantially 
from 1929 onwards, as shown in Figure 3.4. Assistance and subsidy spending increased 72-fold 
between 1932 and 1933. In the following year, subsidies more than trebled from R504 million to 
R1 836 million (2005 values). Subsidy and Assistance spending on the sector declined 
immediately thereafter but remained at historically high levels throughout the 1930s and 1940s.  
 
Figure 3.4: Government Expenditure on Agriculture 
Source: Liebenberg, 2012. 
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3.8 Post–1948 support consolidation and eventual reversal 
Built around the cornerstone provided by the 1937 Marketing Act, South African 
agricultural policy transitioned into its third phase after the Second World War. The sector, or at 
least the white farmers, enjoyed far higher levels of direct and indirect support relative to the 
pre-1940 period, lasting until around 1983 (see Figure 3.4). Examples of direct support measures 
include disaster relief, the construction of irrigation infrastructure, water subsidies, soil 
conservation, research, consumer price subsidies and soft interest rates. Indirect measures took 
the form of greater control over the marketing of agricultural commodities through the 
Marketing Act of 1968 (Vink and Kirsten, 2003; Van Zyl, Fényes, and Vink 1992). On the other 
hand, black maize farmers were doubly affected by these marketing measures since they were 
excluded from accessing urban markets to the extent that they were forced to sell their produce 
through a white farmer as an intermediary, while most (95 per cent) small scale producers had 
to buy maize at a premium since they were not self-sufficient (Van Zyl & Coetzee, 1990). The 
introduction of the interest rate subsidy, in conjunction with the ability to write off capital 
purchases in the year of acquisition, also contributed to the rapid adoption of combine harvesters 
during the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted in significant productivity increases but at the expense 
of employment (see for example De Klerk 1984; Van Zyl, Vink, and Fényes 1987).  
These measures stayed in place until the 1980s, after which agricultural policy was 
gradually restructured towards lower subsidies, market-related interest rates and the 
deregulation of controlled marketing schemes (Van Zyl, Fényes & Vink, 1992b; Kirsten, Edwards 
& Vink, 2009). This process was hastened by the split in the National Party in 1983 that saw the 
farmers siding with the breakaway Conservative Party, rendering them vulnerable to increased 
subordination by corporate agribusiness and their ‘own’ farmer cooperatives (Bernstein, 2004). 
The restructuring process was only completed by the late 1990s and resulted in substantial 
efficiency gains through the removal of marginal land from production and greater access to 
international markets ( Vink and Kirsten 2000).  
3.9 Discussion and conclusion 
At first glance the structural transformation of the South African economy during the late 
19th to mid-20th century seems to fit the textbook example: Farming in the South African interior 
initially faced numerous challenges in the absence of sizable markets, transport networks and 
sufficient labour supply. This status quo was disrupted by the discovery of diamonds and gold, 
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which kick-started commercial farming through increased productivity and eventually an 
expansion to food exports. This resulted in substantial gains for some farmers, but the mining 
industry was initially effective in ‘squeezing’ the broader sector through suppressing maize prices 
given their position as major buyer and the weak international integration of the maize market. 
This, together with growing competition for labour and land between white and black farmers 
on the one hand, and white farmers and the mines on the other, gave rise to growing tension 
between maize and gold. Ultimately the growing political influence of farmers following the 
election victory of the National Party in 1924 enabled them to apply the state machinery to their 
benefit through various forms direct and indirect support measures.  
The South African case illustrates in the complexity of stakeholder interactions and 
resource flows that give rise to the political tensions experienced during the structural 
transformation. Shortly after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, a strategic alliance 
developed between the gold mines and a group of larger ‘progressive’ maize farmers. This 
followed from their mutual interest in the maize market and the securing of black labour. 
However, this relationship showed a gradual deterioration over time because of the depression 
of maize prices by the mines, thereby forcing the ‘progressive’ farmers to increasingly cast their 
lot with that of their smaller compatriots. Eventually this broader white farmer grouping 
managed to gain control of the State with the support of blue-collar mineworkers, thereby 
bestowing direct support upon themselves and product price support through the centrally 
controlled marketing of most agricultural products. These farmers also applied the state 
machinery to help stem competition from black farmers by increasing control over their access 
to land and to produce markets. South African agriculture enjoyed high levels of direct and 
indirect support until the 1980s, but these lasted only until the early 1980s.  
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Hybrid maize adoption in South Africa during the 
20th century: Policy failures and climate 
adaptation successes 
4.1 Introduction 
South African maize yields increased 9.4–fold18 between 1920 and 2015, with almost three 
quarters of the long-run gain in yields occurring during the second half of the century (Greyling 
& Pardey, 2018), a timing that concords with a surge in the rate of multi-factor productivity 
growth for South African agriculture as a whole, Figure 4.1 (Liebenberg, 2012; Liebenberg & 
Pardey, 2012, Table 4). There is a reasonably extensive and heavily cited economics literature on 
the uptake of hybrid maize in the United States during the 20th century (see for example, 
Griliches, 1957a & b, 1960 & 1980; Dixon 1980; and Sutch 2011). In contrast, and notwithstanding 
the importance of maize in the South African agricultural economy, comparatively little economic 
attention has been paid to the uptake of improved (hybrid) maize varieties in South Africa.19 
Rusike (1995) conducted an institutional analysis of the Southern African maize seed industry 
that included South Africa, while Kirsten & Gouse (2003) and Gouse et al. (2005, 2009) examined 
the production, uptake and economic consequences of bioengineered maize varieties in South 
Africa since 1998 (the first year of approval for use of bioengineered maize variety in South 
Africa).20  
In the United States, hybrid maize technology was first commercialized in 1924–25 (Brown 
1983, p. 172, Sutch 2008, p. 2) drawing directly on the research conducted by George Schull (Cold 
Springs Harbor) and Edward East (Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station) on hybrid vigour 
(heterosis) in maize (and especially the findings that occurred in the period 1909–1912), and 
Donald Jones’ 1918 discovery of breeding double-cross hybrids (Fitzgerald, 1990). South African 
researchers were quick to catch on. Numerous United States and other improved maize varieties 
                                                     
18 Based on centred five-year moving averages, commercial production only.  
19 Greyling and Pardey (2018b) noted that “Between 1970 and 2015 an average of 57 per cent of the commercial area in field 
crops was dedicated to the production of maize. In addition to being a major South African feed and food staple, over this same 
period an average of 25 per cent of the country’s maize crop was exported, mostly to Southern African neighbours.”  
20 Other studies of the economics of improved maize varieties, that include references to maize varietal improvement in South 
Africa, include Hassan et al. (2001) and (Byerlee, 2018). 
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were tested in South Africa during the 1920s and a dedicated hybrid breeding programme was 
launched at the Potchefstroom experimental station in 1925 (Saunders, 1942). While South 
African scientists were early adopters of hybrid maize breeding methods, as I show in this paper, 
South African farmers lagged well behind their U.S. counterparts. I examine the likely reasons for 
this considerable lag.  
 
Figure 4.1: TFP index of South African agriculture, 1948 to 2010 
Source: Liebenberg (2012) 
 
In addition to quantifying the overall historical pattern of hybrid maize adoption in South 
Africa, I also compile and assess evidence on the uptake of hybrid maize for seven maize growing 
regions throughout the country. Like the U.S. adoption evidence presented by Griliches (1957a, 
b), Dixon (1980) and, especially Griliches (1960), I find substantial geographical differences in the 
initial uptake (origin) and subsequent rate and ceiling level of adoption of hybrid maize. In 
contrast to a sizable body of contemporaneous sociological literature on the determinates of 
technology adoption, Griliches emphasized the role of economics in accounting for these 
observed geographical differences.21 He used differences in regional market sizes to account for 
differences in the ‘date of availability’ (or origin) of hybrid maize among regions, and differences 
in the relative profitability of hybrid varieties vis-à-vis open pollenated varieties (OPVs) to 
account for the ‘rate (or speed) of acceptance’ of hybrid varieties within each region. He also 
argued that differences in the ‘equilibrium (or ceiling) level’ of adoption in each region—that is, 
differences in the fraction of acreage within each region ultimately devoted to hybrid maize—
                                                     
21 Prior the Griliches the adoption of hybrid maize received attention in the sociology literature most notably by Ryan (1948) and 
Ryan & Gross (1950) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4: HYBRID MAIZE 50 
were “… explained by differences in the average profit to be realized from the shift to hybrid 
seed (Griliches 1960, p. 279).”  
A later study by Dixon (1980) showed the differences in the ceiling (or equilibrium) level of 
adoption among regions were largely a data truncation artefact. Using a longer time series of 
adoption data than was available to Griliches, Dixon revealed that all the regions eventually 
equilibrated at higher—and often more similar (complete or almost complete)—levels of 
adoption of hybrid varieties than Griliches reported. However, access to longer time-series data 
raises questions as to whether or not a symmetrical logistic curve is the best representation of 
the historical time path of hybrid maize adoption in the United States. Dixon found in favour of a 
Gompertz curve that can accommodate non-symmetries (in this case positive skewness) in the 
time path of adoption. In my own efforts to choose functional forms that best summarize the 
South African hybrid maize adoption data, I was also sensitive to these distributional 
asymmetries. Griliches (1980) acknowledged this point in his reply to Dixon’s 1980 paper, while 
also noting that opting for ‘goodness of fit’ considerations comes with a loss of ‘interpretability’ 
(Griliches 1980, p. 1463).  
More recently, Sutch (2008 & 2011) revisited the underlying yield differential evidence 
used by Griliches to quantify the profitability differences between OPV and hybrid varieties and 
account for differences in the rate of uptake of hybrid varieties (and conversely the rate of 
abandonment, or disadoption) of OPV varieties. He reports that in the early years of commercial 
use (prior to 1937) the relative yield-cum-profitability advantages of hybrids over OPVs were in 
fact not supported by the available data, and that superiority of hybrid yields only became 
apparent post–1937 as private seed companies ramped up their R&D investments in the 
development of new hybrid varieties.  
According to Sutch (2011, p. 219), what did give hybrid maize varieties their advantage, and 
thus spurred their adoption in the early 1930s, was their actual, and widely reported (Fitzgerald 
1990), ‘resistance to drought.’ This was revealed during the Dust Bowl droughts of the 1930s and 
its aftermath. In this paper I assemble and deploy a spatialized set of rainfall data to also explore 
the yield differential versus drought resistance explanations for the geographically distinct 
patterns of hybrid maize adoption I observe in South Africa.  
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4.2 The South African and U.S. seed industries, in brief 
To set the scene for my analysis, I begin with a brief overview of the basic principles of 
hybrid maize breeding and contrast the development of the United States and South African 
maize industries. A special emphasis is placed on the institutional structures that underpinned 
the development of the respective industries as means to explain why the South African adoption 
lagged the United States by almost two decades. 
4.2.1 The U.S. hybrid seed industry  
Charles Darwin was among the first scientists to experiment with inbred and cross-
pollinated maize, culminating with the publication of his findings in 1876 that inbred maize 
plants—resulting from forced self-pollination—were generally inferior to cross-bred maize 
plants.22 He concluded that in-bred plants suffered from an ‘inbreeding depression’ while cross 
bred (or out crossed) maize plants exhibited a ‘innate constitutional vigour’ (Sutch, 2011, p.208). 
These findings inspired William J. Beal at the Michigan Agricultural college to experiment with 
inbred pure lines23 and to become the first to cross these to illustrate the value of hybrid ‘vigour.’ 
This work was furthered by George Shull and Edward East, who developed the first systemically 
produced single cross hybrids in 1908 (Olmstead & Rhode, 2008). However, at the time many 
maize breeders were sceptical about their practical usefulness. The poor vigour and low seed 
yields of the inbred lines required for hybridisation made it comparatively costly and time 
consuming to produce sufficient hybrid seed for extensive commercial use (Griliches, 1957a; 
Hallauer & Miranda, 1981). 
The possibility of widespread hybrid use moved a step closer to reality in 1917 after the 
development of double cross hybrids by Donald Jones (Alston et al., 2010). As a cross between 
two highly productive single cross hybrids it increased seed yields dramatically. During the 1920s 
this newly found promise of commercialisation spurred a substantial expansion in the 
development of inbred lines, which provided the impetus for the establishment of the first 
private seed companies. Henry A. Wallace24 founded the Pioneer Hi-Bred seed company in 1926 
after becoming the first to market a private hybrid variety in 1925. But early success was limited, 
                                                     
22 Darwin was by no means the first maize breeder. Genetic and archaeological evidence show that modern maize traces its 
existence back to the domestication and continued improvement of the wild Mexican grass teosinte (Zea mays ssp. Parviglumis 
or spp. Mexicana) 5 to 10,000 years ago in the Balsas river valley in Mexico (Wang et al., 1999; Ranere et al., 2009). 
23 Inbred maize varieties are obtained by forcing self-pollination which reduces vigour and increases uniformity. Pure lines are 
varieties that have been inbred for a sufficient number of generations, usually six to seven, to deliver an offspring that “breeds 
true” since they exhibit complete uniformity and does not suffer any further reduction in vigour (Saunders, 1940). 
24 Later U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President of the United States (Culver & Hyde, 2001) 
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with a mere one per cent of the total U.S. maize acreage planted to hybrid varieties ten years 
later (Olmstead & Rhode, 2008). While double cross hybrids put commercialisation of the 
technology within reach, it also brought with it a different set of challenges, principally stemming 
from the fact that not all double crosses out-yielded their open pollinated competitors. Hence 
the optimal selection of the combination of pure and single-cross hybrids became of the utmost 
importance as the sheer number of unique crossing combinations rendered the trial and error 
breeding methods of the time impractical. For example, a mere 20 pure lines (South Africa tested 
several hundred by the 1920s) could theoretically have 190 unique single cross combinations, 
which in turn make possible 14,535 unique double cross combinations (Hallauer & Miranda, 
1981).  
During the 1930s substantial progress was made with the development of predictive 
breeding techniques that enabled improved pre-trial hybrid screening. One of the first was the 
realisation that the performance of a so-called ‘top cross’—a cross between a pure line and a 
common tester variety (typically an OPV)—gives breeders a good indication of the pure line’s 
hybridisation potential. The second was the development of statistical methods that could be 
applied to the data from single cross hybrids to predict their performance as double crosses, 
thereby reducing the number of double crosses to be tested in field trails (for more detail see 
Hallauer & Miranda, 1981). Taken collectively, Griliches (1957) argues these developments did 
not result in the invention of hybrid maize as such, but rather resulted in the invention of a new 
way of inventing which could then be applied by both public and private entities. This enabled 
Pioneer Hi-Bred and DeKalb25 to develop their own research and development programmes to 
supply U.S. farmers. This, in combination with innovative farmer-dealer contract arrangements, 
enabled these companies to dominate the U.S. seed industry at an early stage, and eventually, 
overseas markets as well. While U.S. breeders could not patent maize varieties under the Plant 
Patent Act of 1930, their intellectual property investments were still protected by trade secrets 
laws. These enabled them to protect the identity of the pure lines and breeding procedures used 
to breed their hybrids. This was also aided by the seed certification programmes that formalised 
the industry during the 1920s (Rusike, 1995).  
During the 1930s and 1940s the number of formal breeding programmes increased in both 
scope and number, and so too did the number of double cross hybrids available to farmers. By 
1943 Iowa became the first state to plant its entire area to hybrid maize, with the whole of the 
                                                     
25Founded by Charlie Gunn in DeKalb, Illinois. 
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United States following suit by 1960. However, this was not achieved without continued varietal 
improvements. During the 1950s, breeders became increasingly concerned that yield growth 
would begin to wane since double cross hybrids were perceived to be approaching their yield 
plateau. However, this concern was misplaced following advances in pure line breeding methods 
that enabled the commercialisation of single cross hybrids. This was achieved through increased 
pure line vigour following continued breeding and improved cultivation practices such as the 
application of fertiliser, herbicides and pesticides. As a result the use of single cross hybrids 
increased from close to zero in 1960 to 85 per cent by 1980 (Hallauer & Miranda, 1981).  
4.2.2 The South African hybrid seed industry 
Scientific maize breeding in South Africa was initiated in 1904, shortly after the Second 
Anglo-Boer War, at the Potchefstroom Experimental Station by the then Transvaal Department 
of Agriculture. By the 1920s government researchers had introduced and tested several hundred 
open pollinated varieties from the United States, Canada and Australia, but only a handful of U.S. 
varieties proved suitable for local conditions. These included varieties such as Hickory King, Iowa 
Silver Mine, Champion White Pearl, and various others.26 Early success came in 1910 following 
the chance discovery of Potchefstroom Pearl, the product of an accidental hybridisation between 
Champion White Pearl and either Hickory King or Iowa Silver Mine. This variety was widely 
distributed during the 1920s and 1930s, and continued to be used as a breeding line, yielding the 
blight tolerant Natal and Pretoria Potchefstroom Pearl variants (Saunders, 1930). The variety 
Natal Potchefstroom Pearl would later serve as the cornerstone of the early hybrid maize 
industries in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi (Rusike, 1995). 
The first hybrid maize breeding experiments in South Africa were conducted by A.R. 
Saunders at the Potchefstroom and Kroonstad experimental stations in 1925 and 1928 
respectively. At the time the programme focussed on traits of “resistance to drought, strength of 
the root system, moderately early maturity, fairly large size of grain and other minor properties 
which appear desirable to have in any variety” (Saunders, 1940, p. 311). As a result, the early 
hybrid breeding programme prioritised adaptability and drought tolerance above yield potential, 
opting for the development of ‘synthetic’27 varieties such as the Synthetic Potchefstroom Pearl 
developed by 1932 (Saunders, 1942). Progress was slow however, with maize yields only 
                                                     
26 This includes Chester County, Golden Beauty, Reid Yellow, Leaming and Boone County White. 
27 As a precursor to single and double cross hybrids, synthetic hybrids are open pollinated varieties (OPV) bred through the 
intercrossing of pure lines that are maintained through selection procedures within isolated populations (Lonnquist, 1961).  
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increasing at an average of 0.7 per cent per year between 1920 and 1949 (Greyling & Pardey, 
2018b).  
The establishment of the South African Maize Board following the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1937 marked a key event in the local hybrid maize industry. While primarily tasked with 
the controlled marketing of maize (see Greyling, Senay & Pardey, 2018), in 1947 the Board 
initiated a Hybrid Maize Scheme (hereafter Scheme) in collaboration with the Department of 
Agriculture, with the former being responsible for seed multiplication and distribution, and the 
latter tasked with hybrid breeding. The first thirteen bags of the hybrid maize were sold to 
farmers in 1949, all of which was the variety PP×K64, a top cross between the synthetic variety 
Potchefstroom Pearl and the imported Kansas strain K64. Described by Laubscher (1970, p. 3) as 
a “diamond in a pile of gravel,” K64 would form part of numerous hybrids developed in 
subsequent decades.28 At the time PP×K64 out-yielded the popular open pollinated varieties by 
an average of 25 to 30 per cent, depending on agro-ecological realities (Kuhn & Gevers, 198, p. 
69). In addition to its other responsibilities, the Scheme was also tasked with setting the price of 
hybrid seed, which it seems to have gotten wrong. Following a research visit to South Africa in 
1950 under the auspices of the FAO, Jenkins (1951)29 as one to the central figures of the U.S. 
breeding programme, argued that the Scheme set the hybrid seed price too low to encourage 
private investments in hybrid development. Referencing the price of U.S. hybrids, Jenkins 
proposed that South African hybrid seed prices should be increased by at least 50 per cent to 
encourage private seed companies.  
Given the substantial yield increases and affordability, the Board was unable keep up with 
the demand, and by 1954 seed multiplication and distribution had to be outsourced to contract 
farmers, farmer cooperatives and seed merchants (Laubscher, 1970). Seed supplies were in such 
short supply during the 1952–53 season that the Department of Agriculture encouraged farmers 
to plant second generation hybrid seed saved from their previous harvest, stressing that this 
should only be done as a temporary measure. Trials conducted by the department showed that 
second-generation, farm-saved hybrid seed still out-yielded open pollinated varieties by an 
average of 18 per cent (Laubscher et al., 1954, p.130). Despite the release of various subsequent 
varieties such as SA4, SA5 and others, the Scheme achieved limited success during the first 
                                                     
28 A variant of this cross as NPP×K64 and PP×K64 was still being marketed in 1974 (Maize Board, 1975).  
29 Byerlee (2018, p. 4) noted that “Merle T. Jenkins (PhD Iowa State 1928) … led the USDA’s mid-west cooperative corn 
improvement program when it was established at Iowa State in 1925 and produced the first widely adopted maize hybrids for 
the Corn Belt. From 1934 to 1958 he headed the USDA’s maize breeding work, based in Beltsville near Washington DC, and would 
play a leading role after the War in transferring hybrid technology to Europe and South Africa.” 
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decade of its existence, primarily because the pedigrees of these various varieties were closely 
related to PP×K64 (Kuhn & Gevers, 1980).  
Although the first private seed companies were established in 1958, the South African 
private seed market was only formalised after the promulgation of the Seed and Foundations Act 
in 1963. The Act established the legal framework for the registration of new varieties and set 
standards for varietal trials, seed certification. It also outlined the procedure for the approval and 
registration of seed merchants, established control over seed imports and exports, and launched 
the South African varietal list. Only varieties on the list could be sold to farmers, and to be listed, 
new varieties had to achieve prescribed performance standards in government-organised trials, 
most notably indicators of agricultural value, uniformity and genetic stability.  
In addition, the act also gave the Seed Inspection Service (established in 1944) the authority 
to prosecute and punish seed companies that violated seed quality standards or misrepresented 
their products through false advertising. The Seed Inspection Service commenced operations in 
1963. The number of inspection visits to the premises of seed sellers and cleaners increased 
tenfold between 1964 and 1974, while the number of transgressions declined in response to 
substantial penalties imposed on transgressors. In 1968 the most common transgressions were 
seed sold in deficient containers (34.8 per cent), a lack of sufficient record keeping (15.2 per 
cent), the selling of unregistered varieties (15.2 per cent), and selling seed under false pretences 
(13 per cent) (Rusike, 1995, p. 105). It is conceivable that these actions may have reduced the 
availability of hybrid seed during the mid–1960s as the newly formed Seed Inspection Service 
stepped up its efforts.  
One of the major institutional impediments to private investment in hybrid development 
was removed with the proclamation of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act of 1964. The act enabled 
breeders to secure intellectual property rights over varietal innovations, and exclude others from 
unauthorised selling of protected cultivars. This aligned the South African legislation with that of 
the United States and Europe, and saw South African seed companies establishing strategic 
alliances with U.S. seed companies, thus giving them access to elite international breeding 
material. Examples include the partnership between Sensako30 and DeKalb Genetics 
Corporation, and Pannar31 and Pioneer Hi-bred International. The first proprietary South African 
                                                     
30 Sensako was established in 1959 by the Central Western Agricultural Cooperative, North Western Agricultural Cooperative, 
and the Eastern Transvaal Cooperative to fulfil the Maize Board contract of multiplying and distributing hybrids released by way 
of the national breeding programme (Rusike, 1995). 
31 Pannar was founded in 1958 by Mr Bill Wall, a Natal (Greyton) farmer who was contracted to multiply and distribute hybrids 
developed by the Natal breeding programme (Rusike, 1995). 
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maize variety was registered in 1965, with Pannar registering their first four varieties in 1968 
(Rusike, 1995).  
While the Department of Agriculture continued breeding so-called ‘S.A. varieties’ (e.g., S.A.9N, 
S.A.5, and S.A.100), rapid progress was made with privately developed ‘elite varieties’, to the 
extent that the latter out-yielded the former by an average of 41 per cent during the 1977 and 
1978 seasons (Kuhn & Gevers, 1980). As a result, the public (S.A.) hybrids were replaced by 
privately bred varieties within just 15 years (1981) of registering the first public hybrid (see 
Section 4.5). As the uptake of improved hybrid varieties expanded, in tandem with the adoption 
of other, largely complementary, technologies (Bennie, Hoffman & Coetzee, 1995; Liebenberg & 
Pardey, 2012) the pace of maize yield increase picked up: these enabled maize yields to expand 
at an annual average rate of 3.5 per cent per year between 1949 and 1981. This slowed thereafter 
to an annual increase of 2.1 per cent, accelerating to a 3.1 per cent increase between 1999 and 
2015 following the deregulation of agricultural marketing in 1998 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018b) 
4.3 South African versus U.S. rates of varietal adoption 
4.3.1 Measuring adoption rates 
Griliches (1957) observed that U.S. hybrid maize adoption exhibited an S-shaped curve that 
can be described mathematically using three parameters; a beginning (origin), rate of adjustment 
(slope parameter), and its equilibrium (ceiling parameter). While various functional forms can 
and have be fitted to adoption data, Griliches opted for a logistic growth function as a summary 
device for his hybrid maize data given its fitting ease and interpretation. Revisiting Griliches’ 
study using a longer time series, Dixon (1980) improved the goodness of fit of the logistic function 
by using a weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) or iterative nonlinear least squares procedure. 
He also used a Gompertz curve as an alternative functional form since it can accommodate 
asymmetrical adoption paths. In response Griliches (1980) conceded the relevance of new 
econometric techniques to improve the fit of the logistic function. But he contests the use of the 
Gompertz functional form, arguing that a ‘decent’ fit would require a three-parameter 
specification, but this would come at the expense of interpretability. Thus, Griliches concludes 
that the logistic growth function still offers the optimal balance between accuracy and 
interpretability and hence I proceed with this function. The logistic growth function is 
mathematically represented by:  
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𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) (1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the hybrid adoption rate expressed as the percentage share of hybrid maize 
in total seed sales or area planted in region 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. As 𝑡𝑡 tends toward infinity, 𝑃𝑃 will tend 
towards 𝐾𝐾 as the ceiling value. The parameter 𝑎𝑎 positions the curve on the time scale while, 𝑏𝑏 
represents the rate of hybrid acceptance or adoption (𝑃𝑃). 
4.3.2 Adoption data and results 
In his foundational 1957 study, Griliches used USDA survey-based data reporting the annual 
percentage of maize area planted with hybrid varieties for 31 U.S. states for the period 1933–
1956. Dixon (1980) used the same data from the same source, now spanning the longer period 
from 1933 to 1960, the year collection of these statistics was discontinued.  
To assess the robustness of my results, logistic growth functions (i.e., equation 1) were 
fitted to the South African and U.S. data using (1) a weighted OLS procedure32, (2) a weighted 
generalised linear method (GLM), and (3) a non-linear least squares (NLS) approach. The model 
results are summarised in Table 4.1, with the actual and fitted (NLS) data shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1: Adoption rate estimates, South Africa and United States 
 (1)  




generalised linear (GLM) 
 
(3) 
Non-linear least squares 
(NLS) 
 𝑏𝑏1 Adj. 𝑅𝑅2  𝑏𝑏2 𝑅𝑅2  𝑏𝑏3 𝑅𝑅2 
South Africa  0.31 (0.03) 0.85  0.24 (0.02) 0.89  0.28 (0.04) 0.94 
U.S. 0.28  (0.02) 0.85  0.25 (0.01) 0.94  0.33 (0.02) 0.99 
Source: See Figure 1. 
Notes: All are statistically significant to the 99 per cent level. 
 
Given that both South Africa and the United States effectively achieved full adoption within 
thirty years of its initial commercial release33, the national average rates of hybrid maize 
                                                     
32 Weighted in accordance to Berkson (1953) and employed by Dixon (1980), the weights associated with 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are inversely 
proportional to 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) with 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the number of observations at each point in time, 𝑡𝑡. 
33 SA: 1949-1979, US: 1933-1964. Technically the first U.S. hybrids were introduced in 1923 but the adoption only reached 0.1 
per cent by 1933. 
… 
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acquisition or uptake are similar for both countries. However, like Dixon (1980), I find that the 
respective fitting techniques deliver substantially different estimates of the adoption rate (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖).34  
All the specifications fitted the trend in the adoption data quite well, although the non-
linear least squares method (3) delivered the best overall fit for both countries given its iterative 
procedure. The slightly worse fit in the South African instance may be attributable to the sharp, 
off-trend dip in hybrid maize adoption during 1966 (from 65 to 51 per cent) and 1967 (from 51 
to 47 per cent) seasons (Figure 4.2). While hybrid maize use recovered to 68 per cent in 1968, it 
was still lower than projected and remained so for some time. While the exact cause of this lower 
than projected uptake of hybrid maize is not ascribed in the literature, a possible contributing 
factor may have been the activities of the Seed Inspection Service that commenced its duties in 
1964 and expanded it efforts thereafter. Regulatory actions against seed companies that violated 
seed quality standards and misrepresented their products may have reduced overall hybrid 
availability or removed relatively affordable but dubious hybrids from the market.  
 
Figure 4.2: Hybrid adoption: South Africa vs United States 
Source: Compiled from: South African Maize Board Annual Reports (1951–1994); U.S.: USDA (1975) 
Notes:  Fitted values as per NLS model (3).  
                                                     
34 Unlike Griliches (1957) and Dixon (1980), we do not restrict my analysis to observations above 10 and below 95 per cent of the 
ceiling level of adoption since we do not face the same computational constraints. Also, not only does the removal of these cut-
off thresholds remove a source of arbitrariness from my study, including all the available data improves the goodness of fit for 
both countries. 
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4.4 Regional hybrid adoption 
The data published by the Maize Board on the regional (i.e., sub-national) uptake of hybrid 
maize is less comprehensive (years 1961–1971) than the corresponding national estimates, but 
informative nonetheless. The data were reported by maize region, as composites of magisterial 
districts, but sadly are also afflicted by inconsistent reporting. However, it was possible to 
standardise the data according to the ten35 maize regions shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3: Maize region map (1981) 
Source: Maize board (1982) 
Notes: Maize triangle represented by dotted lines. NA includes Lesotho, Transkei and Ciskei 
                                                     
35 To do so we had to combine the Western Free State with the Central and Southern Free State regions. In addition, the data 
observations on the Cape as well as the Natal and East Griqualand regions were inconsistently reported. Hence seven regional 
observations are available for this 11 year period.  
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Although this process increased the number of temporal observations, the standardisation 
came at the expense of cross-sectional observations, but with the added advantage of ensuring 
the spatial concordance between the hybrid adoption and public/private hybrid data discussed 
in Section 4.5. To develop summary estimates of the trend path in adoption, I followed the curve 
fitting exercise I undertook at the national level. Unfortunately the NLS model failed (most likely 
because of the limited number of observations (11)), and so an unweighted GLM model (5) was 
fitted instead.36 
Sub-national hybrid adoption in South Africa, as in the U.S., showed wide regional 
differences in both the origin (or initial uptake) and the rate of adoption, Table 4.2 and Figure 
4.4. For example, the Rand region (includes Delmas, Vereeniging and Krugersdorp, see Figure 4.3) 
is the smallest maize region by area planted (denominated in thousands of hectares below the 
district name in Figure 4.4) was the first to reach full adoption (98.6 per cent) by 1966. The 
Western Transvaal (WT: Bothaville, Kroonstad, Viljoenskroon), the second largest maize region 
followed suit in 1970, while the Eastern Transvaal Highveld (ETHv: Bethal, Standerton, Nigel) was 
the last district to cross the full adoption threshold before the Maize Board ceased reporting.  
 
Table 4.2: Regional hybrid adoption rates, growing season rainfall and projected adoption  








 Projected adoption 
 Region   𝑏𝑏5  mm  
Year 75 per 
cent 
4: Central and Southern Free State+ (C&SFS) 0.04 (0.05)  435   
8: Eastern Transvaal Highveld (ETHv) 0.15 (0.08)*  607  1967 
10: Northern and Eastern Transvaal (N&ET) 0.14 (0.05)**  607  1975 
6: North Eastern Free State (NeFS) 0.09 (0.03)***  573   
5: North Western Free State (NwFS) 0.09 (0.06)  502   
9: Rand (Rand) 0.25 (0.09)**  628  1963 
7: Western Transvaal (WT) 0.26 (0.09)**  489  1964 
Notes: Significance codes:  0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’, standard errors shown in brackets  
 + Includes the Western Free State region 
 
4.4.1 Hybrid availability 
Griliches (1957) noted that both hybrid maize supply and demand factors affect the pattern 
of uptake of this varietal technology. The supply side phenomena he dubbed ‘availability,’ 
                                                     
36 Unweighted logit and OLS models were also fitted for comparative purposes, see Appendix E for these model results.  
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referring to the idea that profit maximizing private firms were likely to target their varietal 
development efforts according to market size, with hybrid seed being made available to larger 
maize seed markets ahead of smaller ones.  
 
Figure 4.4: Hybrid adoption by maize region – actual and fitted 
Source: Maize Board (1962–1994) 
Notes:    Total area planted (1 000 hectares) in 1971 shown below district abbreviation. District abbreviations as follow, see 
Figure 4.1 for spatialization. Cape and Natal and East Griqualand districts excluded due to inconsistent reporting.  
 C&SFS:  Central and Southern Free State  
(includes the Western Free State)  
NwFS:  North Western Free State 
 ETHv:  Eastern Transvaal Highveld Rand:  Rand 
 N&ET:  Northern and Eastern Transvaal WT:  Western Transvaal 
 NeFS:  North Eastern Free State   
 
The South African regional adoption model results are presented in Table 4.2. It shows that 
early adopting districts reported the fastest adoption rates. However, if the total area planted 
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per region is an indicator of its relative importance, then the availability argument is not as 
applicable in the South African case since the smallest and second to largest districts were the 
first to adopt the technology as reflected in Figure 4.4. It shows both the actual and predicted 
values with relative importance of the region shown below its label as the area planted to maize 
in 1971 as the last year of data available.  
A possible contributing factor to this outcome is the structure of the South African seed 
market as discussed in Section 4.2.2, specifically the limited involvement of private seed 
companies prior to 1965. This constrained overall R&D investment and limited access to 
international breeding material, thus slowing the overall rate of release of new hybrid varieties. 
The public sector nature of the market may have also muted the tendency (evident in the private 
led U.S. case) to prioritize larger (and thus more lucrative) maize seed markets over smaller ones. 
In fact, political pressures may have pushed in the direction of ‘equal treatment’ such that one 
part of the country was not in fact prioritized ahead of another, or at least the priorities were 
less evident or less effective. The development of PP×K64 provides a case in point: While it 
offered a significant advantage over the OPVs grown at the time of its release, progress slowed 
thereafter since the genetic pedigrees of subsequent derivative varieties varied little from the 
original release (Kuhn & Gevers, 1980). In addition to challenges with the availability of 
genetically suitable hybrids, early adoption was also constrained by challenges in physical 
availability following the Scheme’s inability to meet seed demands. It is uncertain if all districts 
were affected equally. 
4.4.2 Hybrid acceptability and revealed drought tolerance  
On the demand side, Griliches emphasized ‘acceptability,’ positing that the rate of uptake 
is a function of the yield superiority of hybrid varieties over the OPV alternative(s) they replaced. 
He concluded that hybrid varieties, on average, provided a 20 per cent yield advantage over the 
OPVs they replaced.37 This is in line with the South African estimates where PP×K64 out-yielded 
OPVs by between 25 and 30 per cent. However, this showed wide regional differences with some 
districts reporting an increase of up to 60 per cent. In addition, the yield gap was more 
                                                     
37 Specifically Grilches (1957, pp. 58-59) noted that “As [a] … measure of the longer run cross-sectional differences in the 
superiority of hybrids, I used the average pre-hybrid yield of corn. This is based on the widespread belief that hybrids represent 
a constant per centage gain of about 15 to 20 per cent over open pollinated varieties. Hence, differences in average pre-hybrid 
yields will imply differences in the absolute gain in yield due to the use of hybrids. Usually an average for the ten years before an 
area reached 10 per cent in hybrids was used as the estimate of the average pre-hybrid yield. For states, the source was 
Agricultural Statistics. For crop reporting districts, various published and unpublished data from the AMS and from State 
Agricultural Statisticians were utilized.”  
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pronounced in lower rainfall areas (Kuhn & Gevers, 1980) and more importantly, during dry 
seasons (Laubscher et al., 1954: 129). This provides a segue into Sutch’s (2011) hypothesis that 
early adoption (prior to 1940) was not driven by absolute yield gains since these were too small 
relative to hybrid seed cost, but rather by its relative yield advantage during droughts. Using a 
simple scatter plot of 43 yield observations from an unspecified number of trial locations during 
four seasons (1935-1938), Sutch shows that the relative yield of advantage of hybrids was 
greatest when yields were depressed due to drought. 
This can also be tested for South Africa since comparative trial data is available for the early 
adoption period, 1951 to 1954. It encompasses the results of between six and ten trial locations 
but unfortunately their results were averaged to report annual variety averages. Fortunately, this 
period included both drier (1951 & 1952) and wetter (1950 & 1953) years, as the growing season 
average rainfall (November to April) across trial locations38 calculated from the Lynch (2004)39 
rainfall database of Southern Africa. A comparison of aggregate hybrid and OPV yields (Table 4.3) 
during these seasons suggests that Sutch’s hypothesis also holds for the South African case since 
the hybrid advantage was greatest when yields were depressed during drier seasons. 
 
Table 4.3: Annual average yield hybrid and OPV and growing season rainfall 
 Average yield all trails (t/ha)  Hybrid advantage Growing season rainfall 
Year Hybrid Open pollinated  (OPV = 100) all trail locations (mm) 
1950 2.0 1.5  133.7 662.2 
1951 1.6 1.1  140.4 520.8 
1952 1.6 1.3  126.7 463.7 
1953 2.1 1.7  123.7 628.1 
Source: See text, own calculations. 
 
To improve the robustness of this preliminary conclusion and extend Sutch’s analysis, I 
exploit the fact that the average yield of up to eight hybrids and eleven OPVs were reported40 
during for four-year period, hence these can be combined into 199 unique hybrid-OPV 
combinations. These are plotted in Figure 4.5, with OPV yields represented by the horizontal axis 
and the vertical axis showing the hybrid to OPV yield differential expressed as an index of the 
                                                     
38Nine of the ten locations were included since the location of the tenth was not reported. Districts included: Potchefstroom, 
Delmas, Bethal, Standerton, Klerksdorp, Coligny, Bothaville, Kroonstad, Bethlehem. 
39Lynch's (2004) database includes daily rainfall observations from 12 153 weather station across South Africa between 1850 and 
2000. 
40 Not all included each year, number of hybrids and OPVs each year: 1950:2, 4; 1951: 3, 5, 1952: 8, 11; 1953: 8,11 
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OPV yield. The growing season is indicated by the point type while the point colour shows the 
hybrid variety used in the relative yield comparison.  
 
Figure 4.5: Relative advantage hybrid to OPV 
Source: Laubscher et al. (1954: 131) 
 
Two observation clusters are evident as the low and high yield observations because of 
drier (1951 & 1952) and wetter (1950 & 1953) seasons. If viewed collectively it is evident that the 
greatest yield differentials were observed when OPV yields were most depressed. Furthermore, 
this relationship is polynomial and convex with respect to the origin, hence the yield advantage 
of hybrids over OPVs increases at an increasing rate as OPV yields become more depressed. In 
other words, the advantage of hybrid over open pollinated maize is the greatest when rainfall is 
low, but the advantage diminishes as rainfall increases. This is also true when comparing 
individual hybrids and OPVs. To confirm the presence of the observable polynomial trend a 
simple OLS model was devised:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 100 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the hybrid to OPV yield index of the hybrid-OPV combination 𝑖𝑖 during year 𝑡𝑡, 
𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝑂𝑂 and 𝑂𝑂2 is the OPV yield and OPV yield squared, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 are fixed effects if included 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. Fixed effects for the OPVs and Hybrids were included in the model to 
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isolate the impact of their time-invariant characteristics on the relative yield index. In other 
words, by including them as fixed effects within the model it removes the impact of their 
characteristics that does not change over time from the model, thereby allowing me to study 
their nett effect on relative yields. 
The model results (Table 4.4) show that the inclusion of the OPV and/or hybrid fixed effects 
does not have an impact on the statistical significance of the predictor variables, but the inclusion 
of both improves the adjusted R squared, as the indicator of goodness of fit, from 0.329 to a 
respectable 0.742. As expected, the function is convex with respect to the origin since the 
coefficient of OPV yield is negative and the squared term thereof positive, thus confirming that 
the relative yield advantage of hybrid maize increases at an increasing rate as yields are 
depressed because of drought.  
 
Table 4.4: Relative yield advantage model, hybrid vs open pollinated varieties (OPV) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Relative hybrid to OPV yield 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OPV yield -132.311*** -154.592*** -124.748*** -145.070*** 
 (38.535) (34.857) (33.861) (27.180) 
OPV yield squared 34.314*** 45.386*** 32.074*** 42.621*** 
 (12.895) (11.699) (11.322) (9.115) 
Constant 245.341*** 247.953*** 239.769*** 240.614*** 
 (28.097) (25.702) (24.623) (19.997) 
OPV FE? No Yes No Yes 
Hybrid FE? No No Yes Yes 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
R2 0.329 0.555 0.505 0.742 
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.526 0.481 0.714 
Residual Std. Error 11.824 (df = 196) 
9.885 
(df = 186) 
10.340 
(df = 189) 
7.673 
(df = 179) 
F Statistic 47.979
*** 
(df = 2; 196) 
19.311*** 
(df = 12; 186) 
21.427*** 
(df = 9; 189) 
27.074*** 
(df = 19; 179) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
4.4.3 Adoption rates and rainfall 
To test whether drier regions were earlier or quicker adopters of hybrid maize, I compare 
regional hybrid adoption rates and the 75 per cent adoption thresholds with the corresponding 
regional growing season average rainfall. To do so I overlay Lynch's (2004) rainfall database with 
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the spatialised maize region boundaries (shown in Figure 4.2) to allocate the respective weather 
stations41 to maize regions. Thereafter I restrict the observations to the growing season 
(November to April), I then calculate the average rainfall observed per region between 1918 and 
2000. Seeing that only three regions had reached full adoption when reporting was ceased in 
1971, I project adoption levels forward by ten years to establish when the respective regions first 
reaches a 75 per cent acceptance level. The projected year in which the acceptance exceeds 75 
per cent is shown in the last column of Table 4.2. Missing observations are either the result of 
statistically insignificant adoption rates or the fact that the projected adoption threshold did not 
exceed 75 per cent at the end of the projection period.  
Rainfall does not show an apparent relationship with either the adoption rate or the timing 
of adoption as the projected 75 per cent threshold. It is possible that such a relationship is simply 
non-existent, especially since the Rand and Western Transvaal are both the earliest and quickest 
adopters but also the highest and lowest rainfall areas respectively. But it goes without saying 
that the analysis is also hampered by the small number (7) of regional observations of differing 
sizes. Another limitation stems from the fact that the adoption and rainfall indicators represent 
regional averages, but both are location specific. In other words, production and rainfall is not 
distributed evenly across regions. Hence more granular data would be required for such an 
analysis.  
However, other studies have shown that farmers in lower rainfall areas are more likely to 
adopt improved maize varieties. For example, Kaliba et al. (2000) showed that Tanzanian 
smallholders who farm in the relatively drier lowland areas of the country were 25 per cent more 
likely to adopt improved maize varieties.  
4.5 Private hybrid adoption and rainfall 
As stated earlier, the elite private hybrids replaced the public hybrids in rapid succession 
after their introduction in the mid-1960s. Although the share of public hybrids declined from 89.3 
to a mere 1.4 per cent between 1970 and 1981, public hybrids saw a brief resurgence thereafter 
to peak at a 29.5 per cent share by 1986, before declining to an average of 3.2 per cent between 
1990 and 1993 (Figure 4.5, panel a). The replacement of public by elite private hybrids can be 
disaggregated by maize type: In 1970 the share of white to yellow public S.A. hybrids was 
substantially higher at 93.8 versus 82.7 per cent, whereas both showed a concordant decline 
                                                     
41 Note the number of weather stations vary across time.  
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thereafter, the white-yellow order was reversed post 1981. By 1986 the white public hybrids 
represented 24.6 per cent of total hybrid sales compared to a 33.9 share of yellow. This reversal 
between white and yellow carried through until 1993 with a share of 1.5 and 4.7 per cent for 
white and yellow public hybrids respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Share of public (S.A.) hybrids in total seed sales 
Source: Maize Board Annual Reports (1972–1994) 
Notes:  No data reported for 1987 
 
The exact cause of the brief reversal in the relative importance of public hybrids during the early 
1980s is uncertain. It is worth noting that the period 1981 to 1985 was exceptional in the sense 
that the above average yields that propelled South African maize production to a high of 14.87 
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million tons in 1981 (only surpassed by 2014, 14.92 million tons) was followed by consecutive 
droughts (Greyling & Pardey, 2018b). A possible explanation is that the older public hybrids could 
have been more suitable under drought conditions, or farmers simply opted for the older public 
varieties as a cost saving measure. However, it could also have been a matter of seed supply since 
the resurgence in public hybrids also coincided with increases in total seed sales as shown in 
Figure 4.6 panels b and c. These increases were substantial, for example between 1982 and 1983 
the demand for white hybrids showed a more than two-fold increase, while the demand for 
yellow hybrids increased by 34.1 per cent.  
It is worth noting that the South African seed industry experienced substantial changes 
during the 1980s, with the number of private companies declining from ten to six, the state 
ceased to control the price of hybrid seeds and started to shift its duties of laboratory seed testing 
and seed certification to the private sector (Rusike, 1995). This took place in the context of a 
South African economy and agricultural sector in turmoil following the depreciation of the rand 
and increase in interest rates from 10.1 to 21.8 per cent between 1983 and 1984. As a result, 
interest payments became the single largest production cost to farmers. In addition, farmer 
support spending declined by 50 per cent after 1987, in part because of the partial deregulation 
of maize marketing in 1988 (Kirsten, Van Zyl & Van Rooyen, 1994). 
Figure 4.7 provides a disaggregated perspective on the regional public hybrid displacement 
with the region name and growing season average rainfall shown on the right. It shows that 
farmers in drier districts were quicker to adopt the elite private hybrids and were also less likely 
revert to public hybrids during their resurgence in the 1980s. In fact, the lower the average 
rainfall of the region, the more subdued the public resurgence, with the lowest rainfall districts 
showing almost none. This suggests that relative drought tolerance was not a driver of the 
resurgence of public hybrids given the popularity of elite private hybrids in drier production 
regions; hence an alternative explanation should be sought for the resurgence of public hybrid 
use.  
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Figure 4.7: Share of public hybrids in total seed sales by maize region 
Source: See text 
Notes: See Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for meaning of abbreviated district names. Growing season average rainfall indicated to the left 
of region labels. 
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4.6 Measuring rainfall productivity 
At this stage I know that the relative yield advantage of hybrid to open pollinated maize 
was greatest during droughts, but I cannot say whether drier regions adopted hybrid maize at a 
quicker rate or earlier date. But I do know that drier regions adopted elite private hybrids at an 
earlier data and were more steadfast after switching to it. Seeing as the selection for drought 
tolerance was a core objective of the early breeding programme, I attempt to estimate how 
successful they were in achieving this objective. To do so I calculate a simple rainfall productivity 
indicator as the yield per unit of rainfall: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the rainfall productivity index of municipal district 𝑖𝑖 during census year 𝑡𝑡, 
while 𝑦𝑦 and 𝑅𝑅 are the relevant average yield and growing season rainfall respectively.42 The 
district level yield observations were obtained from the spatially standardised agricultural census 
data prepared by Greyling, Senay and Pardey (2018).43 The average district level growing season 
rainfall is calculated using a spatial overlay with the Lynch (2004) data, but now I use the 2007 
ADM 3 municipal boundaries to ensure that the boundaries agrees with the yield observations.44 
I exclude the Cape province as a predominantly winter rainfall area since most of the crop in this 
region is irrigated.45 To ease the interpretation of my rainfall productivity indicator I transform it 
to a simple single unit index with 1950 as base year since it was the last census year before the 
adoption of hybrid maize. To summarise the temporal change in my index, I fit a Generalized 
Additive Model (GAM) with integrated smoothness estimation (see Wood, 2018; Wood, Pya & 
Säfken, 2016) to the indexes calculated.  
Figure 4.8 shows the fitted model results with the shaded area showing the 95 per cent 
confidence interval around the estimate. It shows that rainfall productivity showed little change 
between 1918 and 1950 but increased sharply thereafter before levelling off at a 4-fold increase 
                                                     
42 This is similar to the Rainfall Use Efficiency (RUE), which also takes into account the pre-season rainfall and the change in the 
soil profile water content between consecutive harvests (Bennie, Hoffman & Coetzee, 1995). The pre-season rainfall was excluded 
due to differences in soil water retention and management practises, while change in the soil water balance is unknown. While 
these assumptions would not invalidate the analysis, they could result in an overestimation of rainfall productivity. 
43 Agricultural censuses included: 1918, 1922, 1930, 1937, 1946, 1950, 1956, 1960, 1965, 1971, 1976,1981, 1983, 1988 and 1993. 
These were reported according to magisterial district boundaries (or ADM2, administrative district 2 boundaries). The production 
and area data were disaggregated to a five-arc minute cell or pixel that represents an area that is 10km2 using the 2005 SPAM 
dataset (You et al. 2017) and re-aggregated to the 2007 ADM 3 municipal boundaries. 
44 The 2002 and 2007 censuses could not be included given the time period covered by Lynch (2004).  Attempts were made to 
obtain more recent data from the South African Weather Service but without success. 
45District level irrigation data is only reported in the 2002 and 2007 censuses.  
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by 1981 (relative to 1950) whereafter it inched upward to a 4.2-fold increase by 1993. The 
slowdown after 1981 can be contributed to various factors. From the figure it is clear that the 
growth in rainfall productivity accelerated during the 1970s, possibly because of the adoption of 
the elite private hybrids as discussed in Section 4.5. However, this process was completed by the 
early 1980, which could have contributed to the slowdown in yield growth. Adverse weather 
could also have been a contributing factor. While 1981 was characterised by exceptionally good 
yields, the same cannot be said for 1983 and 1993 since these census years coincided with 
droughts wherein they received 60 and 80 per cent of their respective long term (1918–1993) 
growing season average (Lynch (2004), own calculations), thus explaining the decline in the index.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Rainfall productivity 
Source: See text 
Notes:  Base year, 1950 
 
Although the post–1950 increase in water-use efficiency coincides with the adoption of 
hybrid maize, in cannot be regarded as the sole driver thereof since it also coincided with the 
adoption of other yield increasing technologies such as fertiliser, pesticides, herbicides and 
others (see Liebenberg and Pardey 2012; Liebenberg 2013). During this time farmers also 
benefitted from research on improved farming practices that maximised rainfall utilisation in 
dryland production, especially maize and wheat. This includes research on the benefits of deep 
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tillage practices whereby sandy soils are mechanically loosened to a depth of 1,200mm to ensure 
root penetration of up to 2,000mm, thereby enabling greater access to soil water and thus 
increased production and resistance to drought. Subsequent research also showed the 
advantages of combining this with a controlled wheel traffic and strip tilling production system. 
Herein equipment only traverses the field on established ‘tramlines’, thereby limiting compaction 
to these areas, which can be easily corrected during or after the season. In addition, the maize is 
planted in wide row widths of between 1,500 to 2,100mm46 on the same strips each year, with 
only the soil underneath each row loosened prior to planting (Bennie & Botha, 1986; Bennie, 
Hoffman & Vrey, 1994; Bennie, Hoffman & Coetzee, 1995). 
Albeit caveated, the objective of the hybrid breeding programme to improve drought 
tolerance seems to have been successful. This was also the case with the elite private hybrids 
given the continued increase in rainfall productivity following their adoption during the 1970s 
and their popularity among lower rainfall regions as discussed in Section 4.5.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The seven-fold increase in South African maize yields between 1950 and 2015, largely due 
to the adoption and continued improvement of hybrid maize, is remarkable. However, the fact 
that South African hybrid maize adoption lagged the U.S. by more than twenty years is surprising 
given the early efforts to import U.S. breeding techniques and material. A distinguishing 
difference between the two is the extent of private involvement in hybrid development and 
distribution. Unlike the U.S., where private seed companies played a central role from an early 
stage, the South African government curtailed private seed companies during the early stage of 
hybrid adoption. In addition to taking responsibility for hybrid breeding, multiplication and 
distribution, the State through the Hybrid Maize Scheme also set the price of hybrid seed too low 
to incentivise private investment. This was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the U.S. where 
breeders enjoyed early protection of intellectual property and a formalised seed market, the 
same rights were only extended to South African breeders by the 1960s. This resulted in supply 
shortages, decreased overall research and development spending (as evidenced by the limited 
progress during the first decade of the Scheme’s existence) and prevented private seed 
companies from accessing international breeding material prior to the protection of biological 
                                                     
46 For comparative purposes 86 per cent of US maize is planted at 762mm with the remainder being planted at between 381 to 
1000mm (Jeschke, 2018) 
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property rights. This study therefore echoes the findings of studies that stress the importance of 
plant variety protection for the securing of private research funding (Perrin, Kunnings & Ihnen, 
1983; Knudson & Pray, 1991). 
Collectively these factors delayed the initial hybrid development and adoption, and the 
limited progress of the Scheme slowed the rate of adoption once it got underway. However, the 
formalisation of the seed market in 1963 and the protection of biological property rights in 1964 
enabled South African seed companies to access superior breeding material through strategic 
partnerships with U.S. seed companies. While the first ‘elite’ private hybrids were only registered 
in 1965, by 1978/9 they out-yielded the public hybrids by 41 per cent and consequently replaced 
their public counterparts by 1981. I also show that drier production regions adopted the elite 
private hybrids at an earlier date and were less likely to revert back to public hybrids thereafter.  
The sub-national adoption of hybrid maize in South Africa, as in the U.S., showed wide 
regional differences both in the timing and rate of acceptance. Unlike the U.S. this cannot be 
attributed to differences in the relative importance of regions, since the smallest and second 
largest South African maize regions were the first to adopt hybrid maize, possibly due the more 
democratic allocation of research funding. I also cannot find a link between climate and the 
timing or speed of adoption, but I do find evidence that the hybrid advantage was greatest when 
yields were depressed during drought. In addition to confirming Sutch’s hypothesis, I extend it 
by showing that this relationship is polynomial, hence the yield advantage of hybrids over OPVs 
increases at an increasing rate as OPV yields become more depressed.  
Lastly, I test whether breeding efforts directed towards drought tolerance came to fruition 
by constructing a rainfall productivity indicator as an index that reflects the yield per unit of 
growing season rainfall. I find that while rainfall productivity was largely unchanged between 
1918 and 1950 as the period prior to hybrid adoption, it showed a 4.2 -fold increase between 
1950 and 1993. While not entirely attributable to public R&D spending, it contributes yet another 
example to those highlighted by Alston et al. (2010) of how the persistence in such spending 
pays.  
The South African hybrid maize breeding programme provides pertinent example of how 
drought focussed research efforts can deliver transformative results. The finding that the relative 
advantage of hybrid maize is greatest during droughts, and that this advantage increases at an 
increasing rate as yields become more depressed, is especially important when devising climate 
adaptation strategies for smallholder farmers. This suggests that the use of hybrid maize should 
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be promoted among smallholder farmers, not only to increase overall productivity but also to 
mitigate climate risk, thereby increasing their overall climate resilience and thus food security. 
This is currently under-emphasised within the climate change literature; in some studies it is 
included as one several adaptation strategies (see for example Stringer et al., 2009), but others 
disregard it completely (see for example Morton, 2007; Cooper et al., 2008). An notable 
exception is Hellin et al (2014), who recommend the adoption of heat and drought stress-tolerant 
improved maize varieties as a means whereby smallholders can adapt to clime change. They 
continue that such a strategy is not without challenges, in Mexico the adaption has been low 
since smallholders prefer their local land races because of culinary, agronomic, and cultural 
considerations. Hence, they suggest that public institutions should focus on both the promotion 
of improved maize varieties and improving landraces themselves. 
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Politics, production and productivity:  
20th century farm policies and the spatial 
consequences for maize production 
5.1 Introduction 
For much of the 20th century, South African agriculture took place in the presence of a 
potent, albeit evolving, package of distortionary farm (and broader economic and social) policies. 
The policy foundation for the transition from suppressing to supporting the agricultural sector 
took place well before the start of overt Apartheid, with these policies being put into practice 
beginning with the Malan government in 1948 (Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). These 
ushered in a golden age of support wherein South African agriculture operated under a host of 
policy and institutional instruments that favoured agriculture relative to other sectors of the 
economy. These sectoral policy distortions occurred in the context of other policies that either 
de facto or de jure favoured commercial (mostly white) over smallholder (largely black) farmers. 
Discriminatory policies against smallholder agriculture included restrictions on precisely where 
in the country these farmers could grow their crops, the total amount of land accessible to black 
farmers, and limits to their access to markets and agricultural support measures (see for example 
Bundy, 1988; Van Onselen, 1996; Vink, Kirsten & Van Zyl, 2000). Policies that favoured 
commercial producers included subsidised long-term credit, farmer settlement programmes, 
controlled marketing and capital tax concessions (see for example Brits, 1969; De Klerk, 1983; 
Vink, 1993; Letsoalo & Thupana, 2013).  
Although the racially-based (discriminatory) Apartheid policies persisted for decades, they 
were eventually dismantled, beginning during the early 1980s and accelerating with the de Klerk 
government in 1991–92 that ushered in the Mandela government with the 1994 election, the 
first under universal suffrage in the history of South Africa. However, changes to the many 
distortionary policies affecting the country’s farm sector predated the broader reforms to the 
Apartheid policies. They included the gradual withdrawal of direct price supports and other input 
and output subsidies to the agricultural sector, beginning with the policy reforms launched in the 
early 1980s, and continuing with the subsequent post-apartheid (i.e., post–1994) liberalization 
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of international trade and deregulation of domestic agricultural marketing programs, processes 
that were all largely complete by the late–1990s (Vink et al. 2017). 
I show that the changing orientation of these farm policies had a profound effect on the 
structure of production agriculture in South Africa. I use the changing fortunes of maize 
production to illustrate the complex, but clearly evident, interplay between changing farm policy 
regimes and changing agricultural production realities. Maize has long been, and still is, the 
dominant crop grown in South Africa, accounting for 82.5 per cent of the 3.67 million hectares 
sown to cereal crops in 2015 (and 50.6 of the country’s cropped area when averaged over the 
period 1948–2007) (Liebenberg, 2012; DAS, 2018; Greyling & Pardey, 2018b). It is also an 
important source of calories, accounting for 28 per cent of the country’s 3,022 calories consumed 
per capita per day in 2013 (FAO 2018).47 
To assess the policy-production-productivity interactions, I compiled a timeline of policy 
prescriptions and practices that waxed and waned over the course of the 20th century. For 
extended periods of time, albeit less so of late, these polices provided substantial targeted 
support to production agriculture (including maize), and for much of that time favoured 
commercial (largely white) over smallholder (mainly black) farming interests. I juxtaposed that 
policy timeline against a time-series decomposition of a new, historical (1904–2015) compilation 
of maize production statistics—specifically maize area planted and grain yields—and relative 
domestic versus international farm gate prices.  
An additional, and especially hard won, feature of my compilation is the spatial 
disaggregation of maize production indicators (i.e., yield, planted area, and output) to a spatially 
standardized set of municipal boundaries. Given the complex interactions between spatially 
variable environmental factors (including soil, temperature, rainfall, and pests and diseases) and 
crop genetics, the realized yield and output performance of a crop are closely linked to these 
environmental fundamentals. Thus, cropping agriculture is an intrinsically location specific 
production process, but these locational choices are also subject to distortionary policy 
influences. 
To presage my main findings, I show that the shifting orientation of distortionary farm 
polices accord closely with changes in maize production patterns. The period during which the 
South African policy landscape most favoured agriculture —beginning in the late 1930s and 
                                                     
47 Maize is also the most important staple food crop throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa), accounting, on 
average, for 18 per cent of the region’s per capita calorie consumption (of 2,556 calories per person per day) in 2013 (FAO 2017). 
A large share (17 per cent) of the region’s maize production occurred in South Africa.  
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tailing off by the 1990s— was when the area under maize production expanded markedly and 
yield growth took off. Notably, during this same period, maize marketing interventions resulted 
in domestic maize prices that generally exceeded a reference external (specifically a United 
States average) maize price. As these farm-favourable policies were gradually abandoned, 
beginning in 1983, the area under maize production fell, eventually returning in 2015 to the area 
sown to the crop almost 83 years earlier (in 1932) before many of these supportive farm policies 
were in place48. The rate of growth in maize yields began to accelerate during the mid–1990s as 
the policy bias towards agriculture diminished. The internal–external price differentials also 
gradually diminished so that by 2015 the price received by South African farmers was 3.949 per 
cent above that of U.S. farmers, compared to an average of 31.1 per cent above the U.S. price 
between 1948 and 1998 (see Figure 2). 
Notably, my new spatial production data reveal another important, and hitherto little 
studied (at least by economists), policy-induced distortion in the location of agricultural 
production. The favourable production policies also induced a substantial expansion of the 
physical footprint of production in those areas that had hitherto supported little (if any) maize 
production. I show that the policy-induced expansion of maize area drew in new locations with 
relatively lower maize yields than the areas that supported the bulk of the country’s maize 
production prior to these policy distortions. In other words, the policies sufficiently undermined 
environmentally-based spatial comparative advantages to spur production in these less-
favourable parts of the country. Once the sectoral support policies were removed, not only did 
the total area in maize contract markedly, production largely reverted back to the geographical 
areas with intrinsically higher production (yield) potential. The exceptions to this post-reform 
area reallocation are the irrigated areas along the Vaal and Orange Rivers, and to a lesser extent 
the Western and Southern Cape region. Government support to the instillation of irrigation 
infrastructure (which was at its zenith in the period 1940–1980,(Van Vuuren, 2010a,b)) induced 
a longer lasting change in the geography of South African maize production, indicating that it is 
not just the amount, but also the form of the support, that has consequences for economic 
activity.  
                                                     
48 Commercial maize area. 
49 As a 5-year centred average, see Section 5.2 below for the sources.  
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5.2 Data: Measuring maize 
5.2.1 Aggregate production 
Quantifying the historical pattern of maize production in South Africa (and the rest of the 
African continent for that matter) is tricky. The coverage, completeness and composition of the 
reported data vary over the 98 years encompassed by my series spanning the period 1918–2015, 
often reflecting shifts in prevailing policy and political norms. The data problems I confronted 
included changes in the definition of what was being measured, how it was being measured, and 
in some cases a lack of measurements altogether. Given these inconsistencies, I endeavoured to 
cross-reference my final estimates wherever possible, using a host of historical articles, book 
chapters, industry reports and official documents. All the primary data were digitized, and all the 
steps in converting these data to the estimates presented in this paper were coded or otherwise 
documented to ensure data replicability.  
For my time-series analyses I drew primarily on the Agricultural Censuses and Surveys 
conducted by Statistics South Africa, the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics published by the 
Directorate of Agricultural Statistics of the national Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, and data reported annually since 1911 by the South African Grain Information Service 
(SAGIS) (see Greyling & Pardey (2018) for more specific details). South African maize production 
comes from both commercial and smallholder producers. Unfortunately, the smallholder 
production (specifically planted area and average yields) data are less comprehensive (and less 
reliable) than data on commercially grown maize, and so my formal assessment of the time-series 
properties of South African maize production relies only on my commercial maize compilation. 
Nonetheless, for the period 1935–2015 in which I compiled both commercial and total (inclusive 
of smallholder) production, the series closely track each other.50 
My time-series decomposition of maize price differentials used the average price received 
by South African farmers (primarily taken from Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (1970, 2018) and 
SAGIS (2018)) and average price received by U.S. farmers (taken from USDA (2018)). Both price 
series were deemed representative of the national average maize price received by farmers. The 
U.S. price is measured in real (2009) U.S. dollars, the South African price in real (2009) Rand, 
                                                     
50 For example, a linear regression of the form y = α + βx, where y is total maize production (in tons) and x is the commercial 
maize production, the R2 = 0.9986, β = 1.02(and is statistically indistinguishable from 1.0), and α = 343 158 (close to the period 
average area sown to smallholder production of 374 238 tons). My estimates suggest that the smallholder share of total South 
African production peaked in 1924 at 28.4 per cent, declining to 13.0 per cent of total national production by 1960, 4.3 per cent 
in 1974, and recovered to 6.3 in 2015 (Greyling and Pardey 2018b, Figure 3, Panel a). 
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converted to 2009 U.S. Dollars after deflation using the period average official exchange rate as 
published by The World Bank (2018). 
For my assessment of the spatial production implications of the spatialized South African 
maize output, area and yield data used in this paper I primarily drew on 17 national agricultural 
censuses conducted by Statistics South Africa and its prior variants; the first agricultural census 
in my sample reports data for the agricultural year ending in 1918 and the last ending in 2007.51 
5.2.2 Spatializing measures of maize production 
To assess the historical performance of the South African maize sector from a spatially 
explicit perspective required compiling and standardizing a spatial representation of sub-national 
production, area planted and yield data. From the Agricultural Censuses I extracted tabulated, 
subnational (specifically magisterial district) data for 17 census years beginning in 1918.52 Given 
the number of magisterial districts grew over time—from 207 in 1918 to 321 in 2007—and the 
boundaries of some districts changed as well, major effort was invested in matching district-level 
tabular to geo-coded boundary data, and then standardizing the areal representation of these 
data in a spatially explicit format.  
Using a slightly modified version of the procedure developed by Beddow and Pardey 
(2014), the first step in developing a standardized areal representation of the data was to digitize 
and then geo-code the boundaries of all the magisterial districts using several printed map 
sources spanning the years 1918 to 2007, as described in detail by Senait et al. (2018). Then all 
the district data were mapped to the district boundaries for the closest available year, and each 
of the districts were subsequently divided into arrays of five arc-minute pixels.53 By this means, 
the data for each year were converted from areal (district polygon) to raster (pixelated) data, 
allocating the district’s production and area to each pixel in proportion to the pixel’s share of the 
district area or production obtained from the year 2005 spatial representation of production and 
                                                     
51 The discrepancy between the total production and area planted reported in the 2002 and 2007 Censuses, and the totals 
reported in the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics and other sources such as SAGIS is well known. Since this paper concerns itself 
primarily with differences in the spatial allocation of the area planted and yield, these discrepancies are deemed less important 
if the error is equal across all districts, but it is uncertain if this is the case. This will have to be tested in future research.  
52 Specifically, the agricultural censuses report on data for the agricultural years ending in 1918, 1922, 1930, 1937, 1946, 1950, 
1956, 1960, 1965, 1971, 1976,1981, 1983, 1988, 1993, 2002 and 2007. Thus, for example, 1918 refers to the agricultural year 
1917/1918, which spans the months September to August. Notably, the Union Census of 1911 reports some agricultural data, 
and there has been no agricultural census taken in South Africa after 2007. All agricultural statistics are reported according to the 
magisterial districts used in the South African legal system. These spatial aggregates are smaller than district municipalities (or 
ADM2, administrative district 2 boundaries) but larger than local municipalities (ADM 3), thus they represent a set of “ADM 2.5” 
boundaries. 
53 A five-arc minute cell or pixel represents an area that is 10km2 at the equator. For more information see 
http://harvestchoice.org/labs/how-big-one-5-arc-minute-grid-cell 
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area obtained from the 2005 SPAM dataset (You et al. 2017). This does not imply that the pixels’ 
share of the district’s production and area was invariant between 1918 and 2007 but rather that 
the maize suitability of each was invariant. 
Finally, the raster data were then re-aggregated according to year–2007 district 
boundaries, resulting in a standardized panel of production and harvested area data, all mapped 
to the 2007 ADM 3 municipal district boundaries.  
5.2.3 A chronology of South African maize policies 
Maize has not always been such a dominant (food) crop in South Africa.54 Burtt-Davy (1914, 
pp. 13–14) writes that maize found its way to South(ern) Africa by way of Portuguese seafarers, 
prior to the establishment of the Cape of Good Hope settlement of the Dutch East India Company 
in 1652, but remained principally a (semi-)subsistence food crop until the middle of the 19th 
century.55 The onset (beginning in 1867) and then rapid expansion of diamond mining, followed 
by gold mining in 1886, along with the associated expansion of the rail network, acted as a 
catalyst for commercial maize to feed the rapidly growing mining workforce (Burtt-Davy 1914, 
pp. 58-60;Gilbert 1933; Morrell 1988; Trapido 1971). Proximity to the goldfields in Witwatersrand 
spurred a concentration of production within the South African equivalent of the U.S. Corn Belt 
known locally as the ‘Maize Triangle,’ with the towns of Carolina, Mafeking and Ladybrand 
located in the central north-eastern part of the country forming the corners of this triangle 
(Saunders 1930). 
South African (white and yellow, all farmers) maize production totalled just over 327,000 
tons in 1904 (Saunders 1930, Table 4), increasing substantially thereafter to around one million 
tons by 1915 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018b), and 2.1 million tons56 by 1925 (Saunders, 1930, Table 
4).57 While impressive, the expansion of maize production during the early decades of the 20th 
century was hampered by a policy regime that favoured mining interests over those of the 
broader agricultural sector (Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). A raft of support policies and 
                                                     
54 The principal crops grown in South Africa prior to the expansion of maize production were sorghum and millet (Burtt-Davy, 
1913). 
55 Other commentators have other opinions about the early introduction of maize to South(ern) Africa. Goodwin (1953, p. 13) 
dated the earliest cultivation of maize on the African continent to 1554 (at Takoradi on the Gold Coast) but reports that “[maize] 
had not reached the Cape by 1652… [and that] Van Riebeeck [a Dutch navigator and colonial administrator who founded Cape 
Town in 1652] asks that specimens of Indian Corn … be sent to the Cape for local experiment.” Jeffries (1967) claims it was 
introduced into Southern Africa much earlier by the Nguni people about 1400 and later by the baVenda. For further commentary 
on early maize production in (South) Africa see also Miracle (1966), Brits (1969), McCann (2001) and Bernstein (2004). 
56 See Greyling and Pardey (2018b) for an exposition on the reported and aggregated production and area totals. 
57 Bosman and Osborne (1924) and the Union Statistics (1960) report a similar 1904 production total of 361,169 tons. 
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government managed marketing practices introduced during the 1930s and 1940s shifted the 
policy landscape from one of suppressing to supporting agriculture (Jayne & Jones, 1997; 
Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018), with the nominal rate of assistance peaking at 31 per 
cent between 1980 and 1981 (Kirsten, Edwards & Vink, 2009). The major policy events during 
this and subsequent periods are summarised in Table 5.1. These are also classified with respect 
to the distortionary and discriminatory nature of their objective, with the latter subdivided into 
de jure and de facto to serve as an indication of whether the discrimination against black farmers 
was explicit or implicit.  
The area under maize continued to expand, peaking at 5.6 million hectares in 1964 
(Greyling & Pardey, 2018b). It shrunk steadily thereafter to just 3.0 million hectares in 2015. 
Despite this decline in maize area, production continued to grow during the latter half of the 20th 
century as average yields continued to increase, with production peaking at 14.87 million tons in 
1981. This record was superseded only 33 years later in 2014, albeit marginally so at 14.93 million 
tons. 
All these changes in maize production occurred in tandem with, and often in response to, 
the changes in government policies and practices summarised in Table 5.1, along with changes 
in grain milling and rural transportation infrastructure, plus research- and policy-enabled changes 
in input use (including irrigation, improved seed and mechanization). In addition to the large 
changes in the national area and output totals (and, implicitly, national average yields), this 
constellation of policy, technological, and logistical factors had hitherto unstudied consequences 
for the location of agricultural production in South Africa and its production cum productivity 
implications.  
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X  X 
Provide subsidized loans to commercial farmers 







1912 Land Settlement Act X 
 X 
1) Provided for the acquisition of state and privately-owned land to settle 
white farmers; the use of public funds to buy the land with the state 
subsidy of up to 80 per cent of the sale price; and the provision of 
advances for production costs. 










1913 Land Act X X  
Restricted black farmers to 7.3 per cent of available land and attempted to 
stem alternative land access strategies such as land tenure and 
sharecropping arrangements. 
Vink et al. 2018 347 
1922 Cooperative Societies Act 
  X It permitted the establishment of limited liability cooperative societies Brits 1969 202 
1936 Land Act  X  Released a further 5.7 per cent of available farmland for black farmers after being procured by the state 
Letsoalo & 
Thupana  2013 299 
1937 Marketing Act of 1937 X 
 X 
Controlled marketing - Establishes the state as the sole buyer and seller of 
most agricultural products. Pan-seasonal and territorial prices. 









  X First farmers settled on what is to become the biggest irrigation scheme in South Africa consisting of 29 100 hectares Van Vuuren 2010 24 
1939 Cooperatives Societies Acts 





   
Generally regarded as the start of grand apartheid. Pro-farmer, applies the 
policy foundation laid during the first part of the 20th century for broad-
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facto Author Year Page 
1962 Orange river scheme 
   Initiation of the Orange River scheme that would eventually expand the 
irrigated area in South Africa by 40 per cent 
Water 
Wheel 2010 21 
1966 Agricultural Credit Act X 
  WHY NO DESCRIPTION OR SOURCES LISTED HERE?    
1968 Marketing Act of 1968 
  X Revised the 1937 marketing act Vink  2004  
1971 Completion of Gariep dam 
   Biggest dam in South Africa and cornerstone of the Orange River Scheme  Water Wheel 2010 25 
1973 Subsidised interest  X 
 X Subsidised credit was provided to farmers through the Land Bank. Real interest rates were negative between 1970 and 1984 
The World 
Bank 1994 145 
1977 Capital tax concessions X 
  
Tax concession that enabled farmers to write down the entire cost of new 
machinery in the year of purchase, thereby reducing both their tax liability 
and the cost of new machinery 





   Reduced the machinery write down from 1 to 3 years, thereby reducing 






   The profits or losses of the stabilization fund could not be carried over, 
effectively forcing the board to link the South African price to the world 
price  





Act in 1991 






   Deregulation of agricultural marketing starting 1998 Vink et al. 2018 338 
2005 Cooperatives Act       Modernises existing cooperatives act 
Ortmann & 
King  2007 47 
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5.3 The nexus between policy, production and productivity 
5.3.1 Discriminatory policies: Smallholder–Commercial dualism 
Black and white farmers alike seized the opportunities provided by the mining boom during 
the second half of the 1800s, although the latter did not take lightly to the competition posed by 
the former (see Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). To stem competition from black farmers, 
various ‘apartheid’ policies were enacted by the state in favour of the interests of white farmers. 
These discriminatory policies led to the establishment of a dualistic agricultural system, wherein 
‘white agriculture’ enjoyed the benefits of agricultural support programmes, subsidised credit 
and controlled marketing. Not only were black farmers excluded from accessing these income 
support and marketing arrangements, their direct access to land was also restricted to just 14 
per cent of the available farmland in South Africa by way of the 1913 Land Act (and its successor 
laws). 58 To circumvent these land access restrictions, black farmers opted for various (informal) 
tenure, sharecropping, ‘squatting’ and other arrangements, all of which the state endeavoured 
to thwart over the years (see, for example, (Trapido, 1971; Bundy, 1972; Morris, 1976; Marcus, 
1989; Van Onselen, 1996; Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). Nonetheless, efforts to work 
around blatantly discriminatory policies were substantial; at its peak during the 1950s more than 
half of smallholder maize was produced on areas outside the former homeland reserves (Greyling 
& Pardey, 2018b).  
Ultimately these policy measures succeeded in establishing ‘two agricultures;’ one 
characterised by a relatively small (in numbers) group of mostly white ‘commercial farmers,’ the 
other characterised by a far larger group of mostly black ‘smallholder farmers’ (Lipton, 1977; Van 
Zyl et al., 1992). Unfortunately, the agricultural censuses fail to consistently report smallholder 
production, especially for the sub-national (provincial and municipality) aggregates that are 
central to the spatially explicit analyses in this paper. Nonetheless, Greyling and Pardey (2018b) 
estimated that while smallholders accounted for approximately 30 per cent of total maize output 
in 1911, that share dropped to about 20 per cent by the late 1930s and fell further to around 10 
per cent by the mid–1960s, where it remained until the end of apartheid in 1994. Despite the 
repeal of all racially based land measures in 1991 and the subsequent post-apartheid policy and 
land reform initiatives, the output share of smallholder farmers continued to decline to just 2.9 
                                                     
58 In this instance, farmland excludes government owned land, national parks and cities. Note that the farmed area includes both 
arable (e.g., seasonal crops) and non-arable (e.g., permanent crops and pasture) land.  
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per cent by 2007 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018). The inexorable decline in the contribution of 
smallholder production is partially attributable to the land access restrictions faced by 
smallholder producers (until 1991) but also reflects a continuing shortfall in their uptake of 
modern crop varieties and other agricultural technologies. Another manifestation of this 
agricultural dualism is that the maize yields of smallholders were estimated to be around 41 per 
cent of the yields realized by commercial farmers in 1935 falling to just 18.2 per cent of 
commercial yields by 2003, but then widening again to 37.3 per cent by 2015 (Greyling & Pardey, 
2018).  
This agricultural dualism also extends to the type of maize produced. White maize, which 
is predominantly consumed by humans as porridge (called mieliepap in Afrikaans, or phutu in 
Zulu), represents a major component of the South African maize market. It constituted around 
56 per cent of total commercial maize production during the period 1960–2007 (Greyling & 
Pardey, 2018).59  
Given the irregular and incomplete reporting of disaggregated data, the remainder of this 
paper will focus on commercial (white and yellow combined) maize production in South Africa 
between 1918 and 2007. Commercial maize production was the (increasingly) dominant source 
of the country’s maize output, averaging 96.3 per cent of total production in the decade ending 
in 2007 (and 86 per cent of production over the entire 1918–2007 period). 
5.3.2 Commercial production overview 
Figure 5.1 shows the production (solid line, panel a), area planted (panel b) and yield (solid 
line, panel c) of commercial maize production in South Africa between 1918 and 2015. 
Commercial maize output increased dramatically over this 89-year period, from just 0.9 million 
tons in 1918 to a peak of 14.4 million tons in 1981.60 From 1918 to peak production in 1981, 
commercial harvested area increased less than 3-fold (compared with an 11-fold increase in 
production), from about 1.8 million hectares to 4.3 million hectares, while average yields 
increased just over 4-fold (from 0.5 to 2.1 tons per hectare). Peak area occurred earlier than peak 
                                                     
59 Disaggregated data on white versus yellow maize production (and area) was first reported, it seems, in 1961. The production 
and area (and implicit yield) totals prior to 1961, from sources such as the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, consistently report 
aggregate white and yellow maize production and, with less consistency and less clarity, separate aggregate smallholder and 
commercial production (Liebenberg 2013; Greyling and Pardey 2018b).  
60 The 2014 commercial maize total of 14.3 million tons came close to that 1981 record. However, the 2014 figure was an 
anomalous total for its time (where the five year average for the period 2012-16 was 11.2 million tons), attributable to an 
exceptionally favourable growing season in 2014 (USDA, 2014). 
… 
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production (1968 versus 1981), given that maize yields continued trending up over the entire 
period, albeit with varying rates of growth over time (Greyling & Pardey, 2018). An average of 
12.1 million tons was produced in 2015, and although this is less than the 1981 peak, it 
nonetheless represents a 7.5-fold increase over 1937 production levels. 61 
 
Figure 5.1: Commercial maize production, area planted and yield, 1918–2015 
Source: Panel a) and c): See Greyling and Pardey, 2018b. Panel c): See text 
Notes:  Panel a) and c): The dotted line shows a fitted loess regression with the grey area around the fitted function 
showing a 95 per cent confidence interval for each plot. 
Panel b): The fitted trend is shown in green with the estimated break date indicated by the vertical dotted line. The 
95 per cent confidence interval around the break is shown in red. 
                                                     
61 Five-year average centred on 2015. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5: POLITICS, PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY 87 
 
5.3.3 The temporal concordance of policy and production in the commercial sector 
Empirical strategy 
To test the temporal concordance of policy and production, I compare the policy timeline above 
with empirically identified structural breaks in the maize area planted and real price series by 
using the procedures devised by Bai & Perron (1998, 2003a,b). This technique is novel in allowing 
for the endogenous detection of both the number and location of structural breaks. In other 
words, the number and location of breaks need not be specified beforehand since it is computed 
from the data provided. To this end, the technique uses a dynamic programming approach that 
applies the Bellman principle. In addition, the procedure enables the computation of confidence 
intervals around break points using a distribution function.62  
I examine the maize price breaks by regressing the real maize price on a constant to 
determine the time varying changes in the intercept (𝛿𝛿) of the price function (1), thereby 
estimating the average real dollar price received by farmers during each break period. The price 
function is specified as follow: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1 + 1, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  , 𝑗𝑗 = 1 , … ,𝑚𝑚 + 1 (1) 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the real dollar (2009) price of maize during period 𝑡𝑡, 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 is the intercept of the 
respective estimated break periods and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is the error term. Since the breakpoints are unknown, 
the objective of the analysis is to determines both their number 𝑚𝑚 and location 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗(𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚𝑚). 
By convention 𝑡𝑡0 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚+1 = 𝑇𝑇. In addition to the above, a break parameter (ℎ) must be set 
for the estimation of the breakpoints. It defines the minimum break period length, either in 
absolute terms as the minimum number of years or relative terms as the percentage share of all 
observations per segment. A relative share of between ℎ = 0.1 and ℎ = 0.15 is typical (Zeileis et 
al., 2002), but can be set as high as ℎ = 0.2 if serial auto-correlation is allowed (Bai & Perron, 
2003a: 15).  
Similarly, I the test for the area breaks by regressing the log of area planted (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) on time (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) to establish the break period average area growth rate (𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗) and break period intercept (𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗). 
The error represented by 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. The model is specified as follow: 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1 + 1, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  , 𝑗𝑗 = 1 , … ,𝑚𝑚 + 1 (2)  
   
                                                     
62 We implement my analysis in R using the “strucchange" package developed by Zeileis et al. (2002). It implements the Bai & 
Perron (2003a,b) procedure but does not allow partial break models. For more information see Zeileis & Kleiber (2005). I also 
want to thank Achim Zeileis for his help with the implementation. 
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Table 5.2: Maize price breaks (1911–2015) (2009 dollars) 











359.17 ** 265.69** 399.91** 302.35** 168.72** 
(12.54) (4.12) (13.83) (6.59) (10.55) 
Corresponding breakpoint estimates 
?̂?𝑡𝟏𝟏 𝑡𝑡𝟐𝟐 ?̂?𝑡𝟑𝟑 ?̂?𝑡𝟒𝟒  
1929 1942 1962 1987  
(1924–1934) (1941–1945) (1961–1963) (1986–1988)  
Adjusted R2 0.98    
F (5,100) 1098.00**    
Notes:  In brackets the standard errors (robust to serial correlation) for 𝜹𝜹�𝒊𝒊 = (𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏, … ,𝟓𝟓) and the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals for 𝑻𝑻�𝒊𝒊(𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏, … ,𝟒𝟒) 
Breaks were endogenously chosen based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)  
**Denotes statistical significance at the 5 per cent level 
 
The price break model results are shown in Table 5.2. I find four statistically significant price 
break points (𝒕𝒕�𝒊𝒊) in 1929 1942, 1962 and 1987 with the 95 per cent confidence interval around 
the respective breaks shown in brackets. The incept estimates (𝜹𝜹�𝒊𝒊) represent the period average 
price received by farmers with the robust63 standard errors showed in brackets. With respect to 
area (Table 5.3, Figure 5.1), I find five statistically significant area breaks (𝒕𝒕�𝒊𝒊) as 1930, 1948, 1965, 
1979 and 2000, with the 95 per cent confidence interval also in brackets. The coefficient 𝜷𝜷�𝑖𝑖 shows 
the average annual area growth per break given the log specification of the model; the robust 
standard errors are also shown in brackets. These results are incorporated within the discussion 
below to show the concordance between them and the changing nature of distortionary farm 
policies. 
  
                                                     
63 Wald tests of estimated coefficients using the Newey–West estimator 
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Table 5.3: Area breaks as logged 10 year centred moving average (1923–2011) 













0.029** 0.014** 0.022** 0.002** -0.017** -0.013* 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) 
Corresponding breakpoint estimates 
?̂?𝑡𝟏𝟏 ?̂?𝑡𝟐𝟐 ?̂?𝑡𝟑𝟑 ?̂?𝑡𝟒𝟒 ?̂?𝑡𝟓𝟓  
1930 1948 1965 1979 2000  
(1929–1931) (1947–1949) (1964–1966) (1978–1980) (1998–2001)  
Adjusted R2 0.98     
F (3,86) 73.58**     
Notes:  In brackets is shown the standard errors (robust to serial correlation) for 𝜹𝜹�𝒊𝒊 = (𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏, … ,𝟓𝟓) and the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals for 𝑻𝑻�𝒊𝒊(𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏, … ,𝟒𝟒) 
Breaks were endogenously chosen based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)  
*Denotes statistical significance at the 5 per cent level 
**Denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level 
 
5.3.4 Policy and price concordance: Implementation and reversal of controlled marketing 
While most of the policies highlighted in Table 5.1 affected the maize industry, State 
interventions in commodity markets served as the cornerstone of support. In this regard four 
policy events shown in are of special interest, namely the promulgation of the Agricultural 
Marketing of 1937, the election of the pro-farmer National Party in 1948, the partial deregulation 
of maize marketing in 1988 and the implementation of the Marketing of Agricultural Products 
Act of 1996 that resulted in virtually complete deregulation by 1998.  
Pre-regulation 
The first step towards controlled marketing of maize was taken in 1908 with the passing of 
the Cooperative Societies Act by the then Transvaal Government. It permitted the establishment 
of cooperative societies to counteract the perceived disproportionate influence of independent 
marketing middlemen on the price of maize (Brits, 1969). In addition, this was also seen as a 
means to counteract the dominance of the so called ‘alliance of maize and gold’, as the 
cooperation between the mines (as a major maize buyer) and maize farmers (Trapido, 1971; 
Morrell, 1988; Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018) was styled. However, the cooperative 
movement only started to gain traction as a result of growing discontent within the hegemony 
of maize and gold that drove bigger farmers to cast their lot with their smaller compatriots (see 
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Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). This was also aided by the promulgation of the 
Cooperative Societies Act of 1922, which permitted the establishment of limited liability societies. 
As a result, between 1922 and 1932 the number of cooperatives increased from 54 to 416, with 
their total membership expanding from 12 800 to 85 600. By 1932 the Central Agency (CA), as 
their overarching collective marketing body, controlled 60 per cent of all maize sold nationally 
during that year (Brits, 1969). Morrell (1988) argues that the CA was ineffectual in ensuring better 
prices for farmers; this is illustrated by the break model, which shows a decline in the average 
maize price from 359.17 dollar per ton between 1911 to 1929, to 265.69 dollar per ton between 
1930 and 1942 (Table 5.2). This also concords with a slowdown in the area expansion from an 
annual average of 2.9 per cent realised between 1922 to 1930, to an average of 1.4 per cent 
between 1931 and 1948. 
The regulated maize market 
The objective of collective marketing was realised with the promulgation of the Marketing 
Act of 1937, which replaced the CA. Hailed as the ‘Magna Carta of South African agricultural policy 
during the 20th century’ (Stanwix, 2012), the Act and its subsequent extensions eventually 
controlled the marketing of 90 per cent of agricultural output during most of the 20th century 
(Brits, 1969). In broad terms the Act had the objective of ensuring the ‘orderly marketing’ of 
agricultural produce through the establishment of various commodity control boards (Brits, 
1969). Between 1937 and 1944 the newly established Maize Control Board (hereafter Board) 
eased the industry toward controlled marketing through a trial and error implementation of the 
Act. Eventually the Board settled on a single channel fixed price system that established the 
Board as the sole maize buyer and seller of all maize in South Africa in accordance with a pan-
seasonal and pan-territorial price. In other words, throughout the season the Board purchased 
maize at fixed prices irrespective of delivery and sold it at fixed price64 throughout the season 
irrespective of purchasing location. The Board also had the monopoly on all maize exports and 
imports (Brits 1969). The Board determined the price of maize before the start of each season 
through farmer surveys, with the price set at the average surveyed production cost plus an 
allowance for operator’s earnings65 (Brits, 1969). For storage and handling the Board appointed 
                                                     
64 As the producer price plus transport, storage and handling costs. Pan territorial pricing was enabled by the cross subsidization 
of transport costs by producers close to consumers and vice versa. The system also rendered the MB as the sole importer and 
exporter of maize, as stabilization was used to capture profits or losses of exports (Vink, 2012). 
65 The MB’s price recommendation only became official after the approval by the Minister of Agriculture who also consulted with 
the National (Agricultural) Marketing Board (Brits, 1969). 
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local agents to act on its behalf; this was mostly entrusted to farmer cooperatives, thereby 
establishing them as regional monopolies (Kassier Committee, 1992; Vink, 2012). 
 
Figure 5.2: Prices and trade: SA vs U.S., SA price breaks and net trade share 
Source: See text 
Notes:  Panel b): The fitted trend is shown in green with the estimated break date indicated by the vertical dotted line. The 95 
per cent confidence interval around the break is shown in red. Panel c): The period average net export share is shown 
by the dotted horizontal line. Periods: 1911–1948, 1948–1988, 1989–2015 
 
The implementation of the Act is reflected in the price break analysis given the increase in 
the average price from $266 per ton during the preceding period to $400 per ton from 1942 to 
1962 (Table 5.2, Figure 5.2 panel b). While somewhat slower to respond, the average rate of area 
expansion accelerated from 1.4 per cent per annum between 1931 and 1948 to 2.2 per cent from 
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1949 to 1965 (Table 5.3, Figure 5.1 panel b). Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe (2018) argue that 
the Act was only leveraged to the farmers’ advantage after the pro-farmer National Party came 
into power in 1948. This is evidenced by the fact that South African maize price was consistently 
above the world price during most years in the second half of the nineteenth century, as shown 
in Figure 5.2 panel b.  
The inflated price was inevitable if allowed by the state since the Board was structurally 
biased toward farmers for two main reasons:  First, tasked with setting a ‘fair price’ for maize, 
the Board was not necessarily impartial since more than half of the board members were farmers 
themselves66 (Brits, 1969; Vink, 2012). Second, the overrepresentation of both small farmers and 
those in marginal areas in the price setting surveys inflated the average production cost and by 
implication the maize price (Brits, 1969; Vink, 2012). This incentivised the expansion of 
production into marginal regions (see for example Brits, 1969; Van Zyl, Fényes & Vink, 1992; The 
World Bank, 1994; Vink, 2004, 2012) and resulted in the production of substantial surpluses. Net 
exports as percentage of total production increased from 19.9 per cent before 1948 to 24.6 per 
cent between 1948 and 1988 (Figure 5.1 panel c). All the while the South African farm gate price 
was mostly maintained above the U.S. farm gate price; hence these surpluses had to be exported 
at a loss, with the taxpayer having to foot the bill because the export stabilisation fund was 
continually in arrears. 
The reduction in the average maize price from $400 per ton to $302 per ton between 1963 
and 1987 cannot be attributed to any specific policy event but rather follows the decline in the 
U.S. (global) price (Figure 5.2, Table 5.2). The decline in the real price predates the stalling in the 
area expansion of just 0.2 per cent between 1966 and 1979. After 1979 the marginal area 
expansion transitions into an annual average decline of 1.7 per cent that persisted until 2000. 
Post-regulation 
The first step towards the deregulation of the maize industry was taken in 1988 following 
the change to a single-channel pool scheme wherein the profits or losses of the stabilization fund 
could not be carried over to the next financial year. This effectively forced the board to link the 
South African price to the world price (Vink, 1993, 2012). This is echoed in the price break 
analysis, which reflects an almost 50 per cent decline in the average price from 302 to 169 dollars 
                                                     
66 One could argue that the MB did not have the final say in setting the price since the final decision rested with the Minister of 
Agriculture, but such a rebuttal was unlikely between 1948 and 1982 given the pro-farmer political regime at the time (Vink, 
2012; Greyling, Vink & Van der Merwe, 2018). 
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per ton after 1988, an average level around which it remains thereafter. The de jure deregulation 
of agricultural marketing commenced after the democratic transition in 1994, with the process 
completed by the end of 1998 following the implementation of the new Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act of 1996. This coincided with the liberalisation of trade and increased consumer 
spending, especially through greater animal protein consumption (Ronquest-Ross, Vink & Sigge, 
2015) that increased the demand for maize. The increased demand slowed the annual decline in 
the maize area planted to 1.3 per cent (from 1.7) after 2000 (Table 5.3, Figure 5.1panel b), with 
planted area stabilising since 2000. 
While the spatial impact of removing these policies is yet to be quantified, Breitenbach & 
Fényes (2000) argued that farmers shifted their marginal maize hectares into planted pastures, 
and Vink (2004) postulated that the reversal of the spatial distortions resulted in a north-
eastward shift in production. Vink et al. (2000) also suggested that it led to an increase in average 
yields and average farm size. 
5.4 South African maize production: a spatial assessment 
Location really matters for the productive performance of agriculture (Beddow et al., 2010; 
Beddow & Pardey, 2015),  and a host of location-centric questions stand unanswered. For 
instance, did the geographical pattern of maize production in South Africa also return to its early 
20th century footprint just as the total area under maize shrunk to its early 20th century totals? 
Do changes in the geographical patterns of relative yields support the notion that it was areas 
with less favourable agroecological attributes that benefited from the supportive policy 
environment of the first half of the 20th century as Brand et al. (1992) claimed? Have these same 
areas lost ground as the policy supports to maize production were withdrawn in later years? 
Beddow and Pardey (2014) showed that the shifting location of U.S. maize production during the 
20th century accounted for upwards of one-fifth of the growth in output of that crop in that 
country. Has the shifting location of South African production over the past 100 years been 
similarly beneficial to that country’s maize crop?  
To address these questions, I develop and deploy an entirely new, long-run, spatialized set 
of data on South African maize production for the period 1918 to 2007. The biological basis of 
maize production means that growing the crop is a spatially sensitive undertaking. Soil, climate, 
and pests and diseases vary from place to place, with potentially profound consequences for the 
production and productivity performance of a crop, and the abiotic (e.g., climate) and biotic (e.g., 
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pests and weeds) risks faced by farmers in growing that crop. Thus, changes in crop location have 
direct food security implications—especially for a staple African food crop such as maize—and 
motivate the spatially explicit, historical assessment of South Africa maize production presented 
here. 
5.4.1 The changing spatial concentration and pattern of production  
Figure 5.3 gives a mapped comparison of the change in the spatial concentration of South 
African maize area planted and yields between the 1937, 1976 and 200767 censuses. These were 
selected because the area planted in 1937 was similar to that of 2007 and hence these can be 
compared to see if the area planted and yield relativities remained the same. The 1976 census 
was included because it is the mid-point between when the area planted peaked in 1968 and 
when it started to decline after 1981. The panel a) shows the area planted per district expressed 
as the percentage share of the national area planted during the year in question, while the panel 
b) shows the average yield per district expressed as an index of the national average of that year. 
A side by side comparison of the area relativities (panel a) during the 1937, 1976 and 2007 
Censuses reveal two main trends: One, the number of districts in the largest national area share 
category (in the 4.4–7.7 per cent) increased between 1937 and 2007; and moved toward the 
western corner of the maize triangle in 1976 but partially reverted back east by 2007. Two, the 
districts southwest of the maize triangle increased in importance by 2007 but still represent a 
small total area share (< 0.9 per cent). The area planted in these districts increased because of 
the development of Orange River irrigation system. In addition, area was also added in the far 
southwest as the areas around Cape Town. 
With respect to relative yields (panel b), the figure shows that in 1937 and 1976 the districts 
with an above-average yield were concentrated in the eastern part of the maize triangle, as 
expected given the relatively higher rainfall (see Figure 5.5); this was also true for 2007. It also 
shows that in 2007 the districts with the highest yield of between 160 and 274 per cent above 
the national average were concentrated along the Orange Rver irrigation system.  
Statistics on irrigated production are only available for 2002 and 2007. During these years 
8 per cent of all maize was irrigated, yielding 18 per cent of national output. The development of 
irrigation (mostly pivot) infrastructure along the Orange River and its feeders followed the 
electrification of these areas from the late 1970s onward (Table 5.1). In 2007 the four largest 
                                                     
67 Note that the maps 1937 shows the average of the 1930 and 1937, 1976 the average of 1971 and 1976, and 2007 the average 
of 2002 and 2007. 
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irrigated areas by volume were Herbert, Prieska, Hopetown and Hartswater, all situated within 
the Orange River system, with irrigated output constituting between 80 to 96 per cent of their 
total output. 
The visual illustration of the concentration of maize production is quantified in Table 5.4. 
In 1918, 66 per cent of the country’s maize production occurred in 25 districts, which represented 
just 10.9 per cent of all maize producing districts (229) in that year. At the time the 45 districts 
within the maize triangle collectively produced 71.6 per cent of national output on 72.7 per cent 
of the area. Collectively they represented 20 per cent of all maize producing districts. By 1965 
the most important 25 districts produced 77.4 per cent of the national output on 71.6 per cent 
of the national area. The production and area share of 45 maize triangle districts increased to an 
all-time high of 86.8 and 81.0 per cent respectively. By 2007 the importance of the maize triangle 
districts had declined relative to 1965, encompassing 74.6 and 79.6 per cent of the national 
production and area share respectively. Before 1988 the maize triangle production shares 
consistently exceeded area shares, but this was reversed by the development of the higher 
yielding irrigation areas outside of the maize triangle as discussed.  By 2007 the top 25 districts 
were responsible for 68.5 and 71.3 per cent of the national production and area planted 
respectively, and represented 13 per cent of all maize producing districts.  
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Figure 5.3: South African district maize area share and yield, 1937, 1981 and 2007 
Source:  Authors construction, see text for sources. 
Notes: Panel a) shows area planted per district as a percentage of the national total. The legend shows the area share range as 0 – 0.2 per cent, 0.2 to 1.5 etc. Panel b) shows the relative 
yield per district expressed as an index of the national total in that year. The legend shows the range of relative yields as 20 –80, 80 – 120 etc. Outlier yields because of districts with 
a small area planted and production were removed for simplification and clarity. The maize triangle is indicated in all maps as the dotted triangle. 
0 
20 
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Table 5.4: Concentration of production in the 25 largest and maize triangle districts 












1918 10.9 65.9 65.5  19.7 72.7 71.6 
1922 10.9 70.1 67.5  19.7 75.8 69.8 
1930 11.0 68.2 67.9  19.7 75.1 72.8 
1937 11.0 67.5 69.7  19.8 75.3 76.6 
1946 11.0 66.2 68.5  19.8 75.4 75.7 
1950 11.0 69.6 73.4  19.7 77.0 81.0 
1956 11.2 71.5 75.7  20.1 80.1 83.6 
1960 11.1 71.3 76.5  20.0 79.8 85.4 
1965 11.1 71.6 77.4  19.9 81.0 86.8 
1971 11.4 70.3 74.3  20.5 80.3 83.2 
1976 12.0 71.6 72.5  21.5 81.0 82.2 
1981 12.8 72.4 72.9  23.0 81.3 82.6 
1983 12.4 72.4 74.1  22.3 81.8 82.5 
1988 13.7 75.0 70.8  24.7 84.1 80.9 
1993 13.0 75.2 70.1  23.4 85.3 78.4 
2002 13.8 75.1 70.9  24.9 83.7 78.3 
2007 13.0 73.1 68.5  23.3 79.6 74.6 
Source: Own calculation, see text for source 
 
The coarse estimate of the spatial reallocation of production provided by Figure 5.3 and 
Table 5.4 can be quantified even more concisely by considering the changes in the national 
centroids of output and area. The centroid, or mean centre68, of a spatial variable represents the 
point that minimises the sum of squared distances to all other points of that spatial variable. For 
example, the geographic centre of a symmetrical triangle formed by three points, would be an 
equal distance away from all three points. In this instance I calculate the geographic centre69 of 
each district and assume that all the production and area planted takes place at this point. 
Therefore, the centre point of each district has both a location and a weight. The centroid of 
production for a specific year represents the point on the map that minimises the sum of squared 
distances between the production weighted geographic centres of all the maize producing 
districts.  
                                                     
68 When a weighting is used, the centroid is sometimes referred to as the “mean center,” while “centroid” is reserved for 
unweighted, purely spatial, calculations. 
69 These were calculated according to the Albers Equal Area Conic projection as purposed by Snyder, (1987). See Beddow and 
Pardey (2013) for additional information. 
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Table 5.5 shows the area and production mean centres calculated for each census included 
in this study. The movement is expressed in kilometres to the east (easting) and north (northing), 
with negative values indicating movements in the opposite direction either west or south. Two 
types of indicators are shown with respect to each census and the output and area variables: the 
year-on-year movement of the respective centroids and their cumulative movement relative to 
1918.  
The results show that on the east-west plane, the area mean centre drifted westward 
toward regions with a relatively lower yield potential (see Figure 5.3 & 5.5); by 1965 it reached 
its furthest most western point of 101 kilometres west of its position in 1918. Hereafter it only 
showed a slight eastward movement. By 2007 it was still 96 kilometres west of its position in 
1918. On the north-south plane the area mean centre showed a cumulative northward 
movement of 34 kilometres by 1965 and continued on this trajectory By 1988 it reached its 
furthermost northern point of 60 kilometres north of its position in 1918. It drifted south 
thereafter; by 2007 it reached a point only 20 kilometres north of its 1918 departure point.  
The movement in the production output mean centres showed a similar trend. It reached 
its furthermost western point in 1960 at 73 kilometres west of its position in 1918, and in 1975 
it reached its northernmost point of 75 kilometres north of its position in 1918. By 2007 it settled 
at a point 70 kilometres east and 29 kilometres north of its 1918 departure point. 
Viewed together, the cumulative movement in the area and output mean centres show 
that by 2007 the westward area movement was far greater than the output movement (96 vs 
70). This is the result of the relatively lower yield potential of the drier western production 
regions. On the north-south plane, the difference between the cumulative area and production 
movement by 2007 is far smaller (20 vs 29 kilometres cumulatively). 
Figure 5.4 provides spatial context the discussion above by showing the cumulative 
movement in the area and production mean centres from the 1918 to 1976 and then 2007. 
Between 1918 and 1976 the area and production mean centres moved north-west toward the 
town of Klerksdorp. Their 1976 position brought them close to the geographic centre point of the 
maize triangle. Between 1976 and 2007 they moved south-westward toward the town of 
Bothaville, the so-called maize capital of South Africa.  
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Table 5.5: Movement in the maize area mean centre of selected years, 1918–2007 
 Area movement in kilometres  Output movement in kilometres 
 Easting (+)  Northing (+)  Easting (-)  Northing (-) 
Year Change Cumulative  Change Cumulative  Change Cumulative  Change Cumulative 
1918 - -  - -  - -  - - 
1922 -16 -16  5 5  35 35  15 15 
1930 5 -10  12 18  -15 20  19 35 
1937 -20 -31  -10 8  -21 -1  -15 20 
1946 -11 -41  2 10  -7 -8  24 43 
1950 -10 -52  1 11  -19 -27  -11 32 
1956 -20 -72  16 26  -37 -64  28 61 
1960 -20 -92  7 34  -9 -73  -4 57 
1965 -9 -101  0 34  25 -49  -6 50 
1971 21 -80  12 46  14 -35  10 60 
1976 -11 -91  -6 39  -17 -52  -1 59 
1981 18 -72  11 50  12 -40  15 75 
1983 0 -73  4 54  5 -35  -6 68 
1988 -8 -81  6 60  17 -18  2 70 
1993 1 -79  -9 50  9 -9  -16 54 
2002 -15 -94  -18 33  -56 -65  -10 44 
2007 -2 -96  -12 20  -5 -70  -15 29 
Source:  Authors’ calculation, see text for source. 
Notes:  The change value represents the movement of the maize area and production mean centre to the east (easting) or north (northing), relative to the previous centroid. 
The cumulative value represents the movement of the area and production mean centre relative to 1918. 
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Figure 5.4: Area and production mean centre (MC) movement, 1918, 1976 and 2007 
Source: Own calculations see text 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the maize growing season (November-April) average rainfall per district 
as calculated from the Lynch (2004) rainfall database. It also includes the maize triangle and the 
movement in the area mean centre between 1918 and 2007. It shows that the average growing 
season rainfall decreases from west to east, declining from a high of between 689 to 860 mm per 
season measured around the north-western corner of the maize triangle to a low of between 27 
and 190 mm per season in the western part of the country. With respect to the area mean centre, 
it shows that the western movement between 1918 and 2007 put in a region with a lower 
average growing season rainfall of between 337 to 468 mm, compared to an average of 468 to 
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Figure 5.5: Growing season (November-April) average rainfall (1910-2000) 
Source: Lynch (2004), own calculations 
 
5.4.2 The spatial pattern of (relative) yields  
Maize yields showed almost no change between the two World Wars (1920–1948), growing 
at a comparatively slow rate of 0.7 per cent per year but increased to 3.5 per cent per year from 
1949 to 1981, primarily due to the adoption of hybrid maize. The first thirteen bags of hybrid 
maize were sold in 1949: while slow at first, adoption accelerated in subsequent years to the 
extent that it replaced open pollinated varieties in 1979 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018a). While hybrid 
maize played a major part during this period it also coincided with the adoption of fertiliser, 
chemical weed and pest control measures, (De Klerk, 1983; Liebenberg, 2012; Liebenberg & 
Pardey, 2012) and improved farming practices such as deep tillage and controlled traffic 
cultivation. The third period (1982–1998) saw maize yields continuing to grow but at a slower 
rate, averaging 2.1 per cent per year. Yield growth accelerated to a brisk rate of 3.1 per year after 
deregulation (1999–2015). 
27.1 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5: POLITICS, PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY 102 
 
Figure 5.6 summarises the average yield per district of selected census years using 
smoothed density plots. The census average yield for the year in question is represented by the 
vertical line. Average yields only start their upward trend after the 1950s, but focussing on 
averages obscures inter-district yield differences and their changes over time. Figure 5.6 shows 
that yield densities are positively skewed in all years plotted and are widening over time. 
 
Figure 5.6: Spatial distribution of maize yields, 1918–2007 
Source: Compiled from Union Statistics and Abstracts of Agricultural Statistics, 1960–2009. Values represent average per district 
per decade if multiple censuses were conducted. The average is indicated by the dotted line.  
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5.4.3 Consequences of changing location  
To quantify the productivity changes in response to spatial changes, Beddow and Pardey 
(2013) developed three spatial output indices—area, reallocation and yield—using both a 
Paasche and Laspeyres specification for each index. The calculation of these spatially-specific 
indexes is enabled by the construction of the spatially standardized and balanced panel described 
in Section 5.2.2. The panel is structured such that 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represent vectors of district-specific 
area planted70 and yields for some year 𝑡𝑡. The length of each vector equals the total number of 
districts and is spatially aligned across the vectors, where the 𝑖𝑖-th element indicates the 
corresponding 𝑖𝑖-th municipal district. Therefore, the total production of district 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 is 
represented by 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and the total production nationally in year 𝑡𝑡 is equal to the sum of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖′𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 as 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. 
Using Beddow and Pardey’s (2014) nomenclature, a Laspeyres (𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿) yield index (4) uses base 
period areas to weight both current and base period yields, while the Paasche (𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿) yield index (5) 
uses current period areas to weigh both current and base period yields. 






Intuitively the Laspeyres yield index shows the change in maize output attributable to yield 
changes if the area planted is held constant at base period levels. Similarly, the Paasche yield 
index shows the change in maize output attributable to yield changes but now with current area 
planted as reference. The converse is true with the Laspeyres (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿) and Paasche (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿) area indices 
as shown below, where yield now acts as weight and the area planted can vary. The area indices 
therefore show the changes in production attributable to changes in area if yields are held 
constant, with the Laspeyres (6) and Paasche (7) specifications using the base and current years 











                                                     
70 Area harvested could not be used since it was only sporadically reported. The discrepancy between area planted and harvested 
will be especially large in years with a high rate of crop failures. If average yields are calculated from total production and area 
planted, yields are depressed in general and especially so in below average years.  
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The area indexes cannot be taken at face value, however, since they confound the effect 
of changes in the national area with changes in the relative spatial allocation of production: an 
increase in the national area planted will result in an increase in the area index and vice versa. 
Alternatively, the total area planted could remain the same, but the area planted could be 
reallocated to districts with a higher yield. If the total area under production and the yield vector 
did not change, the reallocation would only be reflected in the area index even though the 
national average yield showed an increase. Since these joint effects can act against each other, 
Beddow and Pardey (2013) propose an alternative specification that separates the scaling effect 
of changes in the total area planted from the spatial reallocation effect, which I am interested in. 
This can be achieved by scaling the Laspeyres (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿) and Paasche (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿) area indexes by the ratio of 
the total area planted nationally during the base year as 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 and the national area planted in year 
𝑡𝑡 as shown in the respective reallocation indices below: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅





𝑃𝑃 = 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 (9) 
The relative spatial reallocation indexes answer slightly different questions from the area 
indexes: The Laspeyres index (𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿) (8) reflects the change in output due to the change in the 
relative spatial allocation of maize area, weighted by base-year yields. The Paasche index (𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿) (9) 
reflects the change in output due to the change in the relative spatial reallocation of maize area, 
weighted by current period (𝑡𝑡) yields.  
The constructed standardized panel does not include observations of area planted and 
production for all districts in all years. Neither maize area planted nor production data were 
reported in 8.4 per cent of the district-years in our panel, and so I took that to indicate maize 
production was absent from those district-years.71 However, if any of these missing or null 
districts report a yield for the base year (in this instance, 1918) of the Laspeyres area index, then 
there is a potential bias introduced into the index since the district in question will be dropped 
from the calculation during all years.72 To avoid this potential problem I estimate a counterfactual 
                                                     
71 It is possible that maize was being produced in a particular district in a particular year but data were withheld for privacy 
reasons. We think that to be unlikely in most of the cases, as only 2 per cent of the district years for which no data were reported 
also failed to report data in either of the adjacent years, or when they did report production, it was trivial, thus indicating they 
are likely to be marginal production district-years where the absence of data indicates the absence of production. 
72 As Beddow and Pardey (2014) explain, the technical reason for this estimation problem is that the numerator in the Laspeyres 
area index involves an inner product of the base-year (1918) area and the yield in any given census year thereafter.  
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yield in those district-years without yield observations, which represents the yield that would 
have occurred had the maize been grown in that district during that year. To do so I used an 
inverse-distance weighted mean function that imputes the missing yield based on the district’s 
three nearest neighbours.  
The spatial yield, area and reallocation indices calculated are shown in Figure 5.6, with the 
solid lines showing the Laspeyres and the dashed lines the Paasche specifications. I use 1918 as 
base year for the sake of simplicity. As expected the yield index starts to increase after 1946 and 
picks up momentum after 1965, given the adoption of hybrid maize. It reaches a local peak (411-
415 per cent above the reference, see Appendix F) in 1981 following above-average yields, 
enabling a record harvest of 14.4 million tons. In 1981, the national average yield was 3.3 ton/ha 
versus an average of 2.1 ton/ha achieved during the preceding five years (1976–1980). The 
decline in the yield index thereafter is the result of consecutive droughts; aggregate production 
declined by 41 per cent (8.3 million tons) between 1981 and 1982 following a below-average 
yield of 1.9 ton/ha and a decline in the area planted of 1.4 per cent. The 1983 drought lowered 
the national average yield to a mere 1.0 ton per hectare, which in combination with a 5 per cent 
area decline, reduced national production by a further 52 per cent to 4 million tons. The drought 
continued in 1984, with production only recovering by 8 per cent to 4.3 million tons following a 
national average yield of 1.1 ton/ha and a 7 per cent decline in the area planted. By 2007 the 
yield index showed a cumulative increase of between 550 and 600 per cent depending on the 
specification. 
The area index increased by 50 per cent between 1918 to the 1930, whereafter it levels off 
until the mid-1940s, only to resume its continued increase to peak in 1981 at almost a 150 per 
cent above the reference. The post-war increase in the area planted was enabled by the rapid 
increase in tractor use. South African farmers had access to just 6 000 tractors in 1937, increasing 
to 20 000 immediately after the war and continuing upward to peak at 174 000 units in 1976 
(Liebenberg 2012). This replacement of animal draught with tractor power enabled farmers to 
both add new land to production and released for crop production the land previously dedicated 
to the production of animal feed (Brand 1969; Van Zyl, Vink & Fényes 1987). The 1981 peak of 
the index does not correspond with the peak in the area planted in 1968 or the 1970 turning 
point of the epochs discussed. One should keep in mind, though, that the area indices confound 
the effect of a change in the total area planted and the spatial reallocation of production between 
districts as discussed. 
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Figure 5.7: Area, reallocation and yield indices, 1918–2007 
Source:  Authors construction. 
Notes:  Note the differing scales in the various panels since this causes the plotted versions of the yield indices to appear 
smoother than the other. 
 
By controlling for the change in the total area planted, the reallocation indices (third panel) 
show the output impact of the spatial reallocation of production. Unlike the yield and area 
indices, the specifications show substantial differences. This suggests that there are marked 
differences if the reallocated areas are weighted by either the base period yields – such is the 
case with the Laspeyres (𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿) specification – or current yields – such is the case with the Paasche 
(𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) specification. The Laspeyres specification shows a relatively small but sustained increase 
(compared to the area and yield indexes), peaking for the first time at 4.5 per cent above the 
base year in 1965, and continued upward thereafter to a high of 6.1 per cent in 2007 (see 
Appendix F).  
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The same cannot be said for the Paasche specification of the index, which shows that the 
area reallocation had a negative impact on output, and by inference productivity, during most 
periods. This is especially true after 1946, apart from a brief jump to 7.8 per cent above the 
reference in 1956, the area reallocation during this period had a negative output impact of 7.9 
per cent relative to the base year in 1965, which peaked at a low of 15.3 per cent below the 
reference by 1993. It recovered thereafter to within 1 per cent of the reference by 2007. 
The intuition of these results can be summarised as follow: if the yield distributions did not 
shift over time as shown in Figure 5.6 but stayed symmetrical to that of 1918, then the 
reallocation of production would have made a positive contribution to output. However, given 
the changes in relative yields, the negative output impact of the reallocation of production areas 
into relatively lower yielding regions increased over time.  
The reallocation index results obtained for the U.S. by Beddow & Pardey (2015) differ 
markedly from this study in two ways. First, they do not find a prolonged divergence between 
respective specifications. Second, they find that the relative spatial reallocation of production 
accounted for between 16 and 21 per cent of the output increase. Seeing that one can argue that 
both countries had access to similar technologies, for example hybrid seed (Chapter 4:), the 
distinguishing difference between the two countries was policy.  
In the South African case the post-1946 decline in productivity because of the area 
reallocation shown by the Paasche specification corresponds with the price and area breaks 
identified in Section 5.3 and centroid movements discussed in Section 5.4.1. For example, the 
1965 decline in spatial productivity of 7.9 per cent below the reference corresponds with the 
maximum area break identified in Section 5.3 and the furthermost cumulative westward 
movement of the area mean centre relative to 1918 as shown in Section 5.4.1. Hence the 
westward expansion into lower yielding areas was at its peak, and this is also reflected in the 
output/productivity penalty because of the spatial reallocation of production. 
Also, the reallocation low point of 15.3 per cent below the base year shown by the Paasche 
index in 1993, straddles deregulation process of maize marketing which was started in 1988 and 
were completed in 1998. While both indices trended upward hereafter, the Paasche index 
showed the greatest gain between 1993 and 2007, since it increased from 15.3 per cent below 
the baseline to just 1.0 per cent below the baseline compared to the increase from 2.9 to 6.9 per 
cent above the baseline shown by the Laspeyres reallocation index. Hence unproductive areas 
were withdrawn from production, thereby increasing the importance of the remaining areas with 
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relatively higher yields. This is also can be explained if viewed in conjunction with the cumulative 
movement in the area mean centres. While the cumulative westward movement into lower 
yielding areas peaked at 101 km in 1965, by 2007 it had only moved 5 km back east to a point 96 
km west of the reference.  
5.5 Conclusion 
During most of the 20th century South African agriculture was subject to a potent package of 
distortionary farm policies that was only dismantled after the mid-1980s. I show that the 
changing orientation of these farm policies had a profound effect on the structure of production 
agriculture in South Africa. 
I start by showing that changes in maize production patterns during the past century exhibit 
a close concordance with the changing nature of distortionary farm polices. Starting in the 1930s 
and tapering by the 1980s, the maize industry enjoyed a golden age of support, in response to 
which the area under production expanded markedly and yield growth took off. This was driven 
in part by the maize marketing interventions that raised the South African price above the 
reference as the price received by U.S. farmers. The gradual removal of support during the 1980s 
coincided with the removal of land from production, to the extent that by 2015 the area had 
returned to the level maintained almost 80 years earlier in 1935, a period before the 
implementation of the various support measures. 
I then continue to estimate the productivity impact of this policy-induced distortion in the 
location of production using our newly compiled spatially disaggregated production data. I show 
that the distortionary policies induced a substantial expansion in the physical footprint of 
production in those areas that had previously supported little (if any) maize production. This 
undermined the environmentally-based spatial comparative advantages of production to reduce 
productivity by 15.3 per cent at its peak in 1993. Once the sectoral support policies were 
removed, not only did the total area contract markedly, but production also largely reverted back 
to the geographical areas with intrinsically higher production (yield) potential. As a result, the 
spatial productivity index to recovered to within 1 per cent of the reference by 2007. But I also 
find a degree of persistence since the spatial productivity of the ‘new’ areas still trailed that of 
the ‘old’ areas by 7.1 per cent. This can be explained by the cumulative movement in the area 
mean centres, which shows that by the end of the period, the area planted almost returned to 
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the 1918 reference on north-south axis but remained close to the western most extreme on the 
east-west axis. 
The persistence of the production in the drier and lower yielding regions can be attributed 
to various factors. One of the principal factors is the state-sponsored hybrid maize breeding 
program, increasingly private after 1965, that prioritized the breeding of drought tolerant hybrid 
varieties. This resulted in a 4.2 fold increase in the yield per unit of rainfall between 1950 and 
1993 (Greyling & Pardey, 2018a). In addition, the persistence was also enabled by research on 
maximising rainfall utilization in dryland agriculture. This included the development of deep 
tillage (400 to 1 200mm) practices and the implementation controlled wheel traffic maize 
production systems with wide maize row widths (1 500 to 2 100mm)73 during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Bennie & Botha, 1986; Bennie, Hoffman & Coetzee, 1995). Another contributing 
factor is the development of infrastructure such grain storage and handling systems; expanded 
road and rail networks; or irrigation systems such as those along the Vaal and Orange Rivers, and 
to a lesser extent the Western and Southern Cape. Government support to the instillation of 
irrigation infrastructure (which was at its zenith in the period 1940–1980, (Van Vuuren, 2010a,b) 
induced a longer- lasting change in the geography of South African maize production, indicating 
that it is not just the amount, but also the form of the support, that has consequences for 
economic activity.  
 
                                                     
73 For comparative purposes 86 per cent of US maize is planted at 762mm with the remainder being planted at between 381 to 
1000mm (Jeschke, 2018) 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation reports the results of an investigation into policy-induced distortions in 
the location of agricultural production in South Africa. The complex interplay between changing 
agricultural policy regimes, agricultural production and productivity, and changes in the spatial 
footprint of production was explored from the perspective of maize, the principal South African 
field crop. A period of more than a century (1904–2015) was covered to encompass a series of 
important changes in the policy regimes affecting the structural transformation of South African 
agriculture. This enabled the estimation of a spatial baseline of maize production before the mid-
1930s, when a series of distortionary farm policies were first implemented. This baseline was 
then used as a comparative point of reference for the subsequent distortionary policies, both 
during their implementation and after they were scrapped. 
6.1 Summary 
There is little (empirically grounded) consensus in the literature on the long-term path of 
planted maize area, output and composition in South Africa. Establishing this empirical 
benchmark was the prime objective of Chapter 2. A new compilation of maize production data 
revealed that South Africa increased its total maize production from 328,000 tons in 1904 to 1.68 
million tons in 1935, and 12.22 million in 2015.74 This 6.1-fold increase in overall maize 
production since 1935 occurred against a 35.7 per cent reduction in the area planted, made 
possible by an 8.6-fold increase in average maize yields. While commercial farmers now produce 
94.6 per cent of the country’s maize crop (on 87.5 per cent of the maize area), that was not 
always the case. In 1942, smallholder farmers–operating in the former homeland areas and 
outside those areas–accounted for 20.6 per cent of production on 40.6 per cent of the planted 
area. With respect to changes in the relative importance of white and yellow maize, the study 
found that although white maize constitutes a significant share of overall production (49.6 per 
cent in 2015), the importance of yellow maize is increasing since yellow maize has outpaced 
white maize in both area planted and yield. 
Building on these new measures of the historical changes in maize production, Chapter 3 
illustrated the complexity of the political tensions that emerged during the structural 
                                                     
74 Five-year average tons centred on 2015. 
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transformation, from the perspective of the maize industry, from the gold discoveries of 1886 up 
to the start of apartheid in 1948 and beyond to the present. To this end it integrated the existing 
literature and supplemented it with newly compiled data. The qualitative institutional (1886-
1948) analysis showed how the converging and diverging interests of groups within the mining 
and agricultural sectors were responsible for a transition process that began with the suppression 
of a large but marginalised group of smaller white and black farmers, to the suppression of mining 
interests and the support for white farmers while continuing to marginalise black farmers. This 
was in line with the emergence of apartheid and set the agricultural policy agenda for the half 
century to come. 
Technological change is an intrinsic feature of the structural changes in the South African 
agricultural economy, as it is with agricultural sectors the world over. Chapter 4 reported the 
results of a study of a quantitative assessment of the adoption of hybrid maize by commercial 
farmers in South Africa. It was found that South Africa’s 20-year lag behind hybrid adoption in 
the United States can be attributed in part to institutional impediments in the hybrid seed 
industry that curtailed private investments, thereby reducing overall R&D spending and slowing 
the rate of adoption. Adoption patterns in South Africa, like the United States, varied widely 
among regions in the timing and rate of hybrid seed adoption. However, in the case of South 
Africa, regional differences in the initial uptake of maize could not be attributed to differences in 
the availability of suitable hybrids—as Griliches (1957) found for the United States—although the 
early stages of adoption did appear to be associated with a period during which the yield 
advantage of hybrids was most pronounced relative to those found on farms, which were 
depressed because of drought. In this respect our findings confirm those that Sutch (2011) 
reported for the United States. I also devised a simple rainfall (partial) productivity index to test 
whether or not the breeding efforts directed at improving the drought tolerance of maize 
varieties planted in South Africa were successful. Juxtaposing maize production data from the 
South African agricultural censuses conducted between 1918 and 1993 against a recently 
developed long-term rainfall database, I estimate that on average the country’s maize yield per 
unit of rainfall increased 4.2-fold between 1950 and 1993.  
Chapter 5 integrated and supplemented the results of the preceding chapters to illustrate 
the complex interplay between policy, production and productivity. The shifting orientation of 
distortionary farm policies showed a close alignment with the increase in maize production and 
price. These distortionary production policies undermined environmental-based spatial 
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comparative advantages by inducing a substantial expansion of the physical footprint of 
production into areas that had previously supported little (if any) maize production. It was 
estimated that this policy-induced shift in the location of production peaked between 1988 and 
1993, when it reduced overall productivity by between 7.9 and 15.3 per cent. The dismantling of 
supportive maize policies during the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a reduction in the area 
planted to maize. By 2015 the overall area planted to maize had returned to the level it had 
reached almost 80 years earlier in 1935, before the supportive measures were implemented. But 
some of the spatial inefficiencies induced by the policies that were terminated in the 1980s 
persisted because some production continued in naturally drier, and hitherto lower-yielding, 
areas because of public investments in drought focussed research and development initiatives; 
and irrigation, grain storage and transport infrastructure. By 2015 the country’s area mean 
centre—effectively the spatial centre of gravity of production—was still at a point to the west 
(the drier side) of the pre-distortion reference (dated 1918). This is also reflected in the spatial 
productivity indexes, specifically those relating to the “new” areas as the Paasche specification 
thereof. These recovered from their 1993 distortionary lows and almost returned to their “pre-
distortionary” levels by 2007 since they recovered to within 1.0 per cent 1918 base year. The 
“old” areas, measured by the Laspeyres specification, showed an increase of 7.1 per cent above 
the 1918 base. This contrasts with the findings of Beddow and Pardey (2015), who showed that 
persistence in the spatial reallocation of U.S. maize production increased national output by 
between 16 and 21 per cent over the course of the 20th century. 
6.2 General comments, contributions and recommendations 
6.2.1 The structural transformation 
One of the primary findings of this study is that the distortionary agricultural policies that 
were enacted in response to political tensions during South Africa’s structural transformation 
prior to the 1950s also distorted the spatial footprint of maize production and lowered 
productivity, and, more importantly, that the spatial distortions and productivity impact thereof 
partially persisted after those policies were removed. This was because, among other things, 
location-specific investments in improving plant material, farming practices and irrigation 
infrastructure made it economically viable to continue producing maize in drier regions where 
previously little or no maize production had occurred. Among the factors that contributed to this 
spatial path dependence were a hybrid maize breeding programme that prioritized improved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 113 
drought tolerance, and the development of improved production practices that increase overall 
rainfall utilisation, such as deep ripping and controlled wheel traffic production systems in wide 
row widths. This path dependence was also strengthened by investments in road, rail and grain 
storage infrastructure, some of which would not have been built in the absence of the 
distortionary policies, but have remained in use after the removal of the policies since they 
lowered production costs to the extent that production in marginal areas remained economically 
viable. The persistence was also likely aided by a learning-by-doing effect, whereby farmers 
gained the necessary experience to increase their productivity sufficiently to offset the reduction 
in support spending and sustain their economic viability in some of the more marginal areas. 
Stated another way, this study found that although South African maize production ended up in 
the wrong places given a suite of distortionary policies, in the end, region-specific investments in 
adapting crops and farming practices, together with investments in grain production and 
marketing infrastructure, made the wrong places more right.  
Binswanger-Mkhize (2014) regarded the structural transformation that have occurred in 
the South African economy as exemplary of a failed case, not least since farm and non-farm 
incomes and productivities have failed to converge after the removal of the distortionary policies. 
He attributed this to the persistence of a dualistic agricultural production system consisting of 
small- and large-scale farmers and the inability of the mining and manufacturing sectors 
to absorb labour. This study provides an example of a physical impediment to the 
convergence of farm and non-farm productivities given the persistence of distortions in the 
location of production that have arisen from the distortionary policies of the past.  
While it is problematic to consider the results obtained for a single crop, specifically maize, 
as being representative of developments pertaining to the entire agricultural (or at least cereal) 
sector, this may be justified in the case of the South African agricultural economy for two reasons. 
First, maize accounts for a significant share of the country’s cereal sector, namely 82.5 per cent 
of the 3.67 million hectares sown to cereal crops in 2015, and 50.6 per cent of the country’s 
cropped area when averaged over the period 1948–2007. Second, almost all the country’s 
agricultural products were affected by the distortionary policies, and thus similar spatial 
production distortions and persistence are likely. The Marketing Act of 1937, together with its 
subsequent extensions, eventually controlled the marketing of 90 per cent of agricultural output. 
If the findings for maize can be thus generalised, then the South African case serves as a 
cautionary example for other transforming countries. While a case may be made for policymakers 
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acting to reduce the magnitude of any farm to non-farm income inequality arising from a 
widening productivity gap between the two sectors as the transformation process proceeds, it 
would be foolhardy to view the use of trade protection or direct price supports as a cost-free rite 
of passage in the development trajectories of all countries, since it carries both short- and long-
term costs. It not only can result in spatial inefficiencies that persist and thus obstruct farm and 
non-farm productivity convergence, but may also divert public finances from alternatives that 
yield a higher long-term return, such as education (see for example Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 
2004), infrastructure (see for example Gramlich, 1994) and agricultural R&D (see for example 
Alston et al., 2010). It may also result in avoidable environmental costs associated with damage 
to natural habitats that would otherwise have not been cultivated. In the South African case, 
most of the additional maize area entailed cultivating grasslands (Palmer & Ainslie, 2005), with 
most of these being returned to planted pastures or grasslands after the removal of the various 
support measures (World Bank, 1994; Breitenbach & Fényes, 2000; Liebenberg et al., 2015). 
However, both international (Török et al., 2011) and domestic (Zaloumis, 2013) studies have 
shown that cultivated grasslands are unlikely to be fully restored to their former state. This is 
particularly relevant from an African perspective since half of the world’s remaining uncultivated 
arable land is in sub-Saharan Africa, and of this 90 per cent is in just nine countries (Deininger & 
Byerlee, 2012). 
The findings of this study are particularly relevant to sub-Saharan Africa since several of its 
countries have pursued or are still pursuing various forms of maize and other marketing 
interventions. At present Mozambique and Uganda are examples of countries whose maize 
market has been comprehensively deregulated and liberalised. They therefore represent 
possible case study sites for testing the findings of this study. Conversely, in Zambia, Malawi, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya, the marketing of maize has only been partially liberalised. In those 
countries the private sector is typically encouraged to participate in the market, but the state is 
also actively involved therein, particularly through export bans, import and export tariffs, 
government directed imports and stock releases (Chapoto & Jayne, 2009). Studies have also 
shown that these mechanisms are exploited by the state for political gains. For example, there is 
evidence that the Zambian Food Reserve Agency, which is responsible for stabilising the maize 
market and maintaining a floor price, purchases 1.5 times more maize during election years 
(Mulungu & Chilundika, 2016). And these interventions are not just leftovers from the past, since 
some scholars are actively promoting their use. For example, Poulton et al. (2006) argue for the 
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institution of an autonomous African agency which would be tasked with maintaining grain prices 
in major markets within a given band, both in and across seasons, thereby increasing price 
stability by levelling the price spikes and dips. Such interventions are doomed, however, since 
they face substantial political pressure to bias the band upward, as happened in South Africa 
before deregulation and is presently happening in Zambia. In addition, policymakers often get 
the setting of the band wrong since agricultural commodity markets are inherently volatile (FAO 
et al., 2011) and lack a long-term trend (Deaton, 1999). 
In countries where distortionary price policies are in place, policymakers should try to 
ensure that spatial distortions are minimised over the short term and do not persist over the long 
term. Possible policy recommendations include strict control over the cultivation of new areasall 
and encouraging farmers to adopt land-saving technologies such as fertiliser, improved seeds 
and irrigation. Furthermore, large public or private investments in permanent grain storage 
infrastructure in marginal production areas should not be encouraged through tax concessions 
or public spending.  
Output per worker need not be increased by temporarily distorting the price of agricultural 
commodities. An alternative strategy would be to increase the output per worker through 
sustained investments in agricultural research and extension in order to facilitate the adoption 
of improved seeds, fertiliser, irrigation and other technologies (Barrett, Christian & Shiferaw, 
2017). The success of this process depends on increasing the integration of the agricultural sector 
into the rest of the economy by improving infrastructure and developing competitive markets 
(Barrett et al., 2017). Improved infrastructure would also give farmers access to foreign markets 
for the excess production and would lower the cost of inputs, especially inorganic fertiliser 
(Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2017).  
Alternatively, the income per household could be increased by changing the commodity 
mix itself by switching from staples to higher-value, often export-oriented, crops. In fact studies 
have found that diversification is the single most important way to reduce poverty for small 
farmers (Dixon, Gulliver & Gibbon, 2001; Pingali, 2004). However, sub-Saharan African 
agricultural exports increasingly face substantial challenges since many countries have large 
populations living far from ocean ports and hence rely on domestic production. In fact, between 
1980 and 2009 more than 80% of sub-Saharan African agricultural output was consumed in the 
country where it was produced, and in landlocked countries this was even greater at 90% (Barrett 
& Upton, 2013).  
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The output per worker can also be increased by pulling them out of agriculture through 
expanding employment in the manufacturing and services sectors. This would have the dual 
effect of stimulating the demand for agricultural produce and increasing the income of 
agricultural workers. However, in sub-Saharan Africa the manufacturing expansion would have 
to take place at an implausibly rapid rate for it to have an effect, given the incoming youth bulge 
(Barrett et al., 2017). This youth bulge offers both an opportunity and a challenge to the region. 
At present half of the population is under 25 years of age and it is projected that between 2015 
and 2035 each year there will be half a million more 15-year-olds than there were the year before 
(Filmer & Fox, 2014).  
6.2.2 Politics, power, location and persistence 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008) argue that while the development trajectory of many 
countries includes frequent changes in political institutions, constitutions or aspects of economic 
institutions, some economic institutions or outcomes can persist despite these changes. 
Examples of such economic institutions include those that govern the enforcement of property 
rights or labour repressive agricultural production systems such as those found in the southern 
US before and after the abolition of slavery. This can also be extended to South African 
agricultural labour relations during the twentieth century. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that 
such economic institutions persist because changes in de jure power following reforms in political 
institutions can be partially or completely counteracted by changes in the de facto power of 
elites. Keeping this in mind, the findings of this study can be viewed somewhat differently but in 
a meaningful way. 
As shown in Chapter 3, South African farmers were successful in increasing their de jure 
political power during the first part of the twentieth century by lobbying the state for various 
supportive agricultural policies. At the same time the de facto power of farmers was also greatly 
increased after the victory of the pro-farmer National Party in 1948. As a result, farmers had 
sufficient political power from the 1950s to the 1980s to apply these policies to their benefit and 
were able to increase their influence in subsequent years. In the case of the maize industry, as 
shown in Chapter 5, this resulted in overproduction, a decline in productivity due to the 
reallocation of production and the distortion of the spatial footprint of production. South African 
commercial farmers lost their de facto political power after isolating themselves from the ruling 
National Party by siding with the Conservative Party in 1983 (Bernstein, 2004), and their de jure 
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power declined following the removal of direct and indirect support measures, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 and 5, which began in 1988 and was completed in 1998.  
This study has, however, shown that the economic impact of the reversal was smaller than 
expected, not because of the interaction between de jure and de facto power, but rather because 
of the persistence of spatial remnants of past power relations. Hence this study identifies a 
second factor that contributes to the persistence of past economic outcomes and explains why 
the effect of de jure reforms is smaller than expected. 
6.2.3 Policy-induced innovation for increasing rainfall use efficiency 
Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1971) contrast US and Japanese agricultural development to 
argue that differences in relative prices, due to differences in factor endowments or changes 
therein, induced a process of directed technical change biased toward saving the limiting factors 
of production. While this hypothesis makes intuitive sense, numerous studies have endeavoured 
to either confirm, extend or criticise it (see Pardey, Alston & Ruttan, 2010 for a summary). Thirtle, 
Townsend and Van Zyl (1998) find that the hypothesis holds for South African agriculture but add 
that it provides an example of a policy-induced innovation, given the bias toward labour-saving 
technical change. They attribute this to agricultural R&D spending in general and the 
incentivisation of mechanisation through tax concessions for machinery purchases and 
subsidised credit. Seeing that they make no mention of the impact of the adoption of hybrid 
maize, it is possible that they overstate the importance of labour-saving mechanical technology 
and understate that of land-saving biological technologies. Olmstead and Rhode (1993), among 
others, also cite these over- and understatements as defects of the standard interpretation of 
the hypothesis in the US case. 
The adoption of land-saving hybrid maize in the South African case would be justifiable 
since the production cost share of land increased throughout the period of hybrid adoption, from 
6.6% in 1948 to a high of 15.5% by the mid-1970s, but declined to a low of 3.0% by 2007 
(Liebenberg & Pardey, 2010). The increase resulted from the capitalisation of the various forms 
of direct and indirect support in land values (Binswanger, Deiniger & Feder, 1993). This would 
suggest that Hayami and Ruttan’s induced innovation hypothesis should be retested for the 
South African case but with the advances in biological technologies considered explicitly. 
The development of technologies that increase the productivity of rainfall, such as hybrid 
maize and special farming practices, such as deep tillage and controlled traffic cultivation, also 
raise an interesting question about the status of rainfall in the induced innovation hypothesis, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 118 
 
and in the greater production and productivity literature. Can rainfall be regarded as an input? 
Rainfall as such does not receive any specific attention in the hypothesis, but Olmstead and 
Rhode (1993) mention the importance of biological investments in enabling ‘dry-farming’, citing 
the example of the development of hard red wheat cultivars that enabled the production of the 
crop in relatively dry states such as Kansas.  
In the case of South Africa, I would argue that rainfall can be regarded as an input, given 
the country’s deliberate investments in rainfall productivity-increasing technologies. The 
resulting technical change, biased towards increasing the amount of maize produced from a unit 
of rainfall, happened in response to an increase in the shadow price of rainfall because of the 
various distortionary policies. 
6.2.4 Location, climate and adaptation 
The South African hybrid maize breeding programme outlined in Chapter 4 provides a 
pertinent example of how drought-focused research efforts can deliver transformative results. 
When climate change is discussed in the context of crop production, it is typically assumed that 
the location of production is fixed and that the climate under which crops are produced changes 
over time. However, a change in the climate under which crops are produced can also result from 
a change in the location of production.  
It can therefore be argued that a change in the location of production can serve as proxy 
for climate change. Thus, the expansion of maize production into marginal lower rainfall 
production areas, and the subsequent R&D investments to generate a sequence of innovations 
biased towards improving rainfall productivity in those regions, offers an example of a successful 
adaptation to a change in climate. Not only can these technologies be applied in regions that are 
becoming drier, they can also serve as an example of how drought-focused research efforts can 
deliver transformative results.  
The finding in Chapter 4 that the relative advantage of hybrid maize is greatest during 
droughts, and that this advantage increases at an increasing rate as yields become more 
depressed, is especially important when devising climate adaptation strategies for smallholder 
farmers. This suggests that the use of hybrid maize should be promoted among smallholder 
farmers, not only to increase overall productivity but also to mitigate climate risk, thereby 
increasing their overall climate resilience and thus food security. This strategy is currently under-
emphasised in the climate change literature. Some studies include it as one of several adaptation 
strategies (see for example Stringer et al., 2009); others disregard it completely (see for example 
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Morton, 2007; Cooper et al., 2008). An notable exception is Hellin et al. (2014), who recommend 
the adoption of heat and drought stress-tolerant improved maize varieties as a means whereby 
smallholders can adapt to climate change. They note that such a strategy is not without its 
difficulties: in Mexico adoption has been low since smallholders prefer their local landraces 
because of culinary, agronomic and cultural considerations. Hellin et al. thus recommend that 
public institutions should focus on both promoting improved maize varieties and improving the 
local landraces. 
6.2.5 Data, measurement and methods 
The techniques applied by this study for measuring the spatial movement and change in 
productivity are relatively simple, but because they are extremely data intensive, preparing the 
data requires a substantial investment in time and effort. For example, the preparation of the 
agricultural census boundaries required for the spatialisation of the data was a major 
undertaking. Not only had the boundaries to be digitised manually, they also had to be cross-
checked against numerous historical maps to ensure the accuracy of the eventual product. In 
addition, the agricultural censuses were not always clear as to which boundaries were used for 
conducting and reporting the census, and hence I had to establish this on a trial and error basis. 
At the same time, the corresponding maize indicators reported in the censuses had to be digitised 
and organised, and numerous reporting inconsistencies had to be addressed. Thereafter the 
district names used in both the district maps and census datasets had to be standardised and 
codified so as to overcome the spelling and name changes that took place during the century. 
Only after the completion of these processes could I join the maize data to the boundaries, after 
which the spatial standardisation techniques were applied and eventually the data was analysed.  
The whole process described above proved to be a good investment since it was relatively 
easy to use the boundaries to spatialise the hybrid maize data and allocate seasonal rainfall to 
districts. Not only will the resulting datasets permit further research, but the digitised census 
boundaries and accompanying index of standardised district names will enable researchers to 
spatialise other indicators as well. 
6.3 Programme of future work 
There are several ways in which the results of this study could be extended and improved. 
The most obvious is to seek other examples of spatial persistence because of distortionary policy, 
for other South African crops, for other countries, such as Uganda and Mozambique, and for Asia 
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and South America. To do this study on a larger scale would require some technical innovation. 
As pointed out above, the techniques it applies are fairly simple but extremely data intensive, 
and the preparation takes considerable time and effort. However, recent advances in machine 
learning and other techniques could be used to automate the manual boundary digitisation that 
was done manually in this study. Such techniques could also be used to speed up the process of 
digitising and organising other historical datasets. Advanced text recognition would be helpful in 
dealing with name changes, identifying inconsistencies and errors, and so on. The technique used 
in this study to disaggregate and re-aggregate the census data according to contemporary 
boundaries, and even the spatial indexing itself, could also be automated. Progress has already 
been made in this respect, with the eventual goal of integrating it as a user-developed tool on 
the G.E.M.S™ platform.75  
The spatial impact of distortionary policies on the use of other inputs such as labour, 
machinery and chemical inputs should also be tested. However, this would require the 
development of an alternative method for the disaggregation and re-aggregation of the census 
data, since the SPAM76 database that I used only covers the major crops and not agricultural 
inputs. Developing and joining such spatially standardised indicators will make it possible to 
estimate multifactor and even total factor productivity indicators, which could further our 
understanding of the spatial impact of policy. It would also make it possible to estimate group- 
and meta-production frontiers in a stochastic framework, as proposed by Huang, Huang and Liu 
(2014). Standardising the labour and machinery data would also make it possible to improve the 
analysis of factor substitution in response to distortionary policy. The decline in South African 
agricultural employment after the mid-1960s was caused largely by policies that promoted 
mechanisation through subsidised credit and tax incentives (De Klerk, 1983; Liebenberg, 2012).  
Further research should focus on improving our understanding of the mechanics of spatial 
persistence, to assist in the formulation of improved policies designed to counteract the spatial 
distortion of production. By highlighting the role of hybrid maize breeding in spatial movement 
and persistence, this study calls attention to the need for more research on drought-optimised 
farming practices and the role of infrastructure in encouraging spatial persistence. With the 
production data in hand, a fairly easy next step would be to test the way South African 
infrastructure developments have shaped the environment-based spatial comparative 
                                                     
75 https://agroinformatics.org/  
76 Spatial Allocation Model, see http://mapspam.info/  
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advantages, especially since the state-sponsored programme of grain silo construction is well 
documented and the location of this infrastructure remains fixed. 
Lastly, there is still more work to be done on the quantitative history of smallholder farming 
in South Africa. While this study has contributed a consistent long-term view of smallholder 
maize output, area planted and yields, little is known about other crops, especially sorghum, 
which was a major smallholder crop during the twentieth century. In addition, the smallholder 
maize production indicators are yet to be spatialised. Future studies should also endeavour to 
improve our understanding of the causes of the yield disparity between commercial farms and 
smallholder farms, especially between homeland and non-homeland smallholders. The smaller 
yield gap between large commercial farmers and non-homeland smallholders suggests that 
positive spill-over effects could have existed between these groups. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Maize output by type of farmer and type of maize 
  All Farmers77   Commercial farmers   Smallholder farmers 
 






Year Maize Maize  Maize White Yellow  Maize Maize Maize 
 1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8 
  3 + 6  4 + 5    7 + 8   
(1000 metric tons) 
1904 328 328         
1911 783 783         
1912 827 827         
1913 873 873         
1914 922 922         
1915 1 019 1 019         
1916 983 983         
1917 1 086 1 086         
1918 1 147 1 147  881    266  266 
1919 1 052 1 055  787    268  268 
1920 1 116 1 124  850    274  274 
1921 1 211 1 211  887    324  324 
1922 1 146 1 234  894    340  340 
1923 1 793 1 649  1 286    363  363 
1924 1 020 930  666    264  264 
1925 2 204 2 045  1 741    304  304 
1926 991 918  697    220  220 
1927 1 656 1 520  1 268    253  253 
1928 1 741 1 601  1 368    233  233 
1929 1 696 1 568  1 259    309  309 
1930 2 024 2 031  1 566    465 139 326 
1931 1 452 1 553  1 249    304 101 204 
1932 1 727 1 845  1 508    337 118 219 
1933 757 806  592    214 50 165 
1934 2 188 2 188  1 683    505 171 335 
1935 1 684 1 684  1 360    323 127 196 
1936 1 359 1 359  1 125    234 122 112 
1937 2 556 2 556  2 078    478 209 269 
1938 1 746 1 746  1 348    398 161 237 
1939 2 633 2 633  2 146    486 218 268 
1940 1 878 1 878  1 533    345 158 188 
1941 2 207 2 207  1 809    398 184 214 
1942 1 482 1 482  1 129    353 115 238 
1943 2 208 2 208  1 781    427 181 246 
                                                     
77 See discussion in Section 2.2 (p. 14) on the reason for the differences. 
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1944 1 667 1 667  1 279    387 135 252 
1945 1 668 1 668  1 349    319 135 184 
1946 1 615 1 615  1 234    381 160 221 
1947 2 227 2 227  1 717    511 221 290 
1948 2 914 2 914  2 314    600 251 349 
1949 1 906 1 906  1 534    372 186 186 
1950 2 704 2 704  2 196    509 246 263 
1951 2 729 2 729  2 306    423 242 181 
1952 1 951 1 951  1 588    363 198 165 
1953 3 063 3 063  2 512    551 292 259 
1954 3 539 3 539  2 977    562 295 267 
1955 3 397 3 397  2 872    525 264 261 
1956 3 391 3 391  2 943    448 287 160 
1957 3 926 3 926  3 308    618 298 320 
1958 3 360 3 360  2 875    486 257 229 
1959 3 765 3 765  3 189    576 286 290 
1960 3 968 3 968  3 450 2 093 1 357  518 247 271 
1961 4 703 4 694  4 094    600 277 323 
1962 5 358 5 346  4 835    511 266 244 
1963 5 467 5 454  4 933    520 242 279 
1964 3 865 3 858  3 424    434 179 255 
1965 4 011 4 010  3 661    349 160 190 
1966 4 478 4 478  4 118    360 150 210 
1967 9 762 9 566  9 080    486 147 339 
1968 4 620 4 620  4 338    282 143 138 
1969 4 529 4 529  4 208    321 123 198 
1970 6 134 6 134  5 814    320  320 
1971 7 199 7 030  6 533 3 692 2 841  497 169 328 
1972 9 525 9 525  9 103    422  422 
1973 4 202 4 490  4 248    242  242 
1974 11 083 11 083  10 610    473  473 
1975 9 139 9 139  8 689    450  450 
1976 7 518 7 548  7 154 3 744 3 410  394  394 
1977 9 793 9 793  9 285    508  508 
1978 10 205 10 205  9 674    531  531 
1979 8 475 8 800  8 340    460  460 
1980 11 040 11 040  10 480    560  560 
1981 14 872 14 872  14 423    449  449 
1982 8 781 8 781  8 262    519  519 
1983 4 399 4 399  4 004    395  395 
1984 4 797 4 797  4 309    488  488 
1985 8 444 8 444  7 909    535  535 
1986 8 600 8 567  7 926 3 449 4 477  641  641 
1987 7 890 7 874  7 071 3 574 3 497  803  803 
1988 7 670 7 647  6 731 3 776 2 955  916  916 
1989 12 481 12 445  11 552 6 366 5 186  893  893 
1990 9 180 9 136  8 343 4 362 3 982  793  793 
1991 8 614 8 573  7 825 3 829 3 996  748  748 
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1992 3 277 3 244  2 956 1 252 1 704  288  288 
1993 9 997 9 963  9 077 4 416 4 661  886  886 
1994 13 275 13 218  12 040 5 732 6 308  1 178  1 178 
1995 4 866 4 836  4 406 2 120 2 286  430  430 
1996 10 171 10 138  9 694 5 836 3 858  444  444 
1997 10 136 10 106  9 582 5 209 4 373  524  524 
1998 7 693 7 665  7 204 4 460 2 744  462  462 
1999 7 946 7 916  7 461 4 601 2 860  455  455 
2000 11 455 11 423  11 001 6 681 4 320  422  422 
2001 7 772 7 745  7 487 4 260 3 227  258  258 
2002 10 077 10 049  9 732 5 537 4 194  317  317 
2003 9 705 9 678  9 391 6 366 3 026  286  286 
2004 9 737 9 710  9 482 5 805 3 677  228  228 
2005 11 749 11 716  11 450 6 541 4 909  266  266 
2006 6 947 6 935  6 618 4 187 2 431  317  317 
2007 7 339 7 339  7 125 4 315 2 810  214  214 
2008 13 164 13 164  12 700 7 480 5 220  464  464 
2009 12 567 12 567  12 050 6 775 5 275  517  517 
2010 13 421 13 421  12 815 7 830 4 985  606  606 
2011 10 924 10 924  10 360 6 052 4 308  564  564 
2012 12 759 12 759  12 120 6 903 5 217  638  638 
2013 12 486 12 485  11 810 5 607 6 204  675  675 
2014 14 925 14 925  14 250 7 710 6 540  675  675 
2015 10 629 10 629  9 956 4 736 5 220  674  674 
Source: Compiled by authors based on sources listed in Appendices C and D. 
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Appendix B: Maize area planted by farmer and maize type 
  All Farmers78  Commercial farmers  Smallholder farmers 
 






Year Maize Maize  Maize White Yellow  Maize Maize Maize 
 1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8 
  3 + 6  4 + 5    7 + 8   
(1000 hectare) 
1904           
1911           
1912           
1913           
1914           
1915           
1916           
1917           
1918    1 789       
1919    1 704       
1920    1 620       
1921    1 544       
1922    1 904       
1923    1 901       
1924    1 565       
1925    2 240       
1926    1 716       
1927    2 101       
1928    1 916       
1929    2 173       
1930    2 589       
1931    2 173       
1932    2 439       
1933    2 458       
1934    2 393       
1935 4 136 4 136  2 404    1 732 371 1 361 
1936 3 295 3 295  2 090    1 205 378 827 
1937 4 313 4 313  2 684    1 629 400 1 229 
1938 4 422 4 422  2 461    1 962 437 1 525 
1939 4 258 4 258  2 674    1 584 403 1 181 
1940 4 091 4 091  2 581    1 511 395 1 116 
1941 4 058 4 058  2 587    1 471 391 1 080 
1942 4 477 4 477  2 360    2 118 357 1 761 
1943 4 577 4 577  2 791    1 785 421 1 365 
1944 5 117 5 117  2 761    2 356 433 1 923 
1945 4 837 4 837  2 970    1 867 439 1 428 
1946 4 698 4 698  2 574    2 124 497 1 627 
                                                     
78 See discussion in Section 2.2 (p. 14) on the reason for the differences. 
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1947 5 259 5 259  2 941    2 318 562 1 756 
1948 5 017 5 017  2 962    2 055 477 1 578 
1949 4 503 4 503  2 801    1 702 505 1 197 
1950 5 008 5 008  3 152    1 856 525 1 331 
1951 4 318 4 318  3 014    1 304 470 834 
1952 4 277 4 277  2 755    1 523 510 1 012 
1953 4 818 4 818  3 136    1 682 542 1 140 
1954 4 943 4 943  3 376    1 567 496 1 071 
1955 5 068 5 068  3 476    1 592 474 1 118 
1956 4 541 4 541  3 396    1 145 492 653 
1957 5 117 5 117  3 468    1 649 464 1 186 
1958 4 806 4 806  3 400    1 407 451 956 
1959 5 294 5 294  3 640    1 654 484 1 170 
1960 5 443 5 443  3 805 2 165 1 639  1 638 426 1 212 
1961 5 281 5 281  3 672    1 609 435 1 174 
1962 5 423 5 423  3 944    1 479 420 1 059 
1963 5 493 5 493  3 931    1 562 395 1 168 
1964 5 588 5 588  4 046    1 543 379 1 164 
1965 5 450 5 450  4 003    1 446 287 1 160 
1966 5 107 5 107  4 241    866  866 
1967 5 274 5 274  4 589    685  685 
1968 5 332 5 332  4 728    604  604 
1969 4 995 4 995  4 205    790  790 
1970 4 583 4 583  4 217    366  366 
1971 4 626 4 626  4 027 2 260 1 767  599 224 375 
1972 4 968 5 113  4 578    535  535 
1973 3 975 4 125  3 611    514  514 
1974 4 820 4 961  4 463    498  498 
1975 4 792 4 910  4 488    422  422 
1976 4 989 5 172  4 548 2 335 2 213  624  624 
1977 4 706 5 011  4 406    605  605 
1978 4 412 4 960  4 361    599  599 
1979 4 566 4 896  4 305    591  591 
1980 4 563 4 915  4 322    593  593 
1981 4 488 4 934  4 338    596  596 
1982 4 664 4 865  4 278    587  587 
1983 4 680 4 623  4 065    558  558 
1984 4 839 4 496  3 953    543  543 
1985 4 502 4 421  3 887    534  534 
1986 4 829 4 716  4 161 2 009 2 152  555  555 
1987 5 063 4 697  4 130 2 318 1 812  567  567 
1988 4 736 4 241  3 729 2 253 1 477  512  512 
1989 4 394 4 327  3 805 2 160 1 645  522  522 
1990 4 163 3 984  3 503 1 965 1 538  481  481 
1991 3 816 3 647  3 207 1 717 1 490  440  440 
1992 4 173 3 966  3 487 1 881 1 606  479  479 
1993 4 377 4 165  3 662 1 984 1 678  503  503 
1994 4 661 4 443  3 906 2 028 1 879  536  536 
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1995 3 526 3 357  2 952 1 401 1 551  405  405 
1996 3 761 3 761  3 307 1 904 1 403  454  454 
1997 4 023 4 023  3 361 1 794 1 567  662  662 
1998 3 560 3 560  2 956 1 797 1 159  604  604 
1999 3 567 3 567  2 905 1 830 1 075  663  663 
2000 4 012 4 013  3 429 2 149 1 281  583  583 
2001 3 189 3 189  2 674 1 562 1 112  515  515 
2002 3 533 3 533  3 017 1 843 1 174  517  517 
2003 3 651 3 651  3 185 2 232 953  466  466 
2004 3 204 3 204  2 843 1 842 1 001  361  361 
2005 3 223 3 223  2 810 1 700 1 110  413  413 
2006 2 032 2 032  1 600 1 033 567  432  432 
2007 2 897 2 897  2 552 1 625 927  345  345 
2008 3 297 3 297  2 799 1 737 1 062  498  498 
2009 2 896 2 896  2 428 1 489 939  469  469 
2010 3 263 3 263  2 742 1 720 1 023  521  521 
2011 2 859 2 859  2 372 1 418 954  487  487 
2012 3 141 3 141  2 699 1 636 1 063  442  442 
2013 3 238 3 238  2 781 1 617 1 164  457  457 
2014 3 096 3 096  2 688 1 551 1 137  408  408 
2015 3 048 3 048  2 653 1 448 1 205  395  395 
Source: Compiled by authors based on sources listed in Appendices C and D. 
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Appendix C: Output data sources 
 Maize output - All farmers 
# Year Source Location 
1 1904 Saunders (1930) Table 4, p.28 
2 1911-1949 Agricultural Censuses as reported in Farming South Africa by Vorster (1952) Table 1, p.173 
3 1950-1954 1950-1954 
Census Summary report, Union of South Africa (1957),  
Agricultural Censuses compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012) Table C3, p.15 
4  1955-1971 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
5 1972-present Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, SAGIS, FAO (1970-2006)*  
    
 Maize output - Commercial farmers 
6 1911-1949 Agricultural Censuses as reported in Farming South Africa by Vorster (1952) Table 1, p.173 
7 1950-1954 Census Summary report, Union of South Africa (1957)  Table C3, p.15 
8 1955-1985 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
9 1986-present Sum of White and Yellow Maize according to SAGIS (2018)  
    
 Maize output – Commercial farmers: White and Yellow 
10 1960,1971,1976 Agricultural Censuses  
11 1986-1988 Breitenbach & Fényes (2000) Table A2, 310-311 
12 1989-present SAGIS (2018)- Grain SA (2018b)  
    
 Maize output – Smallholders outside of homelands 
13 1918-1971 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
    
 Maize output - Smallholders in homelands 
14 1918-85 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012)  
15 1986-present SAGIS (2018) - Grain SA (2018b)  
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes: *FAO (2017) excluded smallholder production from their reported totals beginning in 2007. 
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Appendix D: Area planted data sources 
Maize area planted - All  
# Year Source Location 
1.1 1911-1949 Vorster (1952)  Table 1, p.173 
1 1911-1971 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012)  
2 1972-present Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, SAGIS (2018), FAO (1970-2006)* 
 
    
Maize area planted - Commercial Farmers 
3 1911-1936 Agricultural Censuses as compiled and processed by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
4.1 1911-1949 Vorster (1952) Table 1, p.173 
4.2 1920-1936 SAGIS (2018)  
5 1937-1985 Agricultural Censuses as compiled and processed by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
6 1986-present 
Sum of White and Yellow Maize according to SAGIS (2018), Grain SA 
(2018b) 
 
    
Maize area planted - Commercial - White and Yellow 
7 1986-1988 Breitenbach & Fényes (2000) Table A2, 310-311 
8 1989-present SAGIS (2018), Grain SA (2018b) 
 
    
Maize area planted - Smallholders on White Farms 
9 1935-1971 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012)  
    
Maize area planted - Smallholders in Reserves 
10 1935-65 Agricultural Censuses as compiled by authors and Liebenberg (2012) 
 
11 1966-present SAGIS (2018), Grain SA (2018b) 
 
 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes: *FAO (2017) excluded smallholder production from their reported totals beginning in 2007. 
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 𝑏𝑏4  𝑏𝑏5  𝑏𝑏6 




0.02   (0.03) 




0.06   (0.04) 



















0.02   (0.02) 









0.01   (0.02) 
Notes:  Signifiance codes:  0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 
 + Included the Western Free State 
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Appendix F: Index values 
 
 Laspeyres  Paasche 
Year  yield area reallocation  yield area reallocation 
 
IYL 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿  𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 
(index value, 1918 = 100) 
1922  100.7 105.1 101.0  96.5 100.8 96.9 
1930  124.1 146.2 101.0  121.6 143.2 99.0 
1937  158.5 152.7 101.8  154.5 148.8 99.2 
1946  97.1 147.6 102.6  94.9 144.2 100.3 
1950  146.7 180.0 102.2  138.5 170.0 96.5 
1956  163.3 195.5 103.0  171.0 204.6 107.8 
1960  183.2 221.5 104.1  176.9 213.8 100.5 
1965  201.7 233.8 104.5  177.7 206.0 92.1 
1971  351.5 231.7 103.0  320.0 211.0 93.8 
1976  365.0 240.4 103.1  337.8 222.5 95.4 
1981 514.4 245.1 102.6  511.5 243.7 102.0 
1983  244.1 238.3 102.7  227.5 222.1 95.8 
1988  438.9 219.7 101.8  376.7 188.6 87.3 
1993  282.2 209.9 102.9  232.2 172.7 84.7 
2002  655.6 104.2 105.5  600.9 95.5 96.7 
2007  701.2 127.5 106.1   654.1 118.9 99.0 
Source: Calculated using the data described in the text. 
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